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I am greatly indebted to several people and organizations for their help in writing the 
following thesis.  Although the challenge of completing this f inal task towards my 
Master’s degree was never simple, it was made much more so by the help of my 
committee, peers, and family.  Perhaps it is the high quality of their advice and friendship 
that makes thanking them my most difficult challenge.   
In summer 2003, I collected nearly all the original source documents during a four-
week research trip to St. Charles, Missouri.  Funding for my trip came from two sources: 
The Greater Saint Charles Convention and Visitors Bureau, and the Sons and Daughters 
of Pioneer Rivermen who administer the J. Mack Gamble Fund.  I cannot express enough 
thanks to either organization for making possible my first independent research endeavor.  
I hope they find their investment well served.  
While in Missouri, I relied on the expertise of archivists and librarians at the Saint 
Charles County Historical Society, the Missouri Historical Society, the Western 
Historical Manuscripts Collection, and the St. Charles City-County Public Library–
Kathryn Linnemann branch.  At each place, I found people with a deep passion for 
history and with a friendly patience to answer all my questions.  They made Missouri’s 
past both accessible and a delight to study.  I would likely to personally thank Carolyn 
Roth of the Saint Charles County Historical Society for continually offering her precious 




Charles’s forefathers and mothers alive, and she is truly one the town’s favorite 
daughters. 
Each of my committee members provided an incredible amount of advice, 
encouragement, and motivation.  My director, Larry Babits pushed me harder than I ever 
expected.  He expects only good work and because of this he gets the best work out his 
students.  I am truly indebted to him for his motivation and commitment.  Will Lass is a 
professor emeritus of history with Minnesota State University–Mankato.  His expertise 
and comments greatly improved the accuracy of my work and expanded my 
understanding of the nineteenth-century Missouri Valley.  Don Parkerson’s comments 
were equally valuable and his assistance is much appreciated.  Carl Swanson’s 
remarkable knowledge of colonial history was absolutely invaluable. Besides being a 
master educator of the colonial era, Carl is brilliantly skilled at teach ing the mechanics of 
constructing sound arguments vital to the sophisticate craft of history.   He is a doctor in 
the fullest sense of the word.   
When I began writing my thesis Annalies Corbin served as my director.  Towards the 
end of the process, the PAST Foundation needed her full attention and she made the 
difficult decision to retire from her professorial position at East Carolina University.  Her 
move gave me the opportunity to have two of the best directors ECU has to offer.  It also 
made me appreciate her guidance in a new light because her commitment to my 
education remained unaffected.   
Nearly everything I learned at ECU seems to be rooted in Annalies’s mentorship.  




details of steamboats wrecked in the Missouri River.  She taught me how to navigate the 
bureaucratic web of the National Archives as well as the broken bits of shipwrecks 
beneath the waves.  Of all the countless lessons Annalies taught me, in and out  the 
classroom, I find myself continually returning to the lessons she taught me through her 
example.  In the past few years, I have taught archaeological methods in several field 
schools.  Whenever I have difficulty reaching a student or making a tough de cision, I find 
myself wondering how Annalies would handle the situation.  All I have to do is pattern 
my teaching style on her patience, caring, and attention to detail, and the situation is 
resolved.  Every time I practice her example, I find my students become confident, 
excited, and top-notch archaeologists.  She is my mentor and my compass; for this reason 
I will always be her student.  
I would also like thank my friends at ECU: Heather, Holly, Jackie, Sam, and Drew.  
They were always available for encouragement, venting, or harmless debauchery.  I 
would especially like to thank Josh Howard for being a better historian than me, but 
never pointing it out.  I also thank him for proving that the fraternity of Southern 
gentlemen is thriving in our generation, and that it has enough room for a damn Yankee 
like me. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for giving me the confidence to move far 
from home for my education.  I especially thank my grandparents George and Irene 
Divizio for whom this thesis is dedicated.  I also thank my aunt Carol and uncle Joe, my 




indebted to them for creating every good quality I posses and for exemplifying all the 
ones I pray for courage to display. 
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The following thesis explores the influence of the transportation revolution in early to 
mid-nineteenth-century St. Charles, Missouri.  The complexity of the transportation 
revolution is first considered on a broad, national scale. It is then described on a narrower 
regional scale in the Missouri River Valley. It is finally examined on the narrowest, 
possible scale of specific interactions between St. Charles businessmen and their 
associates in several locations.   
This thesis argues that the transportation revolution altered the way in which 
individuals perceived St. Charles’s location on the Missouri River. Prior to the 
transportation revolution, St. Charles benefited by being the closest river town to St. 
Louis, Missouri.  As steamboat technology adapted to the hostile conditions of the 
Missouri River, outpost towns west of St. Charles gained favor with St. Louis merchants.  
These newly found and lucrative connections between the metropolitan St. Louis 
community and the former Missouri hinterlands were possible only after advancements to 
transportation technology.  Although the transportation revolution brought sweeping 
changes to the Missouri River Valley, it was ultimately the fine scale interrelationships 







In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner presented a critical paper on the process of frontier 
colonization.
1
  Turner characterized the early nineteenth century as the beginning of  the 
“new West.”  The break between the new and old occurred immediate ly after the War of 
1812.  George Rogers Taylor identified this period was identified as the “Transportation 
Revolution.”
2
  Taylor credited the rapid technological improvements to ground and water 
transportation as the distinctive trait in nineteenth-century America.  During this period, 
goods moved across the country at exponentially faster speeds, while dramatic decreases 
in transportation costs changed the nature of trade in the West.  Although Turner agreed 
with Taylor on the rapid changes after 1812, his characterization of the new West was a 
bit more theatrical than Taylor’s.  For Turner,  
There had been a West even in early colonial days; but then it lay close to the coast.  
By the middle of the eighteenth century the West was to be found beyond tide -water, 
passing toward the Allegheny mountains.  When this barrier was crossed and the 
lands on the other side of the mountains were won, in the days of the Revolution, a 
new and greater West, more influential on the nation’s destiny, was created.  The men 
[and women] of the “Western Waters” or the “Western W orld,” as they loved to call 
themselves, developed under conditions of separation from the older settlements and 
from Europe.  The lands, practically free, in this vast area not only attracted the 
settler, but furnished opportunity for all men to hew out their own c areers.  The 
wilderness ever opened a gate of escape to the poor, the discontented, and the 
oppressed.  If social conditions tended to crystallize in the East, beyond the 
Alleghenies there was freedom.
3
 
                                                       
1
 Frederick J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Annual 
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893 (1894): 199–227. 
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 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860 (White Plains, 
NY, 1951).  
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Turner’s students labeled his central argument as the  “frontier hypothesis.”
4
  Also 
referred to as the frontier thesis, it laid the foundation for his views on the distinctiveness 
of nineteenth-century American society.  Originally, Turner stated “the existence of an 
area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement 
westward, explain American development.”
5
  He later expanded his definition of the 
process as  
 
Thus western occupation advanced in a series of waves: the Indian was sought by the 
fur trader; the fur trader was followed by the frontiersmen, whose cattle exploited the 
natural grasses and the acorns of the forest; next came the wave of primitive 
agriculture, followed by more intensive farming and city life.  All the stages of social 
development went on under the eye of the traveler as he passed from the frontier 
towards the East.  Such was the process which was steadily pushing its way into the 




Turner’s argument hinged on two key characteristics of frontier settlement .  First, he 
believed that colonization events began when bold-spirited citizens felt constricted in 
overcrowded settlements.  Urban areas, in particular, limited the econom ic opportunities 
for people of meager resources.  These disadvantaged individuals f elt marginalized and 
eventually were pushed out of settled civilization.  Among this group emerged the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Historical Review 11 (Jan., 1906): 303. 
 
4
 Ray Allen Billington, “Frederick Jackson Turner: The Image and the Man,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly  3 (Apr., 1972): 137–152; idem, “Frederick Jackson Turner 
Visits New England: 1887,” New England Quarterly 41 (Sep., 1968): 409–436; idem, 
ed., The Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of American History?   (NY, 1966); John 
Lauritz Larson, “Grasping for the Significance of the Turner Legacy: An Afterword,” 
Journal of the Early Republic 13 (Summer, 1993): 241–249. 
 
5
 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier,” 199.  
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frontiersmen who made the first forays into unsettled places.  Turner credited the 
American frontier spirit to the enormous land reserves of the western hemisphere.  Unlike 
Europe, settled for millennia, the American wilderness provided countless opportunities 
for experimenting with new modes of living.  In this laboratory, a new type of society 
emerged, one that was radically different from its ancestral home.    
Second, Turner argued that the original impetus for frontier colonization ensured its 
replication.  As the first wave of settlers entered the frontier, they maintained ties with 
their homeland.  Still dependent on the material products of civiliza tion, pioneering 
settlers extracted wilderness resources valued in homeland trade.  Soon the frontier’s 
allure for quick profits pulled in a second wave of settlers.  This group adapted the towns, 
governments, and institutions of the home nation leaving only faint, superficial traces of 
their original ancestry.  The subsequent population swells eventually limited 
opportunities for underprivileged members thereby pushing out a new generation of 
frontiersmen.  Turner believed this process continued until all uninhabited land was 
settled.  In 1890, the US Census Bureau proclaimed the American frontier officially 
closed.
7
  For Turner, the census bureau’s proclamation signaled the end of the frontier as 
both a process and a crucible for the American spirit.   
Turner’s frontier hypothesis became shorthand for the “safety valve” effect of 
colonization.
8
  Turner and his followers initially theorized that economic depressions 
made unsettled frontiers attractive to marginalized individuals.  What these frontiersmen 
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lacked in fiscal resources, they made up in grit, gumption, and bravado.  Turner described 
them as 
 
With his rifle he eked out his sustenance, and the peltries furnished him a little “ready 
cash.”  His few cattle grazed in the surrounding forest and his hogs fed on its mast. 
The backwoodsmen of this type represented the outer edge of the advance of 
civilization.  Where settlement was closer, co-operative activity possible, and little 
villages, with the mill and retail stores, existed, conditions of life were a meliorated, 
and a better type of pioneer was found…. But the frontiersmen proper constituted a 
moving class, ever ready to sell out their clearings in order to press on to a new 
frontier, where game more abounded, soil was reported to be better, and where the 





Unsurprisingly, the nation’s leading outdoorsman, President Theodore Roosevelt 
applauded Turner’s findings crediting him for striking “some first class ideas which  
[have] been floating around rather loosely.”
10
  Since then, scholars across disciplines 
have debated Turner’s original thesis.  The first criticisms leveled against Turner came 
from scholars allied with Herbert Baxter Adams who traced back the foundations of 
American society to medieval Germany where they believed individualism and 
industriousness were founded.
11
  For them, Americans inherited too many intellectual, 
political, and social characteristics from Europe to be passively dismissed.  Others like 
them attacked the safety valve effect by demonstrating that frontier expansion occurred 
during times of economic growth, rather than depressions.  Additionally, colonizers 
                                                       
9
 Turner, “The Colonization of the West,”  315. 
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 Quoted in Billington, The Frontier Thesis, 2.  Although Billington did not provide 
the original source for this quote, it was a reasonable statement based on the common 
caricature of Roosevelt.  
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generally possessed more capital and less self sufficiency than Turner suggested.  Stil l 
others came to regard Turner’s statements as overly simplistic and ignorant of indigenous 
New World cultural contributions to “American” society and European -American 
women.
12
  During the mid- twentieth century, a group of scholars revitalized Turner’s 
hypothesis.
13
  They pointed to Turner’s reluctance to make definite statements.  These 
new proponents highlighted the hypothetical basis of Turner’s observations and reiterated 
his call for testing those insights.  After all, no one could dispute the United States’ 
unparalleled expansion in modern times or its populist sentiments for isolation from 
Europe.  These characteristics, proponents argued, had to have profound effects on both 
the US and the entire modern world.  In a sense, then, Turner’s greatest lega cy to 
American history was not the answers he tentatively provided but the endurance of the 
questions he posited.  Perhaps the most critical advance by Turner’s followers was the 
realization that his frontier hypothesis (although focused on US expansion) w as actually 
part of the larger spread of the modern world.  Historian William Cronon eloquently 
captured Turner’s legacy in the following:  
 
The greatest attraction of the frontier thesis has been its simplicity and its sense of 
movement, its ability to shape and set in motion so many of the mere facts that 
American historians need to narrate .  It supplies at least a rhetorical connection 
                                                       
12
 Wilbur R. Jacobs, “Turner's Methodology: Multiple Working Hypotheses or Ruling 
Theory?” Journal of American History 54 (Mar., 1968): 853–863; Glenda Riley, 
“Frederick Jackson Turner Overlooked the Ladies,” Journal of the Early Republic 13 
(Summer, 1993): 216–230. 
 
13
C. Vann Woodward, The Comparative Approach to American History  (New York, 
1968); Ray Allen Billington, The American Frontier: Attack and Defense (Washington 
DC, 1958); William Cronon, “Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of 




between those facts, and that connection in turn supplies the larger sense of order and 





Agreeing with Cronon, frontier processes are viewed here as united scalar 
phenomena, occurring globally as well as locally.  In many respects the following thesis 
continues Turner’s legacy.  It asks how residents of the lower Missouri Valley, especially 
those of St. Charles, Missouri, engaged the global spread of the modern world with local 
alterations in transportation, production, and personal interactions.  Because this study 
focuses on mid-nineteenth-century US history, I will draw parallels between that period 
and those of the English/British colonial experience in North America.  Although I 
remain cognizant of influences from non-British Europeans and Native Americans, I 
must set practical limits and make some difficult omissions.  But with my  staring point 
set, how do I begin?  
Chapter one sets the foundation for understanding the spread of the modern world.  It 
begins by assessing the factors colonial economic historians have incorporated into their 
analyses.  It then moves to general theories of modern development to highlight key areas 
and relationships where change occurred.  Then it moves to the particular pattern in 
colonial economic history.  These particular events establish themes  discussed throughout 
the following thesis.  
Chapter two carries the theme of transportation.  It uses George Rogers Taylor ’s 
terminology to argue that a “Transportation Revolution” began after the War of 1812 and 
brought rapid economic changes throughout the United States.  These changes are 
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discussed first on the national scale, then on the western regional scale, and then on the 
lower-Missouri Valley scale.  The large scale developments that occurred across the 
country created countless opportunities for economic change in several regions.  Of 
particular note, the activities of early St. Louis businessmen demonstrated how they 
learned to operate in an economy distinct from their eastern contemporaries.   
Chapter three examines the expansion of US transportation and economy on the 
regional level of St. Louis and the Missouri Valley.  During the 1830s, St. Louis became 
the commercial emporium of the West.  Businessmen like the Filley brothers and J. R. 
Stanford bridged the gap between the older frontier economy of St. Louis and a 
transforming modern one.  They could not easily conduct a cash-only business, but found 
a way to ship western products with cash values to the East.  While transportation 
allowed men like the Filleys and Stanford to coordinate their businesses between the East 
and the West, it had a different impact on smaller markets like St. Charles.  
Chapter four explores the growing primacy of credit and cash in St. Charles business.  
As transportation brought western Missouri in from the frontier,  however, later St. 
Charles businessmen had a narrower range of opportunities.  The increase in steamboats 
on the river lim ited St. Charles merchant George W. Garriott’s options for transportation, 
ultimately giving him few choices other than to become both a flour miller and a 
steamboat owner.  St. Charles’s location created an unexpected irony.  Although it was 
the closest Missouri River town to St. Louis, it increasingly became last in line for 





Chapter five demonstrates that the manner in which Garriott secured capital to 
construct his own steamboat linked him to St. Louis in unexpected ways.  While the 
reliability of his Steamboat Fayaway gave him freedom from unruly boat captains and 
upriver wheat markets, it tethered his interests to his investors in St. Louis.  By the time 
he restructured his business to generate large cash revenues, the trappings of earlier debts 
caught up to Garriott.  He sold the Fayaway and his partners abandoned the operations 




I.  SCALING THE MODERN WORLD  
 
The following chapter steps back from the specifics of Turner’s frontier hypothesis, 
but attempts to set the foundation for applying his general understanding of a united 
colonization process from the seventeenth through the nineteenth century.  This is 
undertaken by first exploring the analyses of colonial historians, second by moving to 
general modern world theories, and finally by returning to specific circumstances of 
North American colonization.  These seventeenth- and eighteenth-century traits will be 
shown as common factors in the development of the nineteenth-century lower Missouri 
Valley as well as St. Charles.  This thesis contends that influential economic 
developments in colonial North America appeared in the nineteenth -century West and 
influenced a similar pattern of internal change.  That argument begins here.  
In 2000, colonial economic historians honored the career of Jacob Price.
1
  Throughout 
his career, Price crafted detailed analyses for the early-modern economies of Great 
Britain and its North American colonies.  In a more general sense, Price revealed the 
magnitude of those early economies.  He indicated the extent to which Europeans spread 
a web of influence across the globe.  Price’s intimate knowledge of colonia l trade 
networks instilled a sense of enormity for the scale at which historians must operate.  As 
an example, he articulated the far-reaching parameters necessary for examining North 
American colonial wheat staples.  As a caveat against narrowly focused research, Price 
explained that “a comprehensive study of the North Atlantic wheat trade in the second 
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half of the eighteenth century must include, in addition to American production, exports, 
and prices, a discussion of European states, and some appreciatio n of the significance of 
the Russian conquest of the southern Ukraine and the opening of the Black Sea to 
international trade.”
2
  Price was not only interested in scale from a geographic sense, but 
also from an economic one.   
Price noted the increased scale of economic activity among American and British 
firms during the late eighteenth century.  For instance, two of the largest London tobacco 
traders in 1775 imported more tobacco than over one hundred traders had in the 1660s.
3
  
Price accounted for these radical jum ps in trade volume from two sources.  First, because 
most markets were easy to enter but difficult to endure, only a small percentage of firms 
maintained a good reputation and high credit rating.  
4
 These firms, in turn, used their 
reputation as leverage for credit and for trading on their bills of exchange.  Second, firms 
with greater access to credit gained control over shipping arrangements.  As their 
purchasing power increased, reputable firms moved entire shiploads of goods.  They 
could then charter vessels to sail according to the firm’s schedule.  A steady supply of 
credit and dependable shipping, therefore, gave high volume trading firms an advantage.  
As a result, smaller firms “importing a quarter-shipload of sugar or tobacco had little 
                                                       
2
 Jacob M. Price, The Atlantic Frontier of the Thirteen American Colonies and States: 
Essays in Eighteenth Century Commercial and Social History ,  Collected Studies Series 
(Brookfield, Vt., 1996), 24. 
 
3
 Ibid., 38. 
 
4
Ibid, 18–42; Jacob M. Price, “The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco 
Trade, 1707–1775,” William and Mary Quarterly , 3rd Ser. 11, Scotland and America 





room to maneuver and usually had to accept the added costs of long delays.” 
5
  Price 
devoted many years of careful analysis of the tobacco trade and Glasgow’s mid -
eighteenth-century rise over cities like London, Bristol, and Liverpool.  Even in his 
preliminary analysis, Price underscored the primary reason for Glasgow’s rise when he 
stated that “first place must be given to credit.”
6
  
Increased credit lines extended to British exchange houses produced a corresponding 
rise in colonial economic activity.  Price made clear that tobacco produced more profit 
than any other colonial export.  The second most valuable commodity, however, was 
“invisible earnings.”  Invisibles were activities related to service industries of Atlantic 
shipping.  These services, also referred to as spin-of industries, comprised mainly of 
shipping, commission on freight purchases, storage and sales, as well as marine 
insurance.  Historians James F. Shepard and Gary Walton provided careful estimations 
for the value of colonial “invisible earnings” to demonstrate that these services relieved 
62 percent of colonial trade deficit with Great Britain.
7
  By examining the role of these 
intangible commodities, Shepard and Walton explained how the middle and New 
England colonies experienced substantial economic gains even though their agricultural 
exports cost less than the value of their European im ports.
8
 
From Price’s work is gained a sense for both the physical and econom ic scales 
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6
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7
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necessary to understand modern development.  Price directed the bulk of his long career 
towards synthesis of just one aspect in this undertaking.  Although, putting Price’s advice 
to practice is difficult, it is possible in a manageable way.  The following chapter 
examines general theories concerned with modern world deve lopment as a means to 
understand and unite colonial history and Western North American history.   
First, I must turn our attention to general theories of modern development.  These 
theories identify sets of important variables to test in specific situation s.  Second, I must 
look to other scholars who placed these theories into practical use.  Third, I must confine 
my geographic scale in a manageable way.  This is accomplished by limiting parallels to 
the Missouri Valley to those of British colonial North Am erica.  Once these three steps 
are taken, I can then approach the lower Missouri Valley with a clearer sense of what will 
inform us about its position during the spread of the modern world.  
Economist Karl Marx viewed the modern world’s emergence as  an abrupt departure 
from past life ways.  Marx defined historic episodes on the presence of temporally 
specific “modes of production.”
9
  Overly simplified, a mode of production encompassed 
the methods and human relations determining how products were manufactured , labor 
was controlled, and profits were distributed.  Inequality in the latter two especially caused 
tensions between classes.  The tension, in turn, caused conflict resolved only by the 
                                                       
9
Thomas C. Patterson, Marx’s Ghost: Conversations with Archaeologists (Oxford, 
UK, 2003); W illiam Roseberry, “Understanding Capitalism – Historically, Structurally, 
Spatially,” in Locating Capitalism in Time and Space: Global Restructuring, Politics, 
and Identity, ed. David Nugent (Stanford, Calif., 2002), 61–79; idem, “Marx and 
Anthropology,” Annual Review of Anthropology  26 (1997): 25–46; idem, “Political 





emergence of a revolutionary mode of production.
10
  Tension, conflict, and revolution, 
therefore, formed the cycles of cultural change.  Each new historic era for Marx 
represented a completely new kind of lifestyle.  When new eras arose, the subsequent 
upheaval was dramatic and easily recognized.  Whether I disagree with Marx’s view 
concerning historical eras, I must appreciate his elucidation of critical variables important 
to the shaping of the modern world.  With Marx, I can identify a truly unique historical 
transition by using his predictions to pinpoint important changes in human relationships.  
Roughly, my concern is changes in how people made things and who benefited most 
from their making.  Marx, however, was not a scholar interested in the developing 
modern world.  
Like Turner, other scholars linked western colonization to broader developments in 
European history.  Historians of the Annales School, most notably Fernand Braudel, took 
a much larger view of the past than did Turner.  Braudel focused his efforts on analyzing 
the totality of the modern world.  Like Turner,  he believed that population growth 
contributed to a “differential geography of globe.”
 11
  He also saw the development of the 
modern world as a process structuring relationships between geographically separate 
populations.  Braudel credited limit economic opportunity in European cities for 
contributing to population expansion.  He argued, however, that Europe’s rising merchant 
class engineered expansion to subvert ruling elites’ influence within traditional political 
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borders.  From either scholar’s view, pr ivileged members in European society determined 
the geographic setting of frontier colonization as well as conditions for the colonial 
relationship.   
Political scientist Immanuel Wallerstein built on Braudel’s concepts to formulate his 
theory of modern world systems.
12
  He saw the modern world as a product of the 
capitalist world system, which originated in fifteenth-century Italian city states.  Like 
Turner, he recognized the need for sustained relationships between a frontier and the 
home nation.  For Wallerstein, asymmetrical trade relationships led to differential control 
of wage labor.  Because the home nation’s merchants provided capital for frontier 
expansion, they determined the function of colonial ventures.  Additionally, these 
individuals owned processing facilities for converting frontier materials into finished 
goods destined for colonial consumption.  As a result, the merchant class exerted 
considerable influence over raw material value and ensured higher prices for finished 
goods.  The merchant class efforts to determine colonial functions also created a distinct 
structural appearance across global settlements.  Wallerstein indicated three basic areas in 
the world system structure.  The “core” served as the physical setting for manufacturing 
and distributing finished goods.  It was also the seat of economic power that shifted 
between political borders.  These shifts occurred in cycles throughout history and were 
characterized by such events as the dim inishing importance of Amsterdam’s stock 
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exchange in preference for London’s during the mid-nineteenth century.
13
  Although 
these shifts carried political ramifications and were, in part, influenced by political 
leaders, Wallerstein successfully argued for the modern world’s unique ability to move 
capital freely across nations at the behest of private investors.   
The “periphery” provided raw materials and labor to extract them.  This area often 
characterized colonial settlements.  Importantly, its products were routinely valued lower 
than those of the core.  Because peripheral members did not supply capital for colonial 
ventures, they remained indebted to, and dependent on, outside investors.  This 
dependency laid the foundation for unequal negotiating power in trade.  
Between the two areas, the “semi-periphery” served as an intermediary between the 
core and periphery.
14
  This was the location where raw materials were collected for 
shipment to the core and where finished products were redistributed to disperse d 
peripheral locations.  The semi-periphery also acted as a sort of middle management for 
home nation policies and institutions.  Often these areas were colonial capitals or other 
hubs of industry and trade.
15
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Anthropologist Eric Wolf also saw the spread of the modern world emanating from 
European developments.
16
  Differing from Wallerstein’s focus on trade relations, Wolf 
placed primacy on production relations.  He agreed with Wallerstein’s assertion that the 
spread of the modern world corresponded with the ascendancy of capitalism.  Wolf 
placed the transition to capitalism, however, at a more recent date.  For Wolf, capitalism 
came to dominate global events when the Industrial Revolution removed production from 
households to large mechanized factories.  As individual family units produced fewer 
products in their homes, they lost control over their labor.  Wolf documented this 
transition in early nineteenth-century Great Britain.  Prior to the Industrial Revolution, 
textile merchants operated a “putting out system ,” in which they provided households 
with wool or cotton raw materials for yarn and cloth production.  This system allowed 
households to control their pace of work as leverage in determining the value of labor.  
Mechanization, however, moved production to specialized factories where merchants 
controlled the pace of work.  In addition, the move away from household production to 
mechanical devices decreased the human energy needs for manufacturing.  This reduction 
devalued household labor and created tension between factory workers and owners.
17
   
Although similar linkages existed between Turner’s description of frontier processes 
and Wallerstein’s and Wolf’s views for the development of the modern world, the latter 
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two scholars never made those similarities explicit.  Wallerstein and W olf greatly 
expanded insights related to Turner’s.  Their analyses detailed a much larger process 
operating on a global level, of which the Turnerian frontier hypothesis comprised only a 
small part.  Wallerstein and Wolf contributed to discussions of the modern world mos t 
profoundly in their awareness of the geographic magnitude of modern human relations.  
They also clearly articulated sets of critical variables indicating the alteration of those 
relations under capitalism.   
In the second half of the twentieth century, practitioners of the “New Geography” 
school explored issues of social patterning and processes.  The new geographers 
revitalized the Turnerian hypothesis along with Carl Von Thünen’s Central Place 
Theory.
18
  Formulated years earlier than Turner’s hypothesis,  Von Thünen postulated a 
theoretical world without natural barriers such as mountains, oceans, and canyons.  In this 
world, he believed dense population clusters naturally raised land value s.  Inflated 
property values forced land owners to maximize profits  from their holdings.  As a result, 
urban centers encouraged the development of industrial and craft production primarily 
because they were more profitable and required less land than agriculture.  Von Thünen 
had linked population density to inflated property values that, in turn, determined the type 
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of labor performed in a location.  This relationship, he argued, explained a three -tiered 
settlement hierarchy in which industrial labor occurred in the center.  As one moved 
outward from the population cluster, he or she encountered a second settlement tier with 
moderate priced land.  In this area, land values were lower than urban areas but high 
enough to demand intensive agricultural production.  Decreased transportation costs to 
market centers offset the inflated value of agricultural land.  Beyond the ring of 
agriculture, lay a zone of cheap land suitable for livestock grazing.  Land in this area was 
devalued because of its distance from urban clusters that increased transportation costs to 
the center.  This was the only area, however, where herders could amass land parcels 
large enough to profit from livestock.  Although they experienced the highest 
transportation costs, herders absorbed those costs through higher per volume profit than 
agriculturalists.  At the core of Von Thünen’s model existed a fundamental flaw.  
Because his postulations rested on a theoretical plane without geographic barriers, it 
lacked real-world explanatory power.
19
   
Geographer Jerome Steffen adapted the frontier hypothesis and centra l place theory to 
formulate a structural classification of colonial expansion.  He split colonies into two 
basic types.  He defined the first type as “cosmopolitan” colonies that had specialized 
economic activities focused on extraction of single resources (e.g., fur, lumber, or 
precious metals).  Cosmopolitan frontiers retained close, dependent ties with their parent 
state.  Because resources were generally extracted by small mobile communities, a 
colonial entrepôt emerged as a permanent, regional administrative unit and as a supply 
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source for manufactured goods.
20
  During Spanish occupation of the western United 
States, New Orleans served this administrative and economic function for control over 
the Missouri Valley fur trade.
21
  Local agricultural production typically occurred for the 
colony’s subsistence.  The result was a “household mode of production,” in which lim ited 
manufacturing occurred solely intended for household consumption.
22
  Archaeologist 
Kenneth E. Lewis noted remnants of this production mode in mid-nineteenth-century 
Michigan.   
As US citizens established farmsteads around Saginaw Bay, Michigan, they noted 
how the former French colonists routinely planted small apple orchards around their 
homes.  The Americans were dismayed, however, when they witnessed French settlers 
collecting enough apples for their own consumption and leaving hundreds more lying 
rotten on the ground.  The Americans critic ized the French settlers’ for squandering 
potential profit.  To the Americans this clearly revealed endemic laziness within the 
French community.  The former French occupation, however, specialized on fur trade 
and did not create an alternate market for apples or processed cider.  The 
misinterpretation of French laziness on the Americans’ part showed conflicted ideologies 
between singularly focused cosmopolitan colonies and the type of commercial frontier 
Americans created.  Steffen’s defined this second type as an “insular” colony.  
Historian Cathy Matson discussed the transition from a cosmopolitan to insular 
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frontier in colonial New York.
23
  Although Matson’s terminology differed from Steffen’s, 
she revealed a process where the colonial economy shifted during the decline of New 
York’s fur trade in the late seventeenth century.  Instead of singular efforts fo cused on 
extracting furs, the city merchants sought other items for export.  As merchants 
supplemented dwindling stocks with manufactured-household products, farm families 
viewed surplus production only as the means to acquire goods not produced at home.  
Although market potential existed for farmers to profit beyond subsistence levels, they 
saw the market only as an opportunity “to exchange agricultural produce for windows for 
their homes, buttons for their clothing, and dishes for their tables.”
24
 
Contemporary colonial observers believed, however, that farmers indeed desired to 
produce beyond expedient needs.  Matson recorded one such observer, Daniel Denton, 
stating that every farmer was “making their own Linnen [sic], and a great part of their 
woollen-clo th [sic] for their ordinary wearing… .  Had they more tradesmen amongst 
them … [the colonists] would in a little time live without the help of any other Countrey 
[sic] for their Cloathing [sic].”
25
  Certainly farmers’ intentions across colonial North 
America varied, however, Matson importantly showed that farm ers’ utilization of the 
provisions market conformed to the extraneous needs of agricultural households.   
Insular frontier colonies had diversified economic activities focused on a wide range 
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of resources.  This increased activity lessened dependence on the home nation, and led to 
an increase in local reinvestment of surplus.  These colonies tended to bec ome more 
stratified as certain areas along transportation networks developed secondary markets for 
exports.   
Matson articulated part of this process unfolding in 1690s New York.  As more 
capital flowed in to the colony, “a lumber interest developed among farmers who sold 
boards, cords of firewood, and homemade casks to merchants’ country agents; a few 
sawmill owners ceased their farming operations when returns from producing resin, 
pitch, and tar for export grew appreciably.”
26
 
Cassagrande et al. showed how the transition from cosmopolitan to insular produced  
a hierarchy of settlements similar to Von Thünen’s model but developed specifically for 
frontier regions.  Population centers fell under a four-tiered ranking of “frontier towns,” 
“nucleated settlements,” “semi nucleated settlements,” or , “dispersed farms.”
27
   
Cassagrande et al. expanded Steffen’s model and placed it in more general terms to 
provide a useful set of descriptors for discussing similarities between different frontier 
settings.
28
  With the introduction of steamboats on the Mississippi River, New Orleans 
shifted from a former entrepôt of fur trade to a frontier town linking markets of the West 
to those in the East.  St. Louis merchants in the 1830s replicated the diverse activities 
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begun in New Orleans in the first decades of the nineteenth century.  St. Louis then 
became a second frontier town particularly for the increased variety of products flowing 
out the Missouri Valley.  After the arrival of steamboats, St. Louis became the major 
collection, processing, and redistribution center for the upper Mississippi and Missouri 
valleys.  With its position as a frontier town, merchants in St. Louis interacted more 
closely with eastern suppliers.  As St. Louis developed into a regional center of trade, 
other smaller locations interacted directly with the St. Louis market.  This allowed 
communities like Weston and Independence to become “nucleated settlements.”  These 
towns accommodated increased demand for manufactured products as settlers 
rendezvoused before departing on the Santa Fe and Oregon trails.  Although all 
communities along the Missouri River depended on river shipments to and from St. 
Louis, communities at the heads of overland trails structured steamboat routes to their 
advantage.  As a result, tensions arose between merchants, farmers, and steamboat 
owners.   
Lewis successfully adapted Steffen’s terminology to describe Michigan settlers’ 
colonization of Lower Peninsula during the nineteenth century.  Steffen’s model, 
however, was not as successful for explaining the underlying processes directing 
settlements hierarchy.  In particular, Steffen’s use of the term “insular” implied that 
diversified econom ic activities lessened dependency on outside capital investment.  
Wallerstein argued the opposite, believing increased trade created further imbalances in 
colonial relationships and only elevated dependency on outside capital.
29
  Although 
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Steffen’s model lacked important explanatory power, it significantly refined the model 
presented by Von Thünen’s central place theory.  It also provided a clearer classification 
for physical locations than presented in world systems theory.  Probably for this reason, 
criticisms directed towards Steffen’s work have generally been based upon flaws he 
inherited from Von Thünen’s original thesis.
30
 
Historian W illiam Cronon discussed central place theory’s most critical f law in his 
analysis of Chicago’s commercial ascendancy during the nineteenth century.  Cronon 
argued that central place theory created a deterministic view of history.  In his work, he 
related a personal anecdote in which he described driving from Chicago’ s inner city to 
the surrounding countryside.  As Cronon drove past the urban sprawl, he traveled first 
past agricultural fields and then past grazing land.  It appeared that Von Thünen’s model 
was literally unfolding before his eyes.  Cronon later realized, however, that central place 
theory failed to explain the origin of urban centers.  Von Thünen had not considered the 
primary rationale for locating population centers.  In Cronon’s estimation, high land 
values occurred after a center began attracting dense populations and must have been the 
result (rather than the cause) of hierarchies.
31
   
Cronon considered a point in time when Chicago’s businessmen compete d against 
other Midwest centers for Eastern capital.  Without the successful partnership established  
by Chicago-based merchants with the East, any number of towns might today be a 
Midwest center for commerce.  Cronon documented Chicago businessmen who 
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channeled capital investment into areas like transportation and agricultural storage 
facilities.  Determining railroad routes, allowed Chicago boot manufacturers, for 
example, to bypass leather processing centers in western Illinois.  By circumventing 
towns like Alton, Illinois, Chicago’s leather producers purchased cattle directly from 
herders and gave rise to their city’s well-known slaughtering industry.
32
   
Similarly, Chicago’s wheat dealers provided capital for grain elevators throughout the 
Midwest.  Railroads linked these storage facilities to the stock exchange in Chicago.  As 
elevator owners issued grain receipts to farmers, they restructured agricultural economics 
throughout the Midwest.  The elevator receipts were backed by wheat futures sold in 
Chicago with Eastern capital.  They, in turn, became a source of currency within rural 
communities.  Because railroads primarily utilized grain elevators, they drew freight from 
river transportation and favored the Chicago exchange over St. Louis.
33
  By highlighting 
the personal business relationships of Chicago merchants with Eastern capital, Cronon 
successfully argued against the predetermined ascendancy of Chicago.  He refined Von 
Thünen’s model and illustrated the process through which specific individuals in a 
population cluster purposely center their community within a settlement hierarchy.  He 
also underscored the power of micro-historical examinations to inform us on large 
historical processes.   
The following thesis takes a similar approach to its analysis of mid-nineteenth-
century St. Charles, Missouri.  It does not discuss St. Louis’s ascendancy as a commercial 
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magnet from a single perspective.  On the contrary, it examines this rise from the 
viewpoint of lower Missouri Valley and St. Charles.   
As St. Louis moved from a specialized frontier setting, based on fur trade, to a more 
diversified economy based on agriculture, furs, and metal extraction, as well as 
manufacturing, it began to take on characteristics of an insular locale.  With 
diversification, came an increased reliance on Eastern capital that consolidated business 
activates into specialized sectors existing side-by-side.  This reliance on outside capital 
created unequal trade relationships and forced country merchants to operate in a modern 
economy of scale.  With the shift towards capital investments, tensions arose between 
local farmers and manufacturers.  Steamboat owners operating in the lower Missouri 
Valley increased tensions by demanding storage facilities for freight.  Because farming 
organizations lacked resources to build storage infrastructures, only local merchants 
could meat these demands.   These merchants, however, acquired capital from partners in 
urban markets for local infrastructure investments.  Added investment to local business 
created enough incentives to arrange permanent shipping deals with steamboat owners.  
The extra costs from loans forced merchants to offer lower prices for farm products in 
local markets.  These urban loans also forced merchants to conduct business in a manner 
dictated by their investors.  The more indebted a country merchant became to urban 
partners, the less autonomy he had in accepting payments.  If his investors demanded 
cash, or a specific cash crop, a merchant could only accept those commodities from his 
clientele.  Each time capital flowed into a community, its merchants built new stores, 





modernity but was paid for with its economic independence.  The demands of urban 
investors eventually forced local producers to specialize their activities around particular 
commodities.  These developments created an imbalance, or asymmetry, in regional trade 
that altered producer and manufacturer relationship s within a region.  As each small area 
became linked in a large global trade, it was assigned a specific function by those holding 
the purse.  Although the lives of western frontier people differed in many ways from 
those of earlier eastern colonists, emerging changes to the relationships between 
producers and manufactures marked both periods in profound ways.   
Merging the works of Wallerstein and Wolf, two decisive relationships are explored.  
First, asymmetrical trade relationships between Western merchants and Eastern 
capitalists revealed tensions that ultimately forced Western businessmen to operate within 
capitalism’s rules.  Second, shifting modes of production from household-based 
agriculture to mechanized flour production created tensions between Western merchants, 
farmers, and steamboat owners.  In the following, Marx’s term “mode of production” is 
replaced with the term “economy of scale.”  Marx’s description of the capitalist mode of 
production contained many essential aspects of economies of scale.  Because the latter 
term appears more frequently in colonial history, it is better suited to characterize the 
spreading modern world discussed here.  Defined in more detail below, economy of 
scales described a uniquely modern process where increased surplus production was 
coupled with centralization of output and profit.   
Ultimately, the effects of modern economy of scale continually stacked the deck 





never match St. Louis’s economic might.  Similarly, the efforts of its merchants appear 
desperately futile; but as Cronon argued, businesses relations on a case-by-case basis 
were far from predictable.  Although capitalism exerted heavy pressures upon St. Charles 
merchants, I must acknowledge the possibility of a different history.  The following 
pages cannot possibly do justice to the incalculable m yriad of possibilities.  They do, 
however, bring to light what actually occurred as mid-nineteenth-century St. Charles 
encountered the spreading modern world.  
In general, historical analyses of modern developments can be placed in two broad 
groups.  The first are sometimes referred to as Malthusian studies.  These arguments 
generally rely on population growth models.  Once internal population pressures within a 
society reached a critical threshold, expansion occurred to meet subsistence needs.
34
  
Occasionally, these are also labeled “germ theories” for their analogues with biological 
organisms.  In a liberal definition, Turner’s frontier hypothesis may also be couched in 
these terms.  Like Malthusian theories, he saw change originating internally in a society.  
The negative influences those changes exerted upon certain individuals provided a 
“push” for expansion.  Scholars should apply Malthusian labels with extreme caution.  
Malthusian theories stem back to Thomas Robert Malthus.  In 1798, Malthus penned “An  
Essay on the Principle of Population,” in which he hoped to explain a disturbing reversal 
in the natural “struggle for existence.”  Without natural predators, Malthus predicted that 
the world’s human population would outstrip its food supply by the mid -nineteenth 
century.  Malthus’s provocative work influenced many other scholars like Hebert Spencer 
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and Charles Darwin.  Where Darwin found inspiration to formulate his theory of natural 
selection, others like Spencer continued Malthus’s work with human populations.  To the 
detriment of succeeding generations, Malthus’s original findings were used (beyond his 
original intent) to validate racial and class-based oppression, the full extension of which 
occurred in our era’s most insidious form of population control in late 1930s Europe.
35
   
Population growth as the sole determinant in the spread of the modern world 
economy failed to explain disparities of economic increase such as those observed within 
the English/British markets between the seventeenth and eightee nth centuries.  For 
instance, even though the British population expanded sluggishly from 1670 to 1770, 
their domestic markets (comprised mainly of home-grown foodstuffs) increased by 70 
percent.  Conversely, their import markets (comprised almost entirely  of colonial 
tobacco, coffee, and sugar, along with Asian manufactured goods) increased by 188  
percent throughout the same period.  Disparate growth in non-subsistence production 
sectors cannot be explained sim ply by correspondent population increase.
36
  The span 
between frontier processes and institutionalized oppression is immense, and therefore, 
should always be treated distinctly.  
Economic historians label a second approach as the “staples thesis.”  In brief, the 
staples thesis asserted that colonies began with small domestic markets, limited supplies 
of labor and capital, but large amounts of natural resources.  Colonists’ synchronized 
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their labor to external market demands.  Initially, they traded with home markets in a 
simple exchange system, converting resource-intensive goods into manufactured products 
and additional capital.  They, then, reinvested this capital to further exploit local 
resources and/or diversify production into new sectors.  Based on metropolitan demand 
and the nature of production, two types of economic growth occurred.  In plantation 
colonies, income distribution was highly uneven.  Most colonists received little or no 
income that barely provided for daily subsistence and left nothing for reinvestment.  
Plantation owners, on the other hand, invested profits locally only to increase yields of a 
single staple, or they sent profits overseas purchasing expensive luxury items.  As a 
result, plantation colonies generally possessed large, unskilled populations with no means 
for diversification.  Expansion of their exports had nominal effects on the range of 
activities in the colony.
37
   
In contrast to plantations, farming colonies developed a broader economic base.  
Distribution of capital was more even and resulted in a wide -ranging demand for goods 
and services.  Although colonists’ quickly profited from staple production, their early 
efforts (less orchestrated than plantations) were not channeled exclusively into increasing 
supplies.  The workforce in these colonies, more skilled than plan tations, directed their 
efforts into “spin-off” sectors.
38
  For example, Shepard and Walton estimated that the 
middle and New England American colonies captured the majority of invisible earnings 
from the shipping sector.  Between 1768 and 1772, services associated with shipping 
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netted colonists £610,000; an amount second only to tobacco profits of £766,000.
39
  As 
the domestic demand for export products increased, so did home manufacturing as well 
as supportive industries for staple production.  Manufacturing  of items like barrels and 
casks increased along with service industries like storage, drayage, and transportation.  
Although each staple produced differing spin-off industries, they all encouraged diversity 
of the economic base.
40
 
The staple thesis assumed a two-region world that combined labor, capital, 
management, and manufacturing.  The first region was the colony whose initial 
settlement was characterized by the movement of labor from the metropolitan second 
region.  High demand for resources or lower transportation costs in metropolitan areas 
provided the initial push for colonization.  Metropolitan demand and high risk for settling 
new areas earned initial colonists high profits.  The lure of profit attracted more colonists 
who increased production, but leveled the staple price.  The stabilization of market prices, 
however, lowered risk in the colony thereby attracting external investment.  Metropolitan 
merchants reduced costs by capturing economies of scale.  Historian s John McCusker 
and Russell Menard referred to this as the “cheaper-by-the-dozen effect.”
41
  Staple 
producers in or around metropolitan areas did not have land resources to compete with 
the growing scale of supply from colonial areas.  Often they were forced out of business 
but redirected their labor and capital to more productive sectors – becoming specialized 
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merchants, tradesmen, etc.  As this process eventually stabilized , expansion would begin 
again as demand rose or transportation costs fell.
42
   
Although a general pattern of specialization occurred throughout the North American 
colonies, some areas began the transition earlier than others.  Especially in New York and 
Philadelphia, pre-Revolutionary city merchants concentrated on single overseas markets 
while their counterparts in Providence and Boston maintained simultaneous relationships 
with British dry goods manufactures, Chesapeake tobacconists, and West Indies sugar 
planters.  The differing levels of specialization resulted primarily from domestic 
exchange conditions.  In New York and Philadelphia, paper and hard currency circulated 
more abundantly than in New England.  The former cities’ merchants often held 
exchange bills drawn directly from British firms.  Other New England merchants 
acquired these necessary bills from Southern and Caribbean colonies.  Obtaining bills 
from colonial middlemen complicated the exchange system and reduced profit.  Each 
hand through which a bill of exchange passed kept a portion of its represented profit 
thereby devaluing it along the exchange network.  Additionally, New York and 
Philadelphia prospered from larger amounts of British military spending.  A military 
presence, in turn, brought more specie and bills of exchange.  The fewer port facilities in 
New York and Philadelphia concentrated business sec tors in a handful of areas.  This 
concentration encouraged exchange efficiency and allowed for markets to expand 
sufficiently for “spin-off” industries like commission shipping or provision exporting.
43
 










Capturing profits from a growing economy of scale impl ied more variables than 
simple supply and demand models might suggest.  A considerable variable in the general 
trend towards specialization in the North American colonies was, indeed, the availability 
of larger supplies and increasing consumer demand.  Historian Thomas Doerflinger found 
this aspect true only to a certain threshold of capital input.  While he upheld the position 
of most colonial historians that pre-Revolutionary markets tended to be too small for 
wealthy firms to capture large economies of scale, he was unable to find positive 
correlations between market growth and specialized activity in later periods.  Instead, he 
found that small firms generally chose to specialize in accommodating market conditions, 
while rich firms preferred to “comfortably” grab opportunities from different sectors 
across the globe.
44
   
Shipping magnate, Thomas Fitzsimmons, complicated this pattern by concentrating 
exclusively on the provision trade in 1784.  Fitzsimmons chose to specialize in a single 
trade although he was well positioned to capitalize on the post-Revolution dry goods 
import boom.  On the other hand, wealthy firms like Alexander Brown and Sons of 
Baltimore remained extensively diversified up to the 1830s, well past the supposed 
“mythical state of perfect specialization after 1815.”
45
  The key distinction for diversity 
of activities, indicted by Doerflinger, rested in a firm’s available capital and the degree of 
risk they chose to take.  For larger firms, capital provided more alternatives for diversity 
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or specialization.  Smaller firms could specialize only where market conditions 
accommodated small volume competitors or where capital loans were abundant.
46
   
The frontier markets generally inhibited accumulation of large provisions and 
fostered a web of mid-level traders.  In agricultural areas, milling emerged most 
commonly as the first spin-off industry.
47
  Either from proximity to markets or ambition, 
a miller might choose to sell his products in an urban market for cash revenues.  
Competition for transportation produced a need to capture ever larger supplies of farm 
products, which forced millers to increase their output and become fulltime, specialized 
provision merchants.  In places where transportation to urban markets was unreliable, a 
country miller relied on barter, labor exchange, and a host of subsidiary uses for his mill.  
In seventeenth-century New York, Matson noted “millers also used the millstone to 
sharpen tools, shred rags for the colony’s paper mills, press flaxseed into oil, and grate 
bones for pastes and medicines.”
48
  If a miller could not find work for his mill he also 
“circulated as a local handyman earning small sums for odd jobs.”
49
 
The merchants in urban centers like Philadelphia and New York prospered from 
abundant and fluid credit extensions.  Even with outliers such as Fitzsimmons and the 
Browns of Baltimore, Doerflinger argued the overall effects of consumer revolution 
accounted largely for the fact that 79 percent of 1780s Philadelphian merchants 
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specialized in only one sector of trade: import, exports, or shipping.  The outliers, 
however, give considerable insights into the desires and rationales of eighteenth - and 
nineteenth-century businessmen.  Merchants like Fitzsimmons, desirous of large profits 
with low risks, captured profit from high trade in a single area suited to their personal 
network and talents.  Fitzsimmons’s peers who were willing to venture more capital 
spread their wealth with greater abandon.
50
   
Merchants of smaller means, on the other hand, played to the whim s of their markets 
and credit ratings.  These merchants came closer to the dependent relationships argued by 
Wallerstein.  Their standing among the “peripheral” peers gave no leverage to negotiate 
with creditors who mainly resided in the core.  Like Fitzsimmons, they chose smaller risk 
ventures, but their decisions were based on necessity over choice.  Without capital 
surplus or options for specialization, smaller merchants felt forced to gamble in trade 
sectors outside their comfort zone.
51
  This situation will be discussed in chapter 3 with 
examples from St. Louis.  Two examples from St. Charles show how these small 
merchants often diversified their activities in the provisions sector for short term gains.  
They did so only when accumulation of specie was not crit ical to their primary business 
goals.  
In the colonial Chesapeake, Jacob Price tracked the development of modern 
economies of scale and clearly showed two-way effects between the core and periphery.  
From the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, wealth y British exchange houses 
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directed capital investment to favored colonial planters.  Foreign investment allowed 
certain planters to consolidate their output.  As a few Chesapeake planters accumulated 
large, shipload quantities of tobacco, British exchange houses justified the risks of 
purchasing or chartering vessels in increased numbers.  The guarantee of large shipments 
set off a cycle of higher profit and more investment that consolidated wealth within  
certain British exchange houses.
52
   
Between 1640 and 1775, the number of English/British tobacco importers dropped 
from 346 to 66.  Similarly, the average firm in 1640 traded 3,400 pounds of tobacco, but 
by 1775 the average increased to 668,000 pounds.  The reduction of firms reflected a 
dramatic disparity within the wealth pyramid of exchange houses.  Between 1719 and 
1775, the number of firms handling over one million pounds of tobacco increased from 
five to twelve.  Firms at the bottom of the pyramid (those importing under 50,000 
pounds) previously captured 29 percent of all im ports in 1676, but by 1719 they captured 
2.4 percent and by 1775 their imports accounted for only 0.5 percent of the trade.
53
   
The overall trend from 1676 to 1775 revealed a quadrupling of British tobacco 
imports (11 million pounds to 44 million), while the number of trading firms or 
individuals dropped about nine-tenths (573 to 66) with the average importer trading 35 
times more tobacco.
54
  All this relied significantly on the influences, desires, and 
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cooperation of Chesapeake planters.  Although the capital flowed from the core, personal 
ambition sparked fundamental changes within the Chesapeake colonies.  The cross -
Atlantic relationships appeared more as mutual co-dependencies than asymmetrical trade 
hierarchies.  Price’s work greatly contributed to the historical and economic discussion of 
the twofold effects produced by the modern economy of scale.  Implicit in the following 
discussion of modern economies of scale is the twofold process of increased production 
output with corresponding decrease in the entities controlling and profiting from that 
growth. 
Although the staple thesis described processes similar to other theories discussed 
above, the critical distinction was the motivation for settlement.  Lowered costs of 
transportation generally resulted from technological innovation, not beholden to 
increasing population pressures.  Similarly, rises in market demand were not based solely 
on increased population.  For instance, Britain’s four largest imports (sugar, rum, 
tobacco, and coffee) from its North American and the West Indian colonies were in 
demand based on population preferences rather than population subsistence needs.  
Whereas Malthusians saw population increase as more “mouths to feed,” staple theorists 
saw more “hands in the field.”  Although staple theorists did not ignore the truism that 
increased populations have higher subsistence needs, they saw colonial expansion 
determined by cultural processes rather biological ones.  The underlying process was the 
economics of mercantilism.   
Mercantilism drove European influence throughout the world.  McCusker and 





never achieved a formal body of theoretical thought.
55
  The principles of mercantilism 
were not articulated fully until 1776 in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  Although many scholars credited Smith for originating 
important concepts to the staples theory, historian Harold Innis in the 1930s formulated 
the disciplinary approach in current use.
56
  So while it is tempting to envision sixteenth- 
through eighteenth-century merchants consciously applying principles of mercantilism in 
their business ventures, the reality was quite different.  Unlike modern econom ists who 
can analyze formal principles of capitalism, those who controlled European colonial 
affairs had “little more than a shared perception … that foreign trade could be made to 
serve the interests of government – and vice versa.”
57
  In brief, mercantilism developed 
under co-dependent relationships between merchants and the European nobility.  Nobles 
sought to maintain and extend their power.  Accomplishing their goals required money 
foremost.  For daily expenditures, governments relied on revenues from import and 
export duties.  During emergencies they borrowed money from wealthy merchants.  
Merchants, in turn, relied on nobility to lower risks in colonial ventures by protecting 
overseas colonies and shipping lanes, and through minimizing dom estic and foreign 
competition through trade regulations and charter agreements.
58
  
For example, the three largest capital holders in Britain were also the nation’s biggest 
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lenders.  In 1742, the Bank of England lent Britain £1.6 million.  The bank withheld 
interest charges in exchange for a twenty-three year extension of its charter.  To gain 
similar government protection, in 1760 the South Sea Company financed 27 percent of 
Britain’s national debt while the East India Company contributed an additional 4 
percent.
59
   
For nobles, then, catering to the interests of merchants (even at the expenses of 
higher-priced / poorer-quality goods) ensured a steady flow of bullion into royal coffers.  
Additionally, nobles who increased their country’s trade revenues did so at the expense of 
other European powers.
60
  In a sense, nobles played a zero-sum game where all the 
world’s wealth was like tokens.  Because the number of tokens could not increase, any 
additions to a country’s holdings meant equivalent subtractions to oppo nents’ total 
pieces.  McCusker and Menard stated it thusly: “strength not only replaced weakness but 
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also did so at the expense of one’s enemy.”
61
  Mercantilism provided the explanation for 
why colonial markets exported particular products in favor of others.  
The fiscal interests of the state frequently conflicted with the econom ic development 
of colonial trade.  Because governments required taxes, their fiscal interests almost 
always won out over private interests at home or in the colonies.  The British 
government, for instance, prohibited importing colonial wheat and flour to protect their 
domestic agriculture.  The French mandated similar prohibitions against colonial rum 
imports.  By prohibiting certain colonial imports, European governments controlled the 
range of economic diversity within their colonies.  As a result, colonists produced export 
items for markets dependent on western products like, tobacco, chocolate, and tropical 
dyes.
62
  Although agricultural products such as wheat and flour were important exports 
for colonies like Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, these commodities were 
traded through other colonial ports in exchange for ones valued in domestic British 
markets.  This system strongly encouraged the nature of production and the link ages 
between each area of the British Empire.   
Prohibitions and import duties also played heavily in the mercantilist component of 
colonial economics.  Government rationale for controlling trade frequently centered on 
foreign policy.  During the eighteenth century, for example, the British government 
routinely subsidized naval-store production in the pine-rich colonies of North America.  
They did so to diminish the Royal Navy’s dependence on Baltic countries whose access 
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to timber made them lead suppliers of stores like masts and pine tar.
63
  The British 
Navigation Acts represented the par excellence of mercantilist strategies.  These were a 
series of trade restrictions first enacted in 1651 and further adjusted throughout the 
colonial period.  The first act stipulated that all items im ported into England be carried 
aboard English ships.  A second act in 1660 extended the earlier provision and required 
certain colonial items be exported only to England or its colonies.  Known as 
“enumerated commodities,” these regulated products were, unsurprisingly, items such as 
sugar, tobacco, coffee, and dyes.  An additional act in 1663 stipulated that all European 
goods must pass through English ports prior to importation to the colonies.
64
  
The Navigation Acts critically served to insulate British merchants from their Dutch 
rivals.  They greatly multiplied royal wealth serving the British monarch y’s ambitions.  
From a colonial perspective, American scholars have emphasized the impediments trade 
regulations placed upon colonists.  The continued strengthen ing of the acts, especially in 
1673 and 1696, gave testament to England’s inability to wield absolute control over its 
colonial affairs.  McCusker and Menard argued, however, that historians tended to focus 
too narrowly on the negative aspects of the Navigation Acts.  Just as England’s 
merchants were protected by the trade regulations, so too were its colonists.
65
 
Protection from Dutch and other European competition afforded colonists , especially 
in northern colonies, three profitable advantages.  First, less foreign competition 
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increased domestic colonial demand for New England and mid-Atlantic manufactures.  
Second, the lowered demand across the empire gave northern colonists an advantage in 
trading manufactures to the West Indies.  Northern colonists exchanged their wares for 
West Indian goods for credits that had value in English markets.  These exchanges 
allowed colonists to trade in English markets without producing items in direct demand 
there.  Third, northerners quickly learned to make large profits in service industries like 
shipping that were no longer controlled by Dutch interests.  Largely because of the 
Navigation Acts, then, “New Englanders became the Dutch of England’s empire.”
66
  As 
economic historians formulated sound arguments for colonial manipulation of 
English/British trade regulations, the core-periphery relationship appeared less 
totalitarian.  
Wallerstein’s critics resounded most loudly to his characterization of the dominance 
of core areas over the periphery.  Many anthropologists and historians provided strong 
evidence for varying degrees of independence and influence flowing from the periphery 
to the core.
67
  Although not responding specifically to Wallerstein, McCusker argued that 
North American colonists agitated their British counterparts in “most every sphere of 
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  According to McCusker, earlier historians dismissed anti-colonial sentiments 
as “puffery or self-pity” among British merchants, but more recent scholarship showed 
North American colonists controlled shipping in many sectors of the British Empire.
69
  
For the vast majority of exports to Britain, colonial merchants charged higher freight 
rates than the wholesale cost of goods (except in most cases for tobacco).
70
   
Throughout the eighteenth century, shipping-related industries flourished in North 
American colonies.  By the 1770s, colonists constructed and likely owned nearly one -
third of British Empire shipping.  This was an impressive accomplishment and meant 
North American shippers were responsible for about 500,000 tons of the 1,500,000 total 
measured imperial tonnage.  The value of this tonnage alone, required over £2,500,000 
sterling in capital investment showing the power of colonial economies to generate large 
investment surpluses.  Additionally, Philadelphia’s merchants provided about 20 percent 
of the total colonial share in shipping.
71
   
As city investors contributed increasing amounts of capital into freight handling, 
foreign capital decreased in volume.  In the 1720s, Pennsylvania ns owned just less than 
half the registered tonnage in Philadelphia, whereas their British counterparts owned just 
over one-third.  By the 1770s, the trend had shifted as Pennsylvanians owned more than 
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three-quarters of Philadelphia’s registered tonnage (increase of 59.4 percent), whereas 
British investors owned just over one-eighth (decrease of 62.6 percent).
72
  The take-over 
occurred even as registered tonnage in Philadelphia grew by 42 percent from 1751 to 
1775.
73
  The cargo industry, therefore, was no small enterprise and could be the source of 
great wealth for all merchants in the modern era.   
Historians Jacob Price and Paul Clemens detailed the emergence of a new colonial 
economy of scale from the effects of shipping.  The process they described began as 
larger planters sought higher prices for their overseas tobacco sales.  In the 1650s, a 
handful of these planters avoided colonial middlemen by shipping directly to exchange 
houses in London and Bristol.  By the 1690s, a substantial number of planters ro utinely 
shipped directly to English factors and commission merchants.
74
 
A shift occurred as more exchange houses emerged in England making it difficult for 
firms to passively receive colonial freight.  Ambitious London and Bristol merchants 
secured tobacco supplies by accepting consignments directly from colonial planters.  
Wealthy firms did so by receiving European and Asian goods on one -year credit from 
their suppliers.  They transferred this credit to their corresponding Chesapeake planters 
for guaranteed consignments of large shipments before payments were due.  As a result, 
large English firms began a cyclical pattern of trade dominance.  As they established their 
ability to reliably secure colonial shipments, their credit ratings improved and allowed 
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larger capital loans to secure even more shipments.
75
   
Throughout the seventeenth century, however, direct shipments from planters 
accounted for less than half of the Chesapeake trade.  The main obstacle for colonial 
tobacco planters was the size of their production.  English commission merchants 
routinely favored consignments from the colonial planters, though few had the resources 
to accept them.  The guaranteed delivery of tobacco eliminated their need to search out 
shipments across the Atlantic and reduced wholesale costs.  The most serious drawback 
to accepting consignment futures was the risk involved with shipping.  Smaller 
Chesapeake planters, working with North American middlemen, delivered their freight to 
independent forwarding houses or ship owners stationed at eastern ports.  These smaller 
firms assumed the cargo risk and sold tobacco to larger firms at home.  Although these 
smaller shipments incurred middlemen price inflation, English houses avoided risks 
associated with delays in production or lo sses during shipping.  When an English house 
purchased directly from colonial producers, they assumed more risk because they now 
were forced to purchase or charter a vessel for the Atlantic voyage.  For example, when 
the eighth largest London tobacco impor ter, Barnaby Dunch, died in 1680, he held shares 
in nine vessels and owned one outright – a feat matched by few.
76
   
Because most firms could not purchase or charter entire vessels, only a few with large 
capital surplus or favorable credit standing afforded the expenses of ship ownership.  In 
turn, they justified increased risk only by negotiating with large planters capable of 
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producing full shiploads of cargo.  Regardless of how large the Chesapeake tobacco 
production grew as a whole, no English house wanted to risk its ship to sit idle in a 
colonial port for days or weeks accumulating fractional sized ship loads from mid -level 
planters.  To profit from ship ownership, a house needed guarantees from a single planter 
(or a small consortium) that a full load would meet their vessel on or near arrival.  This 
meant that exchange houses directly benefited from capital investments in select colonial 
plantations.  As the large exchange houses became dependent on large planters, the 
planters in turn, depended on foreign capital to consolidate regional production.  As 
discussed earlier, consolidation of Chesapeake tobacco production correspondingly 
affected developments within Britain.
77
   
From the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth centuries, the amount of tobac co 
exports to Britain increased while the number of exchange houses decreased.  Firms atop 
the wealth pyramid expanded their trade volume and successfully blocked smaller houses 
from capturing exchange goods.  Without the mutual wealth benefits between Eng land 
and the Chesapeake, both production and sales likely would have expanded in direct 
relation to the num ber of planters and the number of exchange houses.  Tapping a new 
economy of scale funneled growth in both sectors to only a few parties while it 
discouraged upstart competition on either shore of the Atlantic.  As Price and Clemens 
noted, by the eve of the Revolution the co-dependency of wealth created a “complex 
chain of credit” linking the interests of Chesapeake planter and British exchange 
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Accounting for colonial influences on economic growth within the core, based solely 
on disparities of export to import values, ignored the importance of credit to the whole 
colonial system.  Even at times when colonial products were cheap and available in 
European markets and did not stimulate the range of diversification as in an American 
metropolis, the role of credit had widespread internal core effects.  Credit also affected 
relations between other core states.   
Credit factored largely in the commercial success of England over the Netherlands.  
Price indicated the distress Britain’s flexible and generous credit systems created among 
other European nations with an inter communication of the Amsterdam exchange house, 
Hope & Co.  The house’s partners lam ented the uneven credit lines fostered by Britain’s 
mercantilist policies, stating that the British “are of all nations the least difficult to treat 
with, and the most averse, through motives of personal interest, from distressing their 
neighbours; and thence partly their unbounded trust to one another.”
79
  
The free circulation of credit within the British Empire linked large business interests 
at home with those of colonial merchants and producers.  By the 1720s, these links were 
clear to author Daniel Defoe, who commented that wealthy “Wholesale Men of London . 
. . [who] give Credit to the Country Tradesmen and even to the Merchants themselves, so 
that both Home Trade and Foreign Trade is in a great measure carried upon their 
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European exports marked the first leg in the credit chain.  The exported goods in a 
sense provided a physical measure for the growing inter -connections within Britain’s 
empire.  For example, British exports to its colonies increased sevenfold from 1699 to 
1774.  At the beginning of this period, England exported 19 percent of its goods to its 
colonies.  By the end, however, it exported 60 percent to its colonies.  For North America 
alone, the export trade increased from 6 to 26 percent.
81
  In mercantilists’ perspectives, 
this growth not only increased home wealth but also decreased foreign prestige and 
reflected the vigorous pulse of the British economic health.  
In other instances, however, government regulations exerted negative impacts on the 
domestic economy.  Duties on British colonial imports increased retail prices in home 
markets 200–300 percent over wholesale.  Phyllis Deane and William Cole estimated that 
between 1765 and 1774, English consumers spent £12 million sterling per year on 
transatlantic colonial products.
82
   Even though only about a third of British im ports 
originated with the Americas and West Indies, a single English consumer spent about £1 
13s per year on these items alone.  Deane and Cole’s most liberal estimate set the average 
Englishmen’s yearly income at about £18.  Duties from transatlantic imports, therefore, 
cost average Englishmen a noticeable amount of  his income.   
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Between 1723 and 1775, the French government took a more extreme position with 
its tobacco duties.  It allied with monopolist French tobacco producers to prohibit 
domestic and colonial competition.  The French monopoly failed to meet its fellow 
citizens’ tobacco demand, which opened the market to British tobacco imports priced 
hundreds of times over wholesale by duties or smuggling costs.
83
   
Most colonists’ debts to Britain resulted from balances on trading accounts and other 
commercial transactions.  Some British firms, however, directly invested in American 
colonies either through buying stock in American companies, or through direct owne rship 
of properties like plantations, warehouses, wharves, and ironworks.
84
  The real source of 
colonial wealth, however, came from “invisible” industries like shipping that produced 
no tangible trade products but offered an indispensable service to trade a s a whole.   
From colonial history I can add to the relationships gained from Marx, Wallerstein, 
and Wolf.  I arrive at much clearer understanding for the role of the “invisible” trade.  I 
see this as providing clues to the uniquely American encounter with  the modern world.  
Because this invisible trade manifested in transportation, new methods of shipping 
created by steamboatmen factored largely in the development of the West as well.  I am 
still concerned with changes in how people made things and who benefited most from 
their making, but now I look for changes to how people moved those things around.  
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II. THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION  
 
For over a century, historians, folklorists, and literary authors  have chronicled vivid, 
fanciful descriptions of the Missouri River.  Its long winding courses and notoriously 
shallow riverbed made snare-like river channels of muddied dark-brown water whose 
intimates chided it as “a river too thick to drink, but too thin to plow.”
1
  In 1882, the 
citizens of Brotherton, Missouri, across the river the from St. Charles, felt the Missouri’s 
power when in it abruptly changed course and devoured the sandy bluff beneath their 
town (figure 1).  Within a few days the Missouri swallowed all traces of the riverside 
community.  They, like many others, learned that the Missouri River commands respect 
from the first encounter, and maintains subordination through spiteful examples to those 
who had, for a brief instant, forgotten that she is as wild as any charted water anywhe re.   
Though the rough and wild nature of the river is well documented in scores of folk 
tales, personal narratives, and biographies of her more fortunate boatmen, the Missouri 
River does have another, less sinister, personality.  For merchants and farmers , whose 
economic viability depended upon land-based agriculture, the river supported their dire 
transportation needs for large bulky farm products in a way superior to land travel.
2
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Fig. 1.  Rudolph Goebel, Last Days of Brotherton, across the Missouri River from St. 
Charles, The Foot of Adams Street. (John J. Buse Collection (JJBC), folder 173: St. 
Charles – Panoramic Views, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of 
Missouri, Columbia.)  This photograph by Rudolph Goebel records the final days of 
Brotherton, near the time of its destruction from the changing course of the Missouri 
River.   
 
Ironically, those individuals most tethered to the products of the land, were 
correspondingly most dependant upon water transportation.  With this inter dependence of 
agricultural and inland river technology in mind, the following chapter argues that lower 
Missouri River communities depended upon steamboats for access to the grain, flour, 
wheat, hemp, and tobacco markets at St. Louis.  The central argument asserts that while 
St. Charles lay in close proximity to the major Mississippi River port of St. Louis, the 
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nation-wide transportation revolution, actually bypassed St. Charles in preference for 
upriver towns lying farther from St. Louis.  As steamboat crews brought central and 
western Missouri towns like Independence, Boonville, Lexington, and Weston in from 
the frontier, their reluctance to service St. Charles relegated her agriculturalists to the 
figurative hinterland of the Missouri Valley (map 1).  
 
 
Map 1.  Location of Select River Towns in Missouri, 1860.  (Source for underlay, the 
1895 US Atlas Missouri, available online www.livgenmi.com/1895/MO/state.htm.)  Note 
the stability of the upper Mississippi River compared to the Missouri.  Also note the 
change in stability between the upper and lower Mississippi River after joining the 







Frederick Jackson Turner believed American expansion was more dynamic than 
population statistics projected.
3
  For Turner, the “history of the occupation  of the 
Mississippi Valley is the history of the colonization of a region far surpassing in area the 
territory of the old thirteen states.  The explanation of this movement into the interior is a 
simple one.  It was, indeed, but the continuation of the advance of the frontier which had 
begun in the earliest days of American colonization.”
4
  Turner saw the statistics of 
westward expansion as the platform from which to arrive at a deeper social history of the 
Westerners.  Turner’s students coined the process of western colonization as the “frontier 
hypothesis” that relied on the activities of two types of people.  The first backwoodsmen 
to venture out into the wilderness instilled great esteem for Turner.  Following behind 
this first wave was the pioneer farmer, equally admirable to the backwoodsmen but for 
different reasons.  In Turner’s eyes, the pioneers brought the first signs of civilization:  
Behind the type of the backwoodsman came the type of the pioneer farmer.  Equipped 
with a little capital, he often, as we have seen, purchased the clearing, and thus 
avoided some of the initial hardship of pioneer life.  In the course of a few years, as 
sawmills were erected, frame-houses took the place of the log-cabins; the rough 
clearing, with stum ps, gave way to well-tilled fields; orchards; livestock roamed over 
the enlarged clearing; and an agricultural surplus was ready for export.  Soon the 
adventurous speculator offered corner lots in a new town-site, and the rude 
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Although Turner’s critics were numerous, they could never fault him for uninspired 
prose.  Even so, he was correct on several general points.  For instance, he realized the 
rapid changes to Western lives after the invention of the steamboat.  Turner believed “the 
introduction of steamboats had revolutionized transportation conditions in the 
West….This explains some of the extension of [Western] settlement, for it was now 
possible to carry supplies up the river-courses and to secure a better outlet for agricultural 
products.”
6
  Turner, however, was not the only historian to realize the power of 
technological improvements at the start of the nineteenth century.  George Rogers Taylor 
defined the transportation revolution as a progression of technological improvements 
aimed at quickening and cheapening the movement of cargo within the United States.
7
  
At its heart, however, the revolution eliminated nearly all remnants of a colonial 
economy from the eastern states but transplanted them along the new “coastline” of the 
Ohio-Mississippi river system.  By the end of the War of 1812, merchant capitalists in 
urban centers like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, who traditionally engaged in 
nearly every aspect of commerce, gave way to more specialized classes of merchants.   
Shipping played a vital role in the specialization of colonial economies.  Thomas 
Doerflinger quantitatively analyzed specialized shipping merchants in Philadelphia from 
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1756 to 1774.  He demonstrated a pattern of expanding dissociation between shipping 
and trading activities among colonial Philadelphians.  Merchant incomes from shipping 
derived from two direct sources : owning all or part of a vessel or managing a consigned 
vessel owned by others.  In the former case, a merchant used a vessel for his trade 
exclusively and/or sold cargo space for customer freight.  In the latter, he profited from 
commission sales of freight arrangements and from tending to repairs and crew 
provisions.
8
   
Each of these activities left a distinct trace in Philadelphia port records.  Merchants 
who purchased even a share of a vessel appeared in the Pennsylvania Ship Register, 
while those who handled commission freight appeared in the Tonnage Duty Book for 
Philadelphia’s port.  Although the nature of colonial records prohibited Doerfling er from 
precisely separating commission merchants from ship owners, a clear trend existed 
between merchants’ involvement in any shipping activity.  Between 1756 and 1761, 62 
percent of Philadelphia merchants shipped freight as either owners or commission a gents.  
In contrast, between 1765 and 1774, only 55 percent of merchants acted in either or both 
capacities.  More revealing, however, was that 6 percent of the city’s merchants from 
1756 to 1774 commissioned an impressive 38 percent of total port freight.  Conversely, 
only 13 percent of the city’s merchants owned about 50 percent of measured ships’ 
tonnage.  Doerflinger’s analysis showed that only about half of Philadelphia merchants 
engaged in shipping of any kind, and the few wealthy firms shipped intens ively.  Colonial 
Philadelphia exemplified the transportation service industry’s power to  capture and 
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control capital.   
Taylor attributed the growth of this new merchant class mainly to improvements in 
transportation on both land and water.
9
  When later merchants moved to the West on the 
flood of expansionism in the 1830s, they encountered an economic environment more 
familiar to their colonial predecessors.   
In colonial ports, an importer (known as dry goods merchant) received finished goods 
like cloth and hardware.  These items sold quickly to other colonial artisans, shopkeepers, 
and farmers, not for cash, but for extended credit of several months.  Even though dry 
goods merchants preferred to pay their suppliers with cash, they often had to accept bills  
of exchange drawn on British firms by other colonists.  These bills originally resulted 
from shipments of provisions like tobacco, sugar, dyes, or foodstuffs sent from the 
colonies to a British exchange house.  The bills for colonial foodstuffs, however, did not 
represent direct shipments from North America to England proper.  Because British 
exchange houses purchased these items cheaper in their home markets, provision 
merchants shipped foodstuffs to satellite branches of British houses stationed in the 
Iberian Peninsula and Madeira, or to other West Hemisphere colonial ports in exchange 
for products valued in England.  Provisions like Chesapeake tobacco or West Indies sugar 
were sent directly to British home markets.  Colonists who purchased foodstuffs pa id for 
them by drawing on their British contacts to transfer their credit from a tobacco shipment 
to the debit account of the foodstuff exporter.  The tobacco exporter then sent the 
exchange bill to the foodstuff exporter thereby balancing their account.  The bill 
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represented a contract to share a certain percentage of profits gained from the sale of 
stipulate goods.
10
   
The English innovated this system by allowing the bearer of an exchange bill to 
discount and transfer the original percent.  Hypothetically , a tobacco exporter who was 
guaranteed 5 percent retail value from his shipment might sell a flour exporter 3 percent 
of the retail.  The negotiation became a wager between the current value of flour and the 
future value of tobacco.  The provisions merchant returned the bill to the exchange house 
(from which he likely purchase d dry goods) to cancel his debt.  In the rare event he had 
no debt, a merchant sold bills to other colonists with debt.  In the latter situation, the 
provision merchant could discount the bill yet again, further dividing future profit.  The 
degree a holder discounted a bill depended on the exchange rate set by the amount of 
colonists needing bills to clear debts.  When demand rose, the exchange rate soared.  This 
in turn heightened demand for stable currency like specie, which further compounded the 
scarcity of gold and silver (the only reason for accepting bills in the first place).  
Merchants unable to find either bills or specie sent their creditors provisions valued in 
England and known as a remittances.  When the need for a remittance originated from 
inflated prices for easily obtained products like tobacco and sugar, merchants sought 
other valued products.
11
  In New England and the Mid-Atlantic, for example, alternative 
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remittances generally consisted of iron, which was difficult to obtain and expensive to 
ship.  The colonial exchange system resembled a triangular trade carrying both physical 
goods and debts around the Atlantic’s rim.
12
   
Although the sources and destinations for prov isions varied for the colonists and mid-
nineteenth-century merchants, they both succumbed to the same external market forces 
from their creditors.  Chapter 3 will show how two New England brothers traveled to St. 
Louis in the 1830s to produce tin ware.  They found an environment that forced them to 
operate much as colonial merchants had a century earlier.  In order to sell their goods, 
they eventually found products valued in the East as remittances.  In broad terms, both 
their notions of the “East” and of items valuable to remit differed from their colonial 
predecessors.  The critical aspect, however, lay in the broader process.  It was not the 
particulars of space and time that wove threads common between early colonists and later 
westerners; instead, it was the fundamental universality of their problems and solutions.  
Considering the western United States simply as a frontier, however, obscures this 
area’s resemblance to a colony.  As Kenneth E. Lewis demonstrated in his work 
concerning the settlement of M ichigan in 1815–1860, the process of frontier expansion 
was inseparable from agricultural colonization.
13
  As physical borders expanded, the 
newly settled periphery relied on agricultural production for its economic survival.
14
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Lewis considered the settlement of the western United States as the manifestation of the 
Europe’s agricultural expansion beginning in the fifteenth century.  By viewing the 
nineteenth-century growth of the United States as a part of a continuum of European 
colonization, therefore, several aspects of the western economy are elucidated.   
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the western economy depended on 
the East.
15
  Even up to the twentieth century, however, eastern colonial America 
depended on an cross-Atlantic economy.  Lewis pointed out that “as the frontier 
incorporates new lands, the process of colonization follows an evolutionary sequence in 
the sense that the pattern of change once occurring in the center of the newly settled area 
was later repeated along its periphery.”
16
  The process of economic replication in the 
expanding frontier, justified viewing the West as a figurative United States colony.  
Similarly, it gave an explanation for the actions, and subsequent reaction, to the western 
economy that eastern-born merchants exhibited after emigrating westward in the early 
nineteenth century.  The spread of modern economy of scale that had begun in the East 
during the 1780s did not reach the western states until the 1830s.   
By the 1780s, a new economy of scale separated the two activities among traders in 
eastern states.  After the Revolution, Doerflinger found it common for Philadelphia dry 
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goods firms to keep 300–400 accounts open.
17
  Although this was similar to earlier 
importers like New York’s Christopher Bancker , who in the early eighteenth century, 
extended credit to over 200 individuals, and to later 1770s importers like W illiam 
Alexander who kept over 300 accounts open with country producers, a different pattern 
arose after the Revolutionary War.
18
  After 1783, even large merchants like the prominent 
provision traders, Stephen Girard and Benjamin Fuller kept open only 85–165 accounts.
19
   
An eastern merchant tried to keep the smallest number of accounts open as possible.  
When he arrived in the West, however, he discovered that a widespread lack of currency 
required him to extend credit to many customers.  Instead of specie, a merchant accepted 
bills of exchange or local products to ship east for remittance.  Those arriving in the 
1830s found these practices anachronistic.  For example, Chapter 3 relates the 
experiences of a St. Louis dry goods merchant during the 1830s and shows his 
displeasure to act as provisions exporter, shipper, and money lender.  Even though 
eastern merchants engaged in these diverse business enterprises up to the late eighteenth 
century, Doerflinger argued this type of diversification was becoming rare in the East by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century.  From an economic viewpoint, then, emigrating 
west in early to mid-nineteenth century was akin to emigrating from Britain to 
eighteenth-century colonial America.  As long as the western United States remained 
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physically isolated from the East, its inhabitants remained both spatially and 
economically separated from their “home country,” the United States proper.  
A turning point arrived with the great innovation of steampower that shortened the 
gap between the eastern and western states by bringing two contrasting economies 
together.  This chapter steps back to define Taylor’s transportation revolution and then 
narrows the broader national developments to the western river steamboat, and then 
finally to the lower Missouri River.  This chapter provides the context for the narrow 
scope of the following chapters. 
 The hallmark of the transportation revolution was the overall decrease in freight rates 
across the United States.  In 1815 as the era dawned, shipping one ton of freight 3,000 
miles (4,828 km) westward across the Atlantic Ocean typically cost about $9.  For that 
same $9, however, one ton of freight across land routes inside the United States could be 
transported only 30 miles (48 km).
20
  The effect of such differing rates severely 
constricted travel within North America, so that the distance between Europe and New 
England was, from an economic perspective, shorter than between Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh.  By the era’s end in 1860, construction of turnpikes and plank roads, coupled 
with competition from canals, steamboats, and railroads dramatically decreased freight 




 The first great push towards connecting large sections of the Untied States came in 
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the form of turnpikes.  Though improved toll roads existed in the eighteenth century, the 
call for large-scale turnpike construction was relatively silent until after the War of 1812.  
A large network of country and farm roads already connected most of the settled United 
States, but these roads, plagued with potholes and mud pits, were notoriously ill-suited 
for heavy cargo.  Although eastern roadways were notoriously rugged, citizens of the 
West looked on them with envy.  As late as 1850, a St. Louis farming journal, the  Valley 
Farmerr [sic], compared roads in both regions and noted that: 
One great draw-back to the prosperity of Western and Southern farmers, and one that 
has prevented, in a great measure, the increase of population in particular localities, 
has been the difficulty of transportation and travel from one point to another.  A 
portion of the year, the roads have been passable, even very good and pleasant, but for 
a few months in the winter season, nearly all travel must be suspended except what 
may be done on horseback.  A fertile, clay soil, destitute of rock and gravel and lying 
nearly level, becomes so muddy from a little rain as to be nearly impassable .  –  Roads 
in such a country are not like the dirt roads of New England where the soil is hard, and 
the surface uneven, and consequently soon drained of the water .  – This peculiarity of 
the Western country to have muddy roads, has often been referred to, and still is, by 
the eastern emigrant when writing to his friends at home.  He tells them that this is a  




When relied upon for the movement of troops and supplies during British coastal 
blockades in 1812, country roads in the East proved alarmingly inadequate for national 
defense.  From the war’s end until the 1830s, a boom in turnpike construction converted 
highly traveled portions of the preexisting country road network into smooth, well-
drained, gravel roadbeds.
23
  This national attention throughout the nineteenth century 
                                                       
22
 Valley Farmerr: A Monthly Journal of Agricultural, Horticulture, Education, and 
Domestic Economy, Adapted to the Wants of the Cultivators of the Soil in the Valley of 
the Mississippi 2, no. 3, ed., Ephraim Abbot (St. Louis, MO, March 1850): 91.  
23






prompted several bills in Congress for federally sponsored turnpike projects.  The 
legislative or executive branches consistently rejected these bills which, in Taylor’s 
opinion, testified to the “bitter state and sectional jealousies which were wracking the 
new nation.”
24
  Even with lessons learned in 1812–1815, federal sentiments against the 
constitutionality of multi-state thoroughfares placed appropriations for turnpike 
construction in local municipalities’ hands.  State governments like Massachusetts, 
fearing to enhance the westward migration of their farmers, bitterly opposed improved 
connections with the mid-Atlantic region.  Other states in the mid-Atlantic and Midwest, 
however, facilita ted the eastward movement of crops to their own ports by encouraging 
turnpike projects.  By the high point of turnpike construction in the mid-1820s, New 
York and Pennsylvania contained the most turnpike mileage in the country, with 4,000 
and 2,400 miles (6,437 and 3,862 km) respectively.  But with the average capital 
investment nearing $100,000 for each project, ample private support was not found easily 
in sparsely populated rural areas.  For passenger service, turnpikes provided superior 
travel compared to country roads, but for the average farmer carrying heavy loads to 
market, turnpikes were too expensive.
25
    
 Although a few states, like Pennsylvania, invested money directly from their own 
treasuries for turnpike projects, capital investments came mainly from private stock 
companies.  With turnpike construction falling to the private sector, no significant 
improvements to roadways extended beyond state borders.  The lack of  national or multi-










state organization, huge capital demands, and endless maintenance costs, returned 
unimpressive dividends for turnpike investors.  Even on the few successful turnpikes that 
charged reasonable fares, the added cost to bulky, agricultural products cut profits too 
sharply when transporting over any sizeable distance.  Ultimately, the short-lived zeal for 
turnpikes yielded to more profitable bridge and plank road companies that quickly 
showed separate advantages to their predecessors.
26
 
  Similar to turnpikes, bridges normally were constructed by private stock companies 
charging tolls for their use.  The most notable distinction with bridges, however, was 
their profit generating capabilities.  The iconic covered bridges common in the East, 
required the same basic set of skills needed in home building and masonry work.  The 
added benefits of cheap lumber and stone made these bridges affordable options  in rural 
settings.  With the development of railroads, however, bridge construction acquired a 
new specialized set of engineering skills.  Although Taylor argued that “the strides which 
marked bridge building between 1816 and 1860 epitomize the transportation revolution,” 
he fell short of giving them full credit for providing economical long-distance 
transportation.
27
  Before railroads, even the best built bridge only connected two sides of 
an incorrigible country road.  Not until their incorporation into the system of railroads did 
bridges serve a vital role in long-distance transportation.  Yet even as railroads and 
bridges linked major markets inside the United States, farmers and merchants still relied 










upon unfavorable country roads for access to the main lines.
28
   
 Starting in the mid-1840s, communities invested funds in plank roads.  These roads 
were the cheapest solution to span short distances to a nearby market house or another 
transportation hub.  Plank roads emerged much like turnpikes.  Private stock companies 
raised capital, charged tolls, and maintained the road bed.  They differed widely, 
however, in their initial cost.  Whereas turnpikes consumed large amounts of time and 
labor for grading, and laying a stone foundation beneath a gravel roadbed, plank roads 
were much quicker and simpler in nature.  Typically laid upon a well-used country road, 
plank roads required little extra modification to the original surface.  Workers laid thick 
wooden timbers (called stringers) on the ground parallel with the road direction.  Stingers 
were similar to the metal rails of a train track, except that across  their top sides an 
additional set of perpendicular wooden planks (about three inches thick and eight feet 
long) created a deck-like floor.  In one sense, plank roads resembled an upside-down 
railroad track without any gaps between the wooden planks.  The end product appeared 
much like the wooden sidewalks common to many American towns in the nineteenth 
century.  Averaging between $1,500 and $1,800 per mile, a plank road compared 
favorably with standard costs of $3,000 to $4,000 per mile for most stone turn pikes.
29
  
While no community intended plank roads to cover large distances, they were touted as 
affordable options for communities where a market house or trunk line lay just beyond 
the horizon.   










Appealing to Missouri farmers’ sense of state pride, the Valley Farmerr [sic] editor 
reminded his readership about the “intelligent yeomanry” of Indiana farmers and their 
zeal for plank road projects.
30
  Not only were Indianans increasing their material wealth  
by building plank roads, but they were also “promot[ing] the cause of civilization, and 
unit[ing] more perfectly the interests of the people.”
31
  There was likely no other project 
requiring more involvement from the local community than plank roads.  Similarly, no 
other personal investment would likely translate  so succinctly to both individual and 
communal prosperity.  Even with their benefits, however, these roads required local 
funding that foremost meant community support.  This could be done, as the Valley 
Farmerr editor did, by highlighting neighboring comm unities’ foresight for the inevitable 
profits of road construction and by associating their eagerness to invest with a desire for 
greater liberty.  The Valley Farmerr noted:  
Hardly a paper in the State [of Indiana] but comes laden with the proceedings of plank 
road meetings – account of stock subscribed  –  receipts from those already constructed  
– and proposed new routes.  All the small towns in the interior of the State are seeking 
connection with each other and preparing a thousand tributary branches by w hich to 
reach the great thoroughfares that lead to the best markets.  The cheapness of 
construction, the abundance of material found in all portions of the S tate, the rapidity 
with which they may be completed, the wonderful adaptation to present wants and 
present means and their unparalleled profits – all these conspire to make them the 
favorite highways of the farmer. 
…  [Plank roads] render man more social, and by constant intercourse with others, 
he extends the limits of his thoughts and opens his heart to the operations of an 
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Ultimately though, planks roads deteriorated quickly, as large impassable holes 
appeared when rotten stringers collapsed.  Extensive replacement of the roadway 
prohibited long term use, and brought a quick end to plank road mania by the late 
1850s.
33
  For a brief period, however, these roads linked farming communities that sat in 
tantalizing nearness to regional markets.  They remained viable only until alternate 
infrastructure penetrated and brought a more cost-effective means of transportation.  
Before transportation alternatives reached St. Charles, the Wheat Growers Association of 
St. Charles led a campaign to raise capital for a  25-mile (40-kilometer) plank road to St. 
Louis.  Their desire for a plank road was a matter of independence from high freight rates 
on the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.
34
 
 Internal improvements upon the roadways of the United States gave unsatisfactory 
results to both investors and long distance shippers.  With some notable exceptions like 
the Lancaster and Cumberland Road turnpikes, the real champions of ground 
transportation were railroads.
35
  Appearing first in the former colonies, steam-powered 
locomotives did not reach the growing agricultural belt of the Midwest until the final 
years of the transportation revolution.  Their relatively slow arrival, therefore, allowed 
developments in water transportation to flourish without serious competition for nea rly 
half a century. 
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 The first great internal improvement to water transportation was the Erie Canal.  Just 
as the War of 1812 sparked enthusiasm for turnpike construction, it also created zeal for 
ambitious canal projects.  Prior to authorization of the E rie Canal in 1817, the United 
States contained only 100 miles (161 km) of canals, although only three stretched longer 
than 2 miles (3 km).
36
   Like turnpikes, canal projects in the past suffered from apathetic 
support as frighteningly high capital investments promised only dismal returns.  Equally 
detrimental for their supporters was the general lack of engineering skill in the United 
States prior to 1817.  Only in terms of political backing did canal projects distinguish 
themselves from other internal improvements.  Without the trumpeting support of New 
York Governor De Witt Clinton, the ambitious Erie Canal project, globally 
unprecedented for both distance and engineering, never would have gained support in the 
state legislature.  Dubbed by its opponents as “Clinton’s Big Ditch,” the Erie Canal cut 
through an impressive 364 miles (586 km) of rugged upstate New York descending 650 
feet (198 m) from its high point at Buffalo and down through a series of sophisticated 
locks and aqueducts to its terminus on the  Hudson River at Albany.
37
  Neither the United 
States, nor any other nation, had attempted an improvement project on such phenomenal 
scale.  As Taylor aptly stated “the Erie Canal was an act of faith, the demonstration of a 
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spirit of enterprise by an organized government that has few parallels in world history.”
38
  
The credit given to Governor Clinton and the New York legislature for assuming total 
responsibility in raising $10,000,000 or $130,000,000 in modern currency cannot be 
overstated.
39
  By 1819, after nearly two years of construction, the canal’s 75-mile (194-
km) middle-section opened for traffic.  By 1825, the entire waterway, including the 
adjoining Champlain Canal, was officially opened with grand ceremonies.  By its second 
anniversary, toll receipts for both canals amounted to over $1,250,000 or $21,250,000 in 
modern currency.
40
  By 1835, work began to widen the canal by 30 feet (9 m) and deepen 
it by 3 feet (1 m) to accommodate the steadily growing traffic volume.  Besides sparking 
a “nation-wide craze for canal building,” the proven success of the Erie and Champlain 
canals marked the first viable solution to opening the bottleneck of internal transportation 
within the United States.
41
  Even though by 1850 nearly 3,700 miles (5,955 km) of canals 
crisscrossed the United States, the vast majority served areas in the Northeast.  While the 
Midwest captured the distance record in 1853 by completing the 450-mile (724-km) long 





Ibid., 33.; for financial equation see,  John J. McCusker , How Much Is That In Real 
Money?: A Historical Commodity Price Index for Use as a Deflator of Money Values in 
the Economy of the United States 2d ed. rev. (Worcester, MA., 2001).  McCusker’s book 
is a useful tool for converting historic money into modern equivalents.  All conversions 
from this point forward are based on his formula that divides the composite commodity 
price index (CPI) for the year 2000 by the CPI for any given year.  In this case the year 
2000 CPI is divided by the year 1817 CPI (2,059 ÷ 160 = 13).  This establishes the ratio 
of year 2000 dollars to year 1817 dollars, which is then multiplied by the dollar amount 
in question to arrive at a modern currency equivalent (13 x $10,000,000 = $130,000,000).  
 
40
Taylor, The Transportation Revolution; for financial equation see McCusker, How 
Much Is That in Real Money?  
 
41





Wabash and Eire Canal, the greatest impact to transportation upon the western waters  
came from the technological im provement of steamboats.
42
  
Steamboat technology fit particularly well into nineteenth-century American life.  As 
Taylor stated, “with its continental expanse and vast inland distances the United States 
was from the beginning peculiarly dependent upon river transportation.”
43
  At the dawn 
of the transportation revolution few places stood to benefit more from improvements in 
river transportation than the western states.  Across the United States inland trade moved 
in a counterclockwise route beginning in the Ohio River Valley.  Farm products like 
wheat, butter, and pork from western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana moved southward 
along the downstream course of the Ohio River.  Rivermen loaded these foodstuffs in 
flatboats at Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, or Louisville.  They then joined these products with 
shipments of hemp, lead, and tobacco collected from points around the Mississippi and 
Missouri rivers; all eventually headed for New Orleans.  From the port of New Orleans, 
overseas provisions merchants bought small portions the interior’s goods for export to 
Europe or the West Indies.  Most other purchases sailed around the North American coast 
to principal Atlantic ports like New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.  As exchange for the 
raw materials of the Ohio-Mississippi river valleys, dry goods importers purchased 
manufactured items like textiles, hardware, and china that their eastern suppliers shipped 
westward in wagon trains across the Appalachian Highlands from Philadelphia or 
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Baltimore.  This circular trade route covered over 3,000 miles (4,828 km) with each 
section utilizing a distinct form of transportation.  The route, however, moved primarily 
in a counterclockwise direction until the introduction of steamboats.
44
   
 Although trade goods moved westward across the Appalachian Mountains by wagon 
routes, bulky farm products of the west could not be transported eastward over the 
turnpikes at a cost effective rate.  Westerners opined this asymmetrical flow of goods was 
an outright conspiracy orchestrated by the eastern businessmen.  Turner credited this 
conspiratorial view mainly to the social circum stances in which Westerners lived.  He 
argued 
it was certain that this society, where equality and individualism flourished, where 
assertive democracy was supreme, where impatience with the old order of things was 
a ruling passion, would demand control of the government, would resent the rule of 
the trained statesmen and official classes, and would fight nomination by 




From a world systems approach, conspiratorial sentiments underscored the inherent 
tensions created by asymmetrical trade relationships.  In Wallerstein’s terms, the West sat 
in a peripheral relationship to the East.  As long the eastern capital directed the flow of 
internal trade, eastern businessmen would always ensure profit margins favoring eastern 
goods over western ones.  Westerners intuitively understood their future independence in 
trade literally hinged on steamboats’ ability to travel against the current of western rivers.  
Their statements revealed this fact clearly:  
if we continue as we have done for the last twenty years, to be tributary to the 










Pennsylvania and Maryland wagoners, it would have been m uch better for us that we 
had not separated from Great Britain ... The British Government felt no jealousy 
against any portion of the West, as is now felt by the mercantile states of the Atlantic  
and particularly by New England.  Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York have and 
are now contending with each other which will monopolize the greatest portion of the 
trade of the western country, and these states have for many years succeeded in 
diverting the trade of the West from its natural channel (the Ohio and Mississippi) 
through the states of Pennsylvania and Maryland and over the rugged mountains 
which nature never intended for the transportation of merchandise for the western 
country.
46
   
 
 Even with land carriage from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh comprising on ly about 300 
miles (483 km), or about 10 percent, of the entire trade circle, this part of the trip cost 
more than both river and coastal shipments combined.
47
  Similarly, the river portion of 
the trade route flowed primarily in only one direction.  The fast currents and numerous 
hidden obstructions of the Mississippi greatly inhibited upriver transportation.  At the end 
of their trip, a flatboat crew dismantled its vessel, sold it as lumber in New Orleans, and 
then literally walked home over the Natchez Trace foot path.  Even for light-weight, 
high-value goods, river shipments against the current of the Mississippi or Ohio rivers 
were simply too costly and laborious for profitable use.
48
  Before the introduction of 
steampower on the western rivers, the only noteworthy attempts to curtail the loss of 
profit and time from flatboat transportation was the construction of larger seagoing 
vessels in upper Ohio River Valley.  
During the early summer of 1816, the fifty-ton schooner Maria, built at Marietta, 
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Ohio, sailed to Baltimore in forty-six days with a cargo of pork, flour, and lard.  By 
setting out on the Ohio River, she overcame the typical delays from transferring cargo 
and scrapping a flatboat at New Orleans, but the hazards of river navigation, especially in 
the shallow Mississippi, proved too dangerous for the deep drafts and sharp keels 
necessary on sea going schooners.
49
   
 Only steamboats advanced the steady westward progression of American culture 
without contest from the railroads until the late 1850s.  Though they were particularly 
suited to the western dependence upon river transportation, some brief mention of their 
role in the East is worth noting.  Several attempts to apply steampower to water 
transportation occurred during the eighteenth century.  In 1737, Jonathan Hull acquired 
the first known patent for a steam -powered vessel.
50
   
By the late eighteenth century, American inventors, particularly James Rumsey and 
John Fitch, devised clever steamboat designs for use on eastern rivers like the Potomac, 
Hudson, and Delaware.  Rumsey’s design for the Potomac used a simple steam -pump, 
similar to those used in mines, which sucked water from the boat’s bow and expelled it 
from the stern.  His propulsion technique worked well on the calm waters of Virginia, but  
low horsepower and the unreliability of Rumsey’s design made his boat a commercial 
failure.  Like Rumsey, Fitch’s designs excelled in ingenuity, but proved better for 
gathering spectators than for moving them.  Though Fitch briefly profited from shuttling 
between Philadelphia and Trenton in 1790, the real commercial success of steamboating 
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came with Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston’s Clermont in 1807.
51
  Built for use on 
the Hudson River, the Clermont enjoyed an exclusive monopoly within the state of New  
York.  By the end of the War of 1812, the Fulton-Livingston partnership had added 
several other steamboats to its monopoly, but challengers wishing to grab profits for 
themselves soon appeared.  John Stevens twice attempted to place steamboats, the 
Phoenix and the Juliana, in New York waters.  By 1813, the Fulton-Livingston 
partnership forced Stevens to withdraw both boats to the Delaware and Connecticut 
rivers.
52
  Granting navigation rights solely to the Fulton and Livingston partnership 
ensured a private monopoly between New York City and Philadelphia, the most lucrative 
trade route in the East, but a second challenger to their title could not be disposed as 
easily as Stevens. 
By 1815, Aaron Ogden successfully convinced the New Jersey legislature to enact 
retaliatory legislation against the New York monopolists.  With this he forced the Fulton -
Livingston partnership into a compromise in which Ogden paid the former for exclusive 
rights to operate steam ferry service between New York and Elizabeth -Town Point, New 
Jersey.  Ogden’s efforts, however, saved him from competition for only a few years.  In 
1818, he formed a partnership with the wealthy southern planter, Thomas Gibbons, who 
carried a reputation as a stubborn duelist and fighter.  Not surprisingly , a quarrel soon 
dissolved the partnership, and Gibbons spitefully outfitted his own boat with Cornelius 
Vanderbilt in command.  Gibbons and Vanderbilt suited each other perfectly.  On the 
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water Vanderbilt brazenly ignored New York state law, while in the courts Gibbons 
pushed his legal rights to the US Supreme Court.  In the famous 1824 decision of 
Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall held that only Congress could regulate 
interstate trade thereby dismantling the Fulton-Livingston monopoly run on water 
between states.  The following year New York repealed its monopoly privileges, and 
steam navigation on eastern waters tremendously expanded.
53
  Turner noted the 
importance of this decision to Western life:  
the outlet from the West over the roads to the East and South was but a subordinate 
element in her internal commerce.  It was the Father of Waters, with its ramifying 
tributaries, which gathered the products of the great valley and brought them to New 
Orleans.  …  As steamboats ascended the various tributaries of the Mississippi to 
gather the products of the growing West, the pioneers came more and more to realize 
the importance of the invention.  They resented the idea of the monopoly which 
Fulton and Livingston wished to enforce prior to the decision of  Chief Justice 





By the late 1820s, and for the rest of their existence, eastern steamboats concentrated 
heavily on passenger service across rivers and lakes.  With inland freight falling primarily 
to canals and railroads, steamboats in the East could not compete for low-value bulk 
freight.  Likewise, on the Great Lakes steamboats could not compete for freight business 
because those waters better suited low-cost sailing schooners.
55
  As passenger carriers, 
however, steamboats became integrated into the system of canals and turnpikes in the 
East.  In upper New York state, for instance, passengers traveling the country could 
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expect coordinating schedules between stagecoaches, canal boats, and steamboats so that 
a trip requiring more than one mode of transportation was theoretically  possible without 
long delays (figure 2).
56
   
By the mid-nineteenth century, westerners traveling east utilized a predictable 
passenger service to move about the country.  In 1844, St. Charles resident, George C. 
Sibley, recorded his trip throughout the United States in one of his surviving 
“Commonplace Books.”
57
  The main impetus for Sibley’s travels was the national Whig 
Party convention held that spring in Washington, DC.  His account detailed the use of 
several modes of transportation, including steamboats, coaches, and railroads.  Most 
interesting for students of transportation was Sibley’s desire to visit friends, relatives, and 
a party of Liberia-bound freedmen in various coastal cities.  While the first leg of his trip 
was a rather straightforward route from the Mississippi River to Washington, his return 
trip took a circuitous route from Baltimore to Philadelphia, then to New York City, and 
finally back home via the Great Lakes.  Sibley revealed a surprising sophistication for the 
mid-nineteenth-century eastern transportation infrastructure.  A condensed version of his 
travel log appears in appendix C of this work, and certainly is worth the extra pages 
afforded its printing.  
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Fig. 2.  Stage, Canal, and Steamboat Register, for Upstate New York in 1829. The 
figure is shown with two enlarged sections giving directions for travel arrangements.  






 Even with early experimentation and commercialization occurring first on eastern 
rivers, the waters of western America quickly rose to the forefront of steamboating.  
Rumsey first advocated the use of steamboats on the Mississip pi and Ohio rivers as early 
as 1785 in a letter to George Washington, his sponsor.  Having spent several years in the 
mountains of Appalachia, John Fitch repeatedly advocated the commercial advantages of 
western steamboats, though he always failed to convince investors.  Even as Fulton 
prepared the Clermont for her maiden voyage, he placed hope in the West, writing that 
“whatever may be the fate of steamboats for the Hudson, everything is completely proved 
for the Mississippi.”
58
  Shortly after his successfu l debut, Fulton still insisted that his 
experiment proved steamboats would “give a cheap and quick conveyance to the 
merchandise on the Mississippi, Missouri, and other great rivers, which are now laying 
open their treasures to the enterprise of our countr ymen.”
59
  Least of those Fulton needed 
to convince of western steamboating was his partner Robert Livingston.   
As minister to France for President Thomas Jefferson, Livingston negotiated the 
Louisiana Purchase and firmly understood the commercial success a waiting steamboats 
in the new territory.  By calling on his brother Edward, a practicing lawyer in New 
Orleans, Livingston kept informed on Louisiana’s political environment and used his 
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connections to duplicate the Fulton-Livingston New York monopoly in the West.
60
   
Unlike the Hudson River, however, exclusive rights to the Mississippi and Ohio 
rivers were not easily obtained.  Most of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers lay between 
states or territories, forcing Fulton and Livingston to petition several legislatures for 
patent rights.  Although granting exclusive rights had traditionally occurred in the East – 
Rumsey received patents from three states and Fitch received them from seven  – all but 
one of Fulton and Livingston’s petitions were denied in the West.
61
 
 Distrust of Eastern business interests was more complicated than geographic 
loyalties.  The possible source of distrust centered in the fears of monopolistic control 
from outside capitalists.  Monopolies had long traditions among mercantilist governments  
and their colonists.  As early as 1684, wealthy New York exporters convinced the 
provincial council and Governor Thomas Dongan to pass a city ordinance creating a 
bolting monopoly.  The ordinance passed even with strong protest from the city’s general 
assembly.  Although the next governor disbanded the monopoly in 1690, it foreshadowed 
decades of tensions between country agriculturalists and city exporters.
62
  Perhaps, 
lingering sentiments of mercantilism were pervasive in the West?  Like seventeenth-
century colonial investors, the Fulton-Livingston partnership could not protect their risk 
without political aid.  Because their success carried mutual public benefit, they could 
argue, state governments had the right, if not the obligation, to offer protective measures.   
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The Fulton-Livingston partnership made an understandable argument.  Besides being 
standard practice in the Atlantic states, the partnership estimated its initial investment in 
1807 for just one steamboat on the Mississippi to reach $200,000 or $3,000,000 in 
modern currency.
63
  Exaggerated or not, how could Fulton and Livingston expect to 
entice investors without assuring protection of their rights?  The partnership’s argument, 
however, fell on deaf ears in the legislatures of Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana, and 
the Upper Louisiana Territory.  Only through Edward L ivingston’s personal connection 
with W. C. C. Claiborne, governor of the territory of Orleans, did the Fulton-Livingston 
partnership gain an exclusive rights patent.  Though their one  success provided an 
eighteen-year monopoly on the most crucial portion of the Mississippi, the partnership’s 
widespread failure resulted from a general distrust of eastern business, weighing heavy in 
the minds of western politicians.  The Territory of Orleans grant took effect in 1810, and 
immediately upriver legislatures protested the monopoly.  Ohio and Kentucky passed 
formal resolutions denouncing the virtual control given to the Fulton -Livingston 
partnership for effectively blocking free movement of trade at Mississippi’s doorstep.  In 




  In October 1811, Fulton and Livingston sent the steamboat New Orleans, built in 
Pittsburgh that same year, on a 2,000-mile (3,219-km) trip to southern Louisiana.  
Reaching New Orleans in January 1812, the 371 ton boat enjoyed two brief but profitable 
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years in the New Orleans-Natchez trade.  In just her first year, the New Orleans returned 
50 percent of the original capital investment by netting a profit of $20,000 or $260,000 in 
modern currency.
65
  Encouraged by this success, the partnership constructed three more 
steamboats for the trade by 1815.
66
  The additional capital placed in steamboats running 
the lower Mississippi quickly proved wise investments.  On just one trip from New 
Orleans to Louisville in 1816, the Fulton-Livingston steamboat Aetna carried a freight 
bill of $25,000 or $300,000 in modern currency.
67
  Two years later on the same run, the 
Vesuvius brought a freight bill totaling $47,000 or $611,000 in modern currency, of 
which half was reportedly net profit.
68
 Like those on the Hudson River, however, profits 
of the Mississippi fleet were simply too impressive to go unnoticed.  After serving only 
one full year on the Mississippi River, a rival steamboat group of Daniel French and 
Henry M. Shreve out of Brownsville , Pennsylvania, challenged the New Orleans.
69
  
 The French-Shreve partnership constructed four steamboats between 1813 and 1816.  
As they prepared their first boat, the Comet, for launch on the Ohio River, French and 
Shreve came under legal suit by Fulton and Livingston.  Undeterred by claims of rights 
violations, French and Shreve continued to violate trade restrictions by sending boats to 
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the port of New Orleans.  Ultimately, their disregard for territorial monopoly led twice to 
seizures of their third steamboat, the Enterprise.  Out of the ensuing lawsuit in 1816, the 
lower state court of Louisiana (statehood in 1812) held that the former territorial 
legislature lacked authority to grant Fulton and Livingston’s monopoly.  Even with an 
unfavorable ruling, the Fulton-Livingston partnership continued bringing legal suits until 
1818.  By this time, however, both Fulton and Livingston had died, and their successors 
grew increasingly unwilling to suffer further courtroom defeats.  Succumbing rather 
ingloriously to the pressures of French and Shreve, two of the three surviving Fulton 
boats were sold, effectively ending the monopoly.
70
   
 Exclusive control of the lower Mississippi ended six years earlier than its counterpart 
on the Hudson River had with Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824.  Without Supreme Court 
intervention, the entire Ohio-Mississippi river system now lay completely unhindered to 
the development and expansion of steam boats.  During the seven-year reign of the 
Fulton-Livingston partnership, from 1811 to 1818, only eighteen steamboats traversed the 
western waters.  In the following years from 1818 to 1820, however, the number of 
steamboats built and operating in the West rose to fifty-eight, not including the original 
eighteen.
71
  While French and Shreve’s dogged assault on the lower Mississippi factored 
greatly into this 322 percent increase, a second event is equally noteworthy.  
In 1816, French and Shreve built their fourth steamboat, the Washington.  The 
following year Shreve accompanied the boat on a trip from New Orleans to Louisville.   










Beside the inevitable courtroom appearance, the trip also sparked great excitement for 
making the run in a record-setting twenty-five days.
72
  Compared to the three or four 
months consumed by keelboat and barge boats ascending the river, the Washington’s 
short trip seemed unbelievable.  Louisville ’s citizens held a public dinner honoring 
Shreve for his accomplishment.  Captain Robeson de Hart master of Fulton’s Aetna, 
which made the run in an equally impressive thirty-five days just one week prior, also 
was invited.  Newspaper editors at the dinner praised both men for having “gained much 
of public esteem by their success and enterprising exertions to demonstrate the 
practicability of navigating the Ohio and Mississippi, ‘the high seas of the western 
country,’ with steam vessels.”
73
  In one respect, western enthusiasm for steamboats began 
with the first line of Fulton-Livingston boats five years earlier, but not until the 
Washington’s celebrated time did westerners truly focus on the possibilities of the new 
era.  No longer could steamboats be seen sim ply as ambitious experiments .  They were 
now a legitimate part of the western scene, a substantive indicator of the rising prosperity 
of the western econom y.
74
    
 The effects of transportation revolution were now fully noticeable to easterners who 
watched New Orleans divert trade from the trans-Appalachian routes.  As congressional 
committees planned to improve turnpikes leading to the Mississippi Valley, western 
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newspaper editors believed this signaled fear in eastern cities.
75
   Re-routing trade 
through cheaper, faster channels kept western wealth at home and balanced political 
power in Washington.  From a westerner’s perspective, then, as the door West swung 
both ways at New Orleans, it could finally correct the asymmetry of economic power.  
This fact was most apparent in the renewed interest of eastern congressmen who called 
for internal-roadway improvements leading to the West.  Westerners believed that steam 
navigation “seals our claims to independence,” and that “ Mississippi steamboats work 
every miracle; form roads, dig canals, enlighten committees of Congress, polish eastern 
manners, connect by mutual interest the east with the west, make western members of 
Congress feel and know their consequence.  All this affected by the power of steam.”
76
  
For western congressmen, steamboats personified the balancing of trade relations 
between themselves and the core of economic influence.  As Wallerstein predicted, trade 
relations equated to economic power leveling the former had immediate corresponding 
affects to the latter.  
 Both the num ber and size of steamboats on the western rivers grew at astonishin g 
rates throughout the ante-bellum period.  By 1830, the number reached 187 boats 
measuring 29,481 tons.  In ten years, the number nearly tripled to 536 boats measuring 
83,592 tons.  In 1860, steamboats numbered 735, and the tonnage measurement had 












increased to 162,735 tons (see Appendix A for Missouri River tonnage estimates).
77
  Not 
reflected in the tonnage measurement was the impressive increase in cargo capacity.  The 
early steamboats carried about half their measured tonnage (cubic capacity) in cargo, b ut 
by the mid-nineteenth century cargo capacity exceeded the measured tonnage by one-
third to one-half.  These figures revealed that if every steamboat in 1817 made at least 
one fully loaded trip, the total cargo transported along the rivers amounted to a maximum 
of 1,645 tons of cargo.  In contrast, if every steamboat made at least one fully loaded trip 
in 1860, the total cargo transported amounted to a minimum of 216,980 tons of cargo.
78
    
 Like the links between cargo capacity and colonial wealth, the dramatic increase in 
cargo capacity during the transportation revolution was a good indicator of the West’s 
growing economy of scale characteristic of the spreading modern world.  By the Civil 
War, not only were there more, larger steamboats in service, there was also a substantial 
decrease in port-to-port times.  From their onset in 1812, steamboats reduced upriver trips 
from New Orleans to Louisville from about four months to just over four weeks.  By the 
mid-1850s, the trip averaged about six days, and the expected number of round trips per 
boat per season grew from only two to upwards of ten or twelve.
79
 The quickening pace 
of transportation occurring within the Mississippi-Ohio valleys essentially reduced the 
distance between New Orleans and major ports in the interior like Louisville, Cincinnati, 
Pittsburgh, and St. Louis.  Correspondingly, the distance between the interior ports and 
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the Atlantic coast was equally reduced.  For instance, trade moving from Cincinnati to 
New York in 1816 required fifty-two days from a combination of Ohio River keelboats to 
Pittsburgh and then wagons to New York.  By 1852, Cincinnati and New York were only 
about twenty-eight days apart by way of steamboat to New Orleans and then coastwise to 
New York.
80
   
 In addition to faster service, freight rates declined.  Around 1820, freight traveling by 
keelboat upriver from New Orleans to Louisville averaged about $5.00 per hundred 
pounds or $75.00 in modern currency.  Steamboats during the Fulton-Livingston years 
undercut keelboats only slightly, charging upriver rates between $4.00 and $5.00 per 
hundred pounds or between $60.00 and $75.00 in modern currency.  The expansion of 
steamboat competition and a nation-wide depression in 1819, however, cut steamboat 
freight rates from New Orleans to Louisville in half to $2.00 per hundred pounds or 
$30.00 in modern currency.  By the mid-1830s, rates in the Louisville trade fell further to 
about 50¢, and in the growing New Orleans to St. Louis trade rates averaged about 63 ¢.  
Nearing the end of ante-bellum period, rates from New Orleans bottomed at about 15¢ 
per hundred pounds or $2.25 in modern currency.
81
  By 1860, the Mississippi-Ohio river 
system produced the second lowest national freight rate for inland transportation at 37 ¢ 
per ton-mile, behind only the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal averaging 25¢ per ton-mile.
82
  
Across the United States, rates for every mode of transportation continually declined 
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during the first half of the nineteenth century.  During this period, however, the two 
important transportation routes for the Mississippi and Ohio valleys, western rivers and 
turnpikes, experienced rather lopsided decreases.  While freight rates over turnpikes 
dropped 50 percent between 1816 and 1860, rates for downstream freight dropped by 78 
percent, but more importantly upstream charges dropped by 94 percent.
83
   
 The great reduction in shipping costs and speed of travel, championed in the West by 
steamboats, provided the necessary foundation for the frenzied western migration of the 
mid-nineteenth century.  The influx of settlers into the Mississippi-Ohio valleys matured 
the region’s pioneer-type econom y, based on self sufficiency and barter, to one relying 
upon manufacturing and agricultural trade.  Within two decades of western river 
steamboating, trade of the Ohio Valley concentrated and flowed out of the ports of 
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati.  By the late 1830s, points above Louisville, like St. Louis, on 
the Mississippi River, expanded their populations and trade, eventually becoming 
important steamboa ting hubs.
84
   
 St. Louis slowly rose as a steamboating hub during the first few decades of the 
nineteenth century.  By the early 1840s, the population of the United States began 
moving increasingly westward.  As the centers of habitation relocated out of the Ohio 
Valley and into the Mississippi, the centers of steamboat activity moved accordingly.  St. 
Louis’s population growth, coupled with increased lead mining in northwestern Illinois 
and southwestern Wisconsin, eventually made St. Louis the post-C ivil War steamboating 
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center of both the Ohio and Mississippi rivers.
85
  For the last two ante-bellum decades, 
however, St. Louis’s economy matured from a fur-trading economy to a 
manufacturing/agricultural exporter.  
 In August 1817, the steamboat Zebulon M. Pike made the first powered boat trip to 
the village of St. Louis.  At that time, trade followed a triangular route as manufactured 
goods traveled west across turnpikes in Pennsylvania or Maryland.  In either Pittsburgh 
or Cincinnati, the commission merchants loaded eastern wares on keelboats headed to 
Louisville via the Ohio River.  Louisville’s dry goods merchants unloaded their freight or 
sent it farther down the Ohio River to the Mississippi junction at Cairo, Illinois.  At 
Cairo, keelboat crews carried western exports downriver to New Orleans, while 
steamboat crews carried eastern imports to upriver towns such as St. Louis.  By 1840, 
steamboats traveled the Mississippi River from New Orleans all the way to St. Paul, 
Minnesota.  In St. Louis, dry goods merchants exchanged eastern products for credit with 
miners, trappers, and farmers.  St. Louis provisions merchants then sent lead, furs, and 
farm products downriver to New Orleans by keel or flatboat where they were 
subsequently sent to the Atlantic coast to balance dry goods merchants’ accounts on 
previous shipments of manufactured articles.
86
  The Pike’s voyage in 1817, therefore, 
was an extension of this triangular trade by replacing the use of keelboats for the 
Louisville to St. Louis leg.  
In St. Louis’s early period, a dry goods merchant operated dually as a provisions 
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merchant.  As the economy expanded through cheaper and more abundant supplies in all 
sectors, dry goods and provisions merchants separated their activities by handling only 
imports, exports, or freight.  Colonial historians have recognized a similar pattern in 
major North American east coast cities.   
Thomas Doerflinger believed the transition from widespread diversification to 
specialization was not necessarily a universal phenomenon across all sectors.  
Nevertheless, the transition occurred rapidly and dramatically.  In contrast to the eclectic 
merchant strategies of 1760s New England, Doerflinger found that by the 1780s 
“shippers no longer had to wrangle with farmers and millers to construc t a cargo; storage 
facilities could be designed for particular types of goods; and traders developed expertise 
in the one or two markets to which they traded.” 
87
  
Although diversifying into provisions sectors occurred regularly throughout the North 
American colonies, there existed a few pocketed locations where various activities were 
not dire preconditions for solvency.  In urban centers such as Philadelphia and New York 
especially, abundance and fluidity of capital encouraged specialization sooner than in  
New England.
88
  In frontier locations, whether far removed from urban centers, or just 
past their outer edges, provisions trading occasionally served as small, but important 
sources of extra income.
89
  Often young businessmen engaged in limited provisions 
trading to secure start-up capital for their primary pursuit.  For example, Doerflinger 
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found that the 1780s Philadelphia textile manufacture, Robert Henderson, engaged in 
small and unprofitable dry goods importing to obtain regional flour for export to 
Charleston, South Carolina.  He did so to exchange flour for indigo.  Henderson’s 
provision shipments neither made a substantial portion of his overall income nor did they 
absorb a considerable amount of his energies.  His cumulative shipments hardly 
amounted to a full cargo load per year, yet his strategy appeared successful as a 
subsidiary to his principal textile operation.  For many other young colonial merchants, 
small-scale provisions trading provided a low profit to risk ratio that was well suited to 
locations with either abundant capital or fluid credit, or where hard currency rarely was 
needed.
90
   
Placing intensive energy into provisions trading had clear advantages, but they, 
however, came at heavy price.  A full time provision s trader who moved into ship 
ownership added a level of complexity further compounding already tight credit 
allowances.  Unlike the year-long terms normal in dry goods credit, a provisions shipper 
operated with loans lasting only a few weeks or days.  Complicating his need for re ady 
cash payments, ships in all ages were “voracious consumer[s] of cash for wages, repairs, 
[and] provisions.”
91
  As a result, a provisions merchant wagered the risk of accepting 
short-term loans against his ability to quickly turn out processed goods.  These risks 
presumably counted less than the promise of reduced per-unit cost through high volume 
staples purchases and the subsequent profit from continuous provisions sales.   
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The move into intensive provisions trading revealed a strange irony in the 
incompatibility of business relations emerging from new economies of scale.  In dry 
goods, supply volume never weighed on a merchant’s mind.  Without much effort he 
could order hundreds of teaspoons, for example, from foreign manufacturers.  But how 
many teaspoons did a farming household really need?  The consumer demand for a single 
household, however, was negligible compared against the sheer  number of those 
households.  The ready supply of dry goods, then, was offset by a ready source of 
customers.  In small economies of scale, dry goods merchants were pushed into 
provisions trading.  The reverse was true also for merchants intending to focus solely on 
provisions.  In the 1750s, even the large colonial shippers, Charles Willing and Son, were 
obligated to import dry goods for local “backcountry credit sales.”
92
 Although they 
concentrated on West Indian trading, they reluctantly sold imported dry goods and 
viewed these sales as “throwing Your Money on the surface of the Water.”
93
 
Other provisions merchants took a more benign view of country trading.  Even 
though farmers were keenly aware that increased foreign demand raised their negotiating 
leverage, their need for hard currency was more accommodating than a merchant’s other 
contacts.  As a result, provisions merchants often fell into the dry goods trade with an 
attitude sim ilar to New York exporter, Abraham Ten Eyck, who claimed that im ported 
goods “will make considerable easement to the [country] Purchasers thereof, and will 





 Charles Willing and Son to Robert Hibbert, 30 July 1754, Willing and Morris 





answer their [i.e., merchants'] Ends as well as Cash.”
94
 
 Steamboat arrivals at St. Louis continued at a steady pace throughout the ante -bellum 
period.  By 1823, the number of annual arrivals rose to 51.  By 1835, it increased to 803, 
and within a decade grew even more frequent to 2,050, finally reaching a pre-war high of 
3,443 in 1857.
95
  As Cincinnati and Pittsburgh supplanted Louisville for dominance in the 
Ohio River trade, steamboat arrivals in St. Louis from these ports eventually 
outnumbered those from Louisville.  Similarly, as trade on the upper Mississippi and 
Missouri rivers developed in the 1840s, New Orleans dry goods merchants expanded 
their markets by sending eastern wares upriver to St. Louis.  New Orleans suppliers 
loaded wares aboard sailing craft for the east coat or Europe and eliminated the coast 
expense for internal land transportation.  As a result, the number of steamboat  annual 
arrivals from New Orleans between 1845 and 1852 increased from 205 to 330.  By the 
last decade of the ante-bellum period, St. Louis’s central location on the Mississippi 
River secured its dominance of the trade within the interior of the North American 
continent.
96
  Its dry goods merchants gained access to eastern goods via New Orleans at 
substantially reduced costs and higher volumes.  To pay for these  goods, however, 
required corresponding increases to the economy of scale within the agricultural sector of 
the Missouri River Valley. 
 The development of steamboating on the Missouri River occurred later than most 
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parts of the Mississippi or Ohio rivers.  Naturally by being the more western location, the 
spread of habitation and the subsequent rise in noticeable communities occurred more 
slowly than in places like Cincinnati or St. Louis.  The first steamboat to enter the 
Missouri, only two years later than the Pike at St. Louis, actually misrepresents the late 
arrival of steampower.  In reality, the fruitfulness of steamboats on this main tributary of 
the Mississippi did not become fully appreciable until the early 1830s, and remained 
under-utilized until the mid-1840s.   
 In May 1819, Captain John Nelson piloted his steamboat, Independence, a modest 
250 miles (402 km) above the Missouri’s mouth to Franklin .
  97
  After its thirteen-day trip, 
citizens of Franklin, Missouri, heralded the steamboat’s arrival with a cannon salute and 
banquet.  Franklin was an appropriate choice for the destination of steamboating’s debut 
on the river.  During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the population of Howard 
County experienced one of the first population boom s of the new territory, rivaling that 
of St. Louis for a brief time (maps 2, 3 and appendix B).  In addition to being county seat 
and home to a land office, Franklin boasted the largest population in Missouri west of St. 
Louis.  Nearly all traffic in Missouri, whether by river or by land across the Boonslick 
Trace, eventually made its way to Franklin or nearby Chariton , Missouri.  For this reason, 
Franklin became the gathering point for the Santa Fe Trail just three years after the 
arrival of the Independence.
98
  The trip of the Independence was distinguished from other 
early steamboat forays, however, by its exploratory purpose.   
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Map 2.  Population of Missouri and Mississippi River Counties, Missouri 1820. Figure 
shows county lines, and selected river town s.  See also appendix B. (Source for 






Map 3.  Population of Missouri and Mississippi River Counties, Missouri 1860. 
Figure shows county lines, and selected river towns.  See also appendix B. (Source for 





Unlike the first trips of the New Orleans, the Washington, or the Zebulon M. Pike, the 
trip of the Independence was neither motivated purely by profit, nor did it carry a cargo 
indicative of a burgeoning trade center.  Undoubtedly, the voyage created great 
excitement in the area apparent in the rise of several smaller communities in the 
Boonslick region of central Missouri.  As in the days before steamboats, local promoters 
advertised the rich agricultural soil to attract potential settlers.  Perhaps even more 
attractive to western immigrants was the name itself.  Named for relatives of Daniel 
Boone, the region failed to produce profits in its intended salt spring ventures .  Even 
loose association with the beloved frontiersmen was enough, however, to keep some 
western immigrants from going any farther west.  Now that at least one boat had steamed 
up the Missouri’s current, the future seemed bright, and soil fertility became a secondary 
selling point.  The promoters of Osage City, Missouri, stressed the natural advantage of 
its location on the confluence of the Missouri and Osage rivers.  Halfway between the 
Kansas and Mississippi rivers, the town offered a safe anchorage for steamboats whose 
inevitable appearance on the river made Osage City a leading intermediary point for 
commercial traffic of the Missouri Valley (see map 1).  Other towns like Thorntonsburg 
made similar promises that their location would become “Louisville of Missouri,” even 
though a second steamboat experiment only months after the Independence revealed the 
haste of that claim.
99
  
 Late in December 1818, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun organized an ambitious 
plan to firmly assert the United States expansionist goals.  The plan he presented to 







Congress soon became known as the Yellowstone Expedition .  Calhoun’s primary 
objective was to establish two military posts, one at the junction of the Minnesota and 
Mississippi rivers and a second at the junction of the Missouri and Yellowstone riv ers.   
Though plans for the Missouri River were altered to place the post lower downriver near 
present-day Bismarck, North Dakota, steamboats remained a vital component of 
Calhoun’s vision.  By ascending the river with the new steam technology, Calhoun 
sought to elevate the government’s prestige by the daring placement of military posts in 
remote regions of the new nation.
100
  With four steamboats and 1,100 troops, the 
expedition left St. Louis on June 21, 1819.  Accompanied by a small a complement of 
keelboats, the expedition succeeded only in proving the Missouri’s unforgiving nature.  
Before a single boiler was fired, the government insured failure by ignoring two 
important aspects of Missouri River navigation.  First, the river typically maintains an 
extremely shallow depth along its entire course.  In the decades following the 
Yellowstone Expedition, Missouri River steamboats rarely exceeded drafts of 4 feet (1.2 
m) at full cargo capacity, but in 1819 the US government employed three boats with 
drafts over 6 feet (1.8 m).
101
  The fourth steamboat, Western Engineer, was the only one 
with a draft less than 4 feet (1.2 m) and light enough for the Missouri.  Second, the 
government expedition departed from St. Louis in late June, magnifying the 
incompatibility of the deep draft boats by placing them on the river at the end of the 
navigation season.   










Two important rises in water level occurred on the Missouri each year.
102
  The first 
rise began in April as a result of melt-water from the Great Plains and lower Rocky 
Mountains.  The second rise occurred from mid- May through June from precipitation on 
the Great Plains and melt-water from the upper regions of the Rocky Mountains.  The 
expedition’s late departure, compounded by the boats’ deep drafts, resulted in a n arduous 
trip during which the steamboats grounded numerous times.
103
 
   The Western Engineer advanced the farthest, reaching a point slightly above 
present-day Omaha, Nebraska but far short of intended destination.  Most doubters 
believed the Yellowstone Expedition of 1819 proved the ineffectiveness of early 
steamboat designs for use on the Missouri.  Because the expedition’s keelboats covered 
more distance than its steamboats, it is of no surprise that the second Yellowstone 
Expedition in 1824 used only keelboats.
104
 
 In the years following the trips of the Independence and the first Yellowstone 
Expedition, steamboat traffic on the lower Missouri slowly increased.  Though the failure 
of the Yellowstone Expedition had not established a post as high on the river as Calhoun 
anticipated, it did lead to the creation of Fort Atkinson just above present-day Omaha.  
For the next decade, therefore, steamboating on the Missouri River centered on supplying 
Fort Atkinson until it was abandoned and replaced by Fort Leavenworth i n 1827.  During 
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the 1820s, steamboats reduced the shipping time against the Missouri’s current compared 
to laborious keelboat service, but they often succumbed to mechanical failure or river 
hazards and could not be chartered without exorbitant freight rates.  In the early 1820s, 
only Untied States government contracts met the large freight demands and shipping rates 
of 10¢ per pound required by steamboatmen to risk a voyage up the Missouri.
105
  
 As a result of Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821, the Santa Fe Trail 
officially opened in the following year, making central Missouri the staging area for 
western expansion.  With growing settlement in the state’s interior and the rise of sales in 
wheat, tobacco, and hemp the Missouri Valley’s economy boomed.  Dry goods 
merchants, like James Aull of Lexington, found a lucrative business in supplying 
freighters headed for Santa Fe with manufactured goods originating on the Atlantic 
seaboard.  In 1830, Aull sold over $8,000 worth of Philadelphia merchandise, but c ould 
secure regular upriver steamboat shipments only after buying partial ownership in three 
steamboats operating out of St. Louis.
106
  Harkening back to the days of merchant 
capitalism in New England, Aull’s experience resembled that of colonial merchants a nd 
the necessity for owning boat shares to assuredly predict the arrival of cargo bought in 
foreign markets.   
Although dry goods and provisions trade became increasingly specialized with 
emerging modern economies of scale, the relationship between the two  activities and 
shipping was not immediately incompatible.  Pre-Revolutionary colonial merchants, 
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regardless of their primary focus, frequently engaged in shipping.  The connectedness of 
global colonial trade allowed merchants to have a Janus-gaze from the backcountry to the 
waterfront.  Initially, the two arenas were compatible.  By the 1790s, however, merchants 
in eastern states looked in one direction.  Dry goods importers spent more time in the 
backcountry foraging for customers and setting up regional distributors.  Provisions 
exporters like Stephen Girard, on the other hand, spent more time in home ports.  By 
1786, Girard invested in stores on or near the Philadelphia waterfront specifically to 
oversee loading provisions in his vessels.  As he placed intensive energy into freight 
handling he had to maintain good relations with his shipping contacts.  These relations 
required physical proxim ity to a “miscellany of waterfront artisans and related personnel 
– captains, carters, chandlers, customs officers – as well as with the merchants who 
supplied outward cargoes and bought the incoming ones.”
107
   
The relations forged with the shipping community fostered reliable access to cargo 
space beyond the capabilities of foreign dry goods firms.  As result, provisio ns merchants 
tended to abandon their dry goods activities and focus more intently on catering to, or 
investing in, the shipping industry.  Garriott’s intensification in shipping connections 
resembled the post-1790 phenomenon seen in eastern states where the “the disparate 
nature of shipping and importing caused firms after 1775 to expand within the context of 
one of these operational modes, instead of freely branching from one to the other.”
108
 
Unlike those in the East, however, Aull and his competitors rel ied on the United 
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States military to contract the services of their boats and defray shipping costs.  Even 
though the Boonslick Region was rapidly increasing the scale of agricultural products, 
farmers generally preferred to send their shipments downriver on  home-built fla tboats.
109
  
To offset the high transportation costs of his own products and heavy competition against 
downriver shipments, Aull’s steamboat business profited with supplemental government 
contracts.
110
    
 Military supply contracts, therefore, provided the main impetus for steamboat service 
on the lower Missouri throughout the 1830s.  Earlier in 1826, chronic flooding of the 
Missouri River forced abandonment of Franklin, which moved the staging area for the 
Santa Fe Trail across the river elevated site of Boonville, Missouri.  For a short time, 
then, Boonville served as the leading depot for private cargo.  From the mid to late 1830s, 
however, the head of the Santa Fe Trail moved three more times farther upriver to 
Independence, Lexington, and Westport, and these locations soon replaced those on the 
lower river.  Each year during the 1830s saw record numbers of boats advertising 
departures from St. Louis for points on the Missouri.  In 1834, at least fourteen boats 
were chartered for the Missouri.  By 1835, the population and trade of the Boonslick 
region increased sufficiently to warrant the creation of five regular packets on the river.
111
  
Although steamboats ventured on the lower Missouri River with more frequency during 
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the 1830s, the bulk of their cargo was mainly government stores for Fort Leavenworth  
(figure 3).  Without steady supply contracts of the 1830s, little if any steamboat activity 
would have occurred on the lower Missouri.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Fort Leavenworth as drawn in 1849.  (James D. Horan, The Great American 
West: A Pictorial History From Colorado to the Last Frontier , New York, 1959, 31.) 
 
The Missouri River would not become synonymous with steamboating, however, 
until a member of the American Fur Company brought optimism for steamboat use in the 
remote regions of the fur trade.  Kenneth McKenzie organized the Columbia Fur 
Company in 1822, and by 1827 diverted noticeable profits from the American Fur 
Company.  The company promptly bought McKenzie’s stock and offered him 
employment.  McKenzie’s addition to the company sparked interest in the use of 
steamboats on the upper Missouri.  Within three years of his association with the 
company he and prominent member, Pierre Chouteau, Jr., convinced the company to 
construct the steamboat Yellow Stone.  Though the boat’s first trip up the Missouri in 





Dakota), the Yellow Stone reached the fort in the following season, thereby silencing the 
steamboat opponents in the company.  The construction of a second steamboat, the 
Assiniboin, corrected the Yellow Stone’s design flaws and proved a valued addition to the 
company’s operations in the upper Missouri Valley.
112
  For the next several years, 
steamboats on the upper Missouri made annual trips to Fort Union.  The American Fur 
Company brought national fame and enthusiasm for Missouri River steamboating.  
Stories of Indian attacks and cholera outbreaks told by pioneering river pilots like Joseph 
La Barge stirred interest and romance in the upriver history.
113
  The fur trade, carried out 
in harsh environments by rugged outdoorsmen, blended the wild unforgiving nature of a 
frontier with the sleek fast technology of modernity.  The obvious literary metaphors 
between human progress, manifest destiny, and indigenous rights embossed upriver 
steamboats and their crews as national heroes.  They expanded the outer edges of 
civilization, pushed forward the frontline of progress.  Though their stories were 
compelling, indeed, they were far from comprehensive.  
The true weight of the western economy, however, was carried on the decks of 
humbler steamboats engaged in the lower Missouri River trade.  These boats were 
celebrated locally for carrying the necessities of life – wheat, flour, nails, and dishes.  
They were not the sleek stallions of the American Fur Company.  Instead, they were 
lumbering, strong Clydesdales.  Never gaining national fame, the boats of lower Missouri 
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were the unassum ing workhorses of daily life.  Although tales of these steamboats were 
likely never recounted in eastern cities, local communities routinely courted boat owners 
for regular service.  The lower river’s workhorses may have lacked romance, but they 
made up for it tenfold in significance.  The transition from technological curiosity to 
economic necessity, however, was slow, rough, and the frequent source of more tension 
than relief.  What follows is this story – that of Missouri’s workhorses told from the 
banks of St. Charles (Figure 4).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Unknown artist, Pen Picture of the Village of St. Charles from the East Bank of 
the River in 1835. (JJBC, folder 174.)  
 
 The sputtering rise of steamboat activity on the lower Missouri throughout the greater 





varying freight rates.  In 1839 standard rates to Liberty Landing, just six days ’ trip from 
St. Louis, fluctuated between $1.00 and $3.00 per hundred pounds.  Town merchants 
reported similar discrepancies on freight bills of groceries amounting as low as 10 
percent or as high as 20 percent of their shipments’ total value.
114
  Though rates remained 
high in 1840, thirty-four steamboats operated on the lower river making 139 total trips.  
In 1841, only twenty-six steamboats were in operation, but they made a total of 312 
trips.
115
  The number of boats on the river during the 1840s leveled off early in decade 
remaining at about forty boats per year in active service.  In 1848, thirty-six boats entered 
the Missouri, but made only 286 trips that season.
116
  This decrease, however, likely 
reflects higher tonnage capacities for steamboats in the mid-nineteenth century.  Even 
with greater cargo capacity on the river as a whole, the effect of fewer boating trips 
enhanced Missouri towns like Weston, Lexington, Boonville, and St. Joseph.  These 
towns were among the first to receive regular packet service.  Their dry goods merchants 
bought eastern products months in advance and expected steamboat service regardless of 
the total boats on the river.  In Weston alone, steamboat arrivals between 184 6 and 1848 
grew from 132 to 193.
117
  As the magnet of shipping for northwest Missouri, the Frontier 
Journal recorded that Weston exported nearly one-half of all agricultural products sent 
downriver from Platte, Clay, and Clinton counties in 1848.  In addition to downriver 
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exports, the total worth of all sales in the Weston market, including goods sold to Fort 
Leavenworth and Santa Fe traders, for that year reportedly reached $500,000 or $11 
million in modern currency.
118
  In the same season, the Lexington Weekly Press reported 
190 “up stream” arrivals and 180 “down stream” farther downriver in Lexington.  The 
balance of steamboat arrivals reflected the growing economy of scale for agricultural 
exports out of the Missouri Valley.  While the total value of products of imports into 
Lexington that year amounted to $200,000 or $4.4 million in modern currency, the total 
value of exports amounted to $250,000 or $5.5 million in modern currency.
119
  The 
business of lower-Missouri river towns certainly thrived during the late 1840s.  
Improvements in Lexington just for 1848 counted: twenty-one brick residences, one 
three-story brick business house, ten blacksmith shops, three silversmith shops, sixteen 
dry goods houses, four commission storage and produce houses, and “fourteen or fifteen” 
other storage houses.
120
  All of these structures were related to one another in the larger, 
growing infrastructure of the modern world.  Jacob Price defined infrastructure as 
not merely roads, canals, docks, waterworks, and other physical im provements, but 
also the myriad commercial and financial institutions, including banks, 
clearinghouses, insurance companies, Lloyd's exchange, and the stock exchange of 
course, but also commercial practices and law, commercial education, an improved 
postal system, to say nothing of the human capital and good will created by the 
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 Centered in Missouri’s tobacco region Glasgow, in Howard County, boasted 
successful shipping seasons in the late 1840s.  In a description of their town’s business 
affairs, the Glasgow Times reported that between two and four packets made regular 
stops at their levee each year, and shipments to St. Louis averaged from 18¢ to 20¢.  
Noticeably absent in the Time’s description, however, was the mention of storage 
facilities and commission houses like those built in Lexington.  In Lexington , ample 
facilities existed for a manufacturer or farmer to simply sell his products to a provision 
merchant specialized in export shipping.  At Glasgow, however, “manufacturers and 
growers [of tobacco], in many instances, [were] their own shippers.”
122
   
 The dramatic increase during the 1840s, at least in part, was a product of the 
immigration boom occurring across the entire nation.  Throughout this decade , the 
population of Missouri more than doubled.  More importantly though, the lower Missouri 
had officially entered the transportation revolution that tapped a growing economy of 
scale in agricultural production.  Steamboat traffic increased and with it came broader 
ranges of economic diversity that was expanding westward since the end of the War of 
1812.  Individual merchants, especially those of St. Charles, Missouri, adapted to this 
new era by utilizing business strategies of a merchant capitalist in an ever diversifying 
economy.  The self-reliant economy, initially focused on inter-regional trade, now 
became connected with markets in the East.  The transition from a frontier economy to a 
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market-oriented one, however, required western merchants to pattern their business 
strategies in ways not common to the eastern seaboard for almost a century.  
III. THE MARGINAL FRONTIER:  
TRAMP BOATS, WAREHOUSES, AND THE WAYSIDE 
 
In the 1837 Gazetteer of the State of Missouri, Alphonso Wetmore, credited 
steamboats for the growing commercial prosperity of St. Louis, saying “the speedy 
voyages of steamboats … force commercial men to forget the space that intervenes 
between St. Louis and the ocean.”
1
  As the gaze of St. Louis businessmen moved steadily 
eastward, the space between them and the interior of Missouri grew increasingly larger.  
With each shipping season, the amount and variety of goods aboard steamboats seemed 
limitless, but equally lim itless were the debts of western dry goods merchants.  In an 
environment where hard currency was scare, western business had no other option than to 
export local products for balancing accounts with eastern suppliers.  For towns on the 
lower Missouri, agricultural surplus prom ised the best rewards for export, but was also 
the least compatible with the quick pace and high volume cargos of steamboats.  
Although the eastern business environment demanded that St. Louis merchants 
participate in the export/provisions trade, the lower Missouri River was slow to develop 
an agricultural economy of scale fitting the needs of the St. Louis market.  Just as St. 
Louis dry goods merchants came to depend on the availability of local exports to ship 
east, so too did merchants on the lower Missouri River become dependent on the growing 
market in St. Louis.  The following chapter shows how St. Louis manufacturers and dry 
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goods merchants relied on local exports of lead ore to pay for eastern goods.  Conversely, 
dry goods merchants along the Missouri River sought local agricultural exports to pay for 
their eastern purchases.  As they did so, they experienced two added difficulties not 
present in St. Louis.  First, fewer steamboats meant increased competition for freight 
handling, thereby raising shipping rates.  Second, Missouri Valley exports were confined 
mainly to bulky, low-cost agricultural products that lim ited the variety of resources 
available to send East.  Farm products also required additional infrastructure in a variety 
of collection and storage facilities already established in St. Louis by the late 1830s.  
While St. Louis merchants were afforded a luxury of an easily amassed variety of export 
goods namely lead ore, furs, and processed flour, Missouri River merchants had fewer 
options.  On the Missouri, and especially in St. Charles, nothing was more critical to a 
provisions merchant than commanding the flow of agricultural exports from Missouri’s 
interior.  St. Charles, as the last center of population before the major markets in St. 
Louis, struggled to remain active in the growing agricultural export trade.  Without an 
ability to send local agricultural products to market, the merchants of St. Charles risked 
being shut-out of the only viable source of trade between their region and the wealth of 
eastern America.  
The western United States during the nineteenth century must be considered as both a 
frontier and an American colony.  The process of colonization generally replicated 
economic conditions as the population expanded outward from the parent economy.  This 
replication of the eastern economy in the Missouri Valley occurred first in St. Louis.  As 





the procedures its merchants adopted to engage in the market economies of the East.   
The process was quite similar to John McCusker and Russell Menard’s description of 
farming colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Increased demand for 
wheat staples encouraged “spin-off” industries like milling, barrel making, and 
specialized shipping services.  As McCusker and Menard noted, mid-level producers 
around metropolitan areas either increased their scale of production or redirected their 
capital into emerging support sectors.
2
  Because the whole M issouri Valley’s population 
was increasing, commercial demand remained consistent.  A dry goods dealer seeking to 
distribute foreign products never lacked customers.  Tapping wealth from the other two 
growing sectors proved more difficult.  
First, to engage in the St. Louis economy required obtaining local agricultural 
products of the Missouri Valley.  In many areas, surplus of this sort, however, was still 
following the former household mode of production that affixed monetary values to 
articles and then traded products based on that value without actually handling hard 
currency.  To obtain agricultural exports, a merchant in the Missouri Valley had to be 
willing to exchange his eastern goods (obtained at a fixed price), for local surplus 
(obtained a highly fluctuating price).   
Second, because the source of population growth occurred in western Missouri, the 
transportation network was focused on the extreme ends of the state .  For merchants 
located between St. Louis and the western trails, the most central concern was the 
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drawing away of steamboat service from their levees.  All communities along the 
Missouri River fell under a hierarchy of regional exchange based in St. Louis.  For 
intermediary places, like St. Charles, the need for water transportation bec ame a 
desperate attempt to compete with the growing economies farther upriver.  Contingent to 
all these events, however, was a pattern of econom ic growth begun in New Orleans that 
rippled out to the entire western territory.  As the Mississippi Valley economy prospered, 
regional centers like St. Louis gained prominence as both importers and exporters of 
commodities.  The rise of St. Louis as a transportation hub for the Mississippi River set in 
motion further ripples of economic growth throughout the Missouri Valley.  Once again, 
water transport was the true measure of a community’s prominence.  The question for 
towns along the Missouri River, then, was simple: Who would be the next St. Louis?  To 
understand the strategies of merchants in Missouri’s interior, it is important, therefore, to 
explore the strategies of St. Louis merchants and the impact steamboats had during the 
city’s rise to a “commercial emporium.”  
Steamboats in the lower Missouri River trade cannot be considered in the same light 
as their counterparts in the upper river trade.  Generally, a steamboat on a fur trade run 
did not service river towns on the lower Missouri.  Their upriver cargos consisted of trade 
items, post supplies, and government freight for extreme frontier locations.  Places  like 
Fort Union had practically no other contact with the outside world, and so the single 
yearly trip of a fur company’s steamboat by necessity had to be filled before going up 
river.  Occasionally fur trade boats purchased small stores at landings on the lower 





bought 33 1/2 bushels potatoes, 40 bushels corn meal, and 21 empty barrels from L. J. 
Chauvin, operator of the St. Charles ferry.
3
  Purchases of this kind, however, were likely 
incidentals for the boat crew that were either overlooked in St. Louis, or more 
conveniently purchased en route.  They did not reflect the burgeoning trade between fur 
traders and Missouri River communities.  In other words, the fur trade never promoted, or 
directly tapped, the new economy of scale in the lower Missouri provisions sector.  The 
downriver trip proved equally useless to lower ports’ cargo needs since an entire year’s 
worth of furs was crammed in boat hulls destined for St. Louis.  Though incidents of 
small trade surely existed, steamboats employed by fur companies had no appreciable 
effect on the development of trade below Fort Leavenworth.  The real lifeblood for 
communities in a marginal frontier setting was packet boats.  Shuttling between St. Louis 
and some predetermined river town, steamboat packets never treaded the virgin waters of 
the upper-Missouri or reached the farthest boundaries of Euro-American civilization.  
They were, instead, movers of a growing frontier economy – the unrequited workhorses 
of the west.   
The organization of packet service, however, followed a period of loosely organized 
tramp and transient service.  Owners of these boats operated on a freelance basis, making 
ad hoc contracts with widely varying rates.  While later packet service supplemented and 
did not eliminate tramp service, the former allowed a centralization of lower Missouri 
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River trade in the late 1830s.  From St. Charles’s perspective, however, the move towards 
organized packets centralized the agricultural monopolization of ports in western 
Missouri.  As the hierarchy described by Cassagrande et al. crystallized, mid-level 
producers became more marginalized.  This pattern emerged in colonial North America  
as the overall number of Chesapeake planters decreased while tobacco production 
increased.  Planters who remained active expanded their production output at the expense 
of lower-level competitors.  Historians Jacob Price and Paul Clemens related this 
development to the internal changes within the British tobacco exchange market.  
Paralleling consolidation of colonial planters, seventeenth-century English exchange 
firms in London, Bristol, and Liverpool became less numerous, dropping from 346 firms 




  By the eighteenth century, British firms in Glasgow, Scotland, diverted most 
tobacco imports away from London, Bristol, and Liverpool.  The large firms utilized a 
two-fold strategy.  First, they increased credit lines to colonial planters.  The introduction 
of capital allowed favored planters to produce large volumes of tobacco on a predictable 
schedule.  Second, exchange houses used guarantees for full shiploads of cargo to borrow 
money for chartering or purchasing a vessel.  This ensured exclusive use of a vessel and 
allowed for speedy returns from the colonies.  Many smaller firms could purchase only 
partial space aboard vessels.  Frequently, their shipments spent weeks in a colonial port 
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waiting for the ship’s captain to fill his hold with other customers’ freight.  By the time 
the smaller houses’ freight arrived home, the large firm had already sold its merchandize.  
Often the first large shipment of the season received the highest price; it also flooded the 
market thereby lowering prices for late-comers.
5
  Through extended credit and controlled 
shipping, British tobacco merchants altered the nature  of colonial production and 
domestic exchange.  They revealed correlations between production, sales, and shipping 
that contributed to new economy of scale in the Chesapeake.  Although changes within 
the Missouri Valley took different forms, the essential characteristic remained identical.   
Although St. Charles was seemingly the gateway to the Missouri River, it was 
alternately the last destination for downriver agricultural products.  Packets only appeared 
in locations with an established ability to fill boats headed back to St. Louis.  With large 
stores of cargo accumulating in upriver ports, St. Charles found resistance from tramp 
captains to leave deck space for downriver freight from their levee, thus creating more 
resistance for later packet service.  Even though dry goods merchants in the West had 
access to manufactured goods and credit from eastern centers like Boston, Philadelphia, 
and Pittsburgh, balancing accounts was impossible without a means to remit debt.  The 
production of lead, wheat, and tobacco had the greatest potential for balanced trade with 
eastern markets.  Without an ability to command the agricultural exports of Missouri’s 
interior, St. Charles was effectively shutout from the foundation of their economy.  
By the late 1830s, St. Louis was “the commercial emporium of Missouri” as well as a 







growing center for steamboating on the Mississippi River.
6
  Eastern manufacturers like 
Oliver Dwight Filley emigrated westward hoping to find new markets for their products.  
Filley came from Wintonbury, Connecticut, where he learned his family business of 
making Japanese style tin ware.
7
  Along with Oliver went, his brother Giles Filley, and 
their associate Sam Wing, all of whom found an abundant market for their tin ware.  The 
St. Louis demand for manufactured goods kept the Filley brothers in constant work to the 
point that they were “nearly used up from the constant exercise of body and mind in 
selling and packing tin wares.”
8
  The active market Filley enjoyed in St. Louis, however, 
was not limited to only his wares.  As his associate Sam Wing noted, “Business of all 
kinds is brisk.  Steam Boats full freighted are continually coming and going and to see 30 
lying at our wharves is but an every day occurrence.”
9
  
Wing was not alone in his assessment of St. Louis’s business environment.  In an 
1837 guide for western travelers, W. G. Lyford gave a similar description of St. Louis 
commerce saying that “forty-two steam boats, of different sizes, varying from one 
hundred and fifty to three hundred tons, have frequently been seen at the wharf at one 
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Oliver Filley, Giles Filley, and Sam Wing to Parents, 10 Apr. 1837, Filley Family 
Papers (FFP), MHS.  The majority of the letters sent by Oliver Filley from St. Louis to 
his family in Connecticut also contain the correspondence of his brother Giles, and their 
associate Sam Wing.  Each spoke of “brisk business.”  Sam Wing’s quote above 








time; and at no season, excepting winter, are there less than twenty steamboats within the 
harbor–the average number is about thirty....  They invariably arrive and depart with full 
freight.”
10
   Perhaps the most visible example of St. Louis’s growing prominence as a 
steamboat port was the construction of a floating dock for the care and maintenance of 
boats.  The floating dock was an excellent example of a nineteenth-century spin-off 
industry, distinct in practice but similar in spirit to those noticed by colonial historians.  
Lyford described the operation and convenience of this St. Louis-based invention saying 
that: 
This dock consists of a certain number of floats, which can be increased or diminished 
at pleasure, and are connected together laterally.  Each float is about fourteen feet 
wide and sixty feet long, and can be sunk in the river to any given depth, and there 
suspended.  When the floats are connected together and sunk, a boat is placed 
immediately over them; they are then gradually raised above the surface of the water, 
until the boat is entirely exposed.  She is then repaired without any of the 
inconveniences attended on the mode of construction of other docks.  A free 
circulation of air is obtained, by means of which the workmen can operate with facility 
and comfort; and the entire hull of the vessel being exposed to the action of the sun 





The St. Louis Floating Dry Docks Company held patents for the dock and sold at least 
twenty shares to Kenneth Mackenzie who was a dogged advocate of Missouri River 
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steamboating.  Each of his shares valued between $100 and $110 in 1848–49 (figure 5).
12
  
Boats arrived in St. Louis principally to deliver freight, but they also had certain 
operational needs that St. Louis businessmen were more than happy to meet.  Closer 
examination of employee records (assuming they survived) would likely reveal workers 
formerly originating from generalized service sectors like carpentry and mechanics.  The 
Floating Dry Docks probably capitalized on the diversity of St. Louis indus tries to create 
a specialized workforce and service.  Specialization, however, was not a universal 
phenomenon.  
 
Fig. 5.  Certificate of Purchase for Ten Shares in the St. Louis Floating Dock and 
Insurance Company by Kenneth Mackenzie, 22 Nov. 1848.  (Ste amboats Collection, 
Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.)   
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The brisk business found by the Filley brothers required acumen sharper than simple 
supply and demand.  Even though their tin ware sold faster than their production output, 
the Filleys endured a series of severe money shortages.
13
  The economics of the frontier, 
created by the paucity of specie in the western United States, functioned through 
extending credit and drawing drafts on individual debts.  Ideally, the Filley brothers 
expected to purchase raw tin plates and wire from the East on long term credit.  Colonial 
importers usually received twelve to eighteen months credit from European suppliers.  
Dry goods dealers often required such long-term loans to synchronize their accounts with 
agricultural cycles.  Creditors from Europe happily extended large sums of long-term 
credit because it ensured payment in provisions valued at home.
14
  The universal lack of 
specie in colonial North America and the western frontier forced a reliance on local 
production for repaying debts.   
As the Filleys manufactured eastern materials into products for western sale, they 
encountered unexpected difficulties in western business.  In theory, they only required 
ample supplies and energetic consumers.  In practice, however, the Filley brothers could 
not risk selling merchandise to just any customer.   
The sale of goods took one of three avenues: outright purchase with specie, trade of 
needed property or services, or purchase through bills of exchange .  The first two were 
straightforward.  The third practice was complicated and more common than Filley 
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desired.  Trading through bills of exchange occurred directly between Filley and his 
customer, but often required buying third party drafts based on a debt owed the customer 
by some other individual.  If a farmer, for instance, sent wheat to an eastern firm  he 
received an exchange bill as receipt for unsold shipments.  Filley could accept bills of this 
type and either collect payment directly from the eastern firm or transfer i t to his eastern 
supplier who then credited Filley’s account.  Exchange bills from large reputable firms 
were often endorsed by large eastern banks whose solvency was unquestioned.  These 
were universally preferred and nearly as good as cash.  When offered a bill endorsed 
locally, Filley had to weigh the purchase amount against the reputation of both the drawer 
and the endorser.  If he could confidently expect either party to cover the value of the 
draft, he made the sale.  By accepting drafts and extending  credit, Filley easily liquidated 
his tin ware stock, but had little to show except scattered loans throughout St. Louis.   
Thomas Doerflinger found sim ilar strategies among Rhode Island colonial merchants.  
For example, he counted the “far-flung activities of the Brown brothers of Providence” as 
simultaneously focusing on operating a candle works and an iron works, while 
maintaining steady trade with the West Indies, England, and many American ports.  The 
Brown brothers’ most extensive activities occurred primarily in the decade prior to the 
Revolution.  Their diverse trading operations provided specie and exchange bills to 
purchase manufactured items and semi-processed materials like whale head matter for 





choice but a necessity.” 
15
 
Exchange bills from eastern firms were difficult to find because farmers preferred to 
trade with local Missouri firms.  By June 1837, Filley’s cash reserve was nearly as 
depleted as his inventory.  He wrote with desperation that “we find considerable 
difficulty in arranging our money affairs, and what we shall do I hardly know.  We have 
some $12.00 or $15.00 in specie and some little Eastern paper – how we shall manage for 
the balance I know not.”
16
   
Once those balances with eastern merchants came due, Filley faced a frustrating 
situation in which his brisk business in the West could not buy supplies from the East.  In 
writing home, he explained that “we have money enough on hand and loaned out in town 
to pay for all we want to buy – but if we collect it, it is not in a shape that will answer our 
purpose East.”
17
  Filley’s problem stemmed from the gamble associated with buying 
exchange bills.  Hypothetically, for example, if Filley received a balance due for $100 
worth of tin ware materials, he never would receive a corresponding exchange bill for 
$100 worth of wheat.  Instead, he received bills verifying the transfer of some specified 
number of unsold bushels of wheat (measured in volume not monetary value).  In a sense, 
Filley was not purchasing actual wheat, but the right to sell wheat in some distant port.  
Filley, then, had to anticipate the future price of wheat against the value of his labor and 
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size of his debts.  If prices rose he might turn a profit; if they fell he was sunk.   
Historian W illiam Cronon discussed the eventual extension of this system in the 
Chicago Stock Exchange during the late nineteenth century.  As grain elevators dotted the 
Illinois countryside, local farmers sold their  exchange bills directly to elevator operators.  
They transferred both physical property and the rights to its sale.  The right to sell wheat 
was known as wheat futures but only nominally represented the amount of stored wheat 
awaiting sale.  In Chicago, firms or individuals bought wheat futures that contractually 
obligated the seller to provide payment by a specified date.  A firm or individual could 
also purchase stocks or shares of elevator supplies.  If the same firm or individual secretly 
purchased a majority of both wheat futures and stocks, they owned the supply and 
demand for wheat.  Because a stockholder was not bound to se ll his shares, a majority 
holder could keep wheat tied up in elevators to artificially raise prices.  He or she, then, 
forced those who sold futures to remit payment at several times the normal value.  
Traders referred to this maneuver as “cornering the market ,” and its practice was 
eventually curtailed in the twentieth century through trade regulations.
18
   
Chicago traders’ ability to corner wheat markets had parallels to business practices of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Just as Price attributed growth in the tobacco 
economy of scale to increased carrying capacity of oceanic vessels, the increased cargo 
loads of railroads also contributed to correspondingly large economies of scale in the 
wheat market.  In the colonial tobacco trade, English capital allowed indiv idual planters 
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to consolidate their land holdings and increase output.  They were still bound, however, 
to the carrying capacities of contemporaneous transportation.  In Illinois, Chicago capital 
focused on transportation and storage infrastructure without direct investment in farming 
households.  The grain elevator allowed farmsteads to maintain household production 
levels while consolidating their output.  The system was simpler and more effective, but 
designed to achieve the same goals.  In the mid-nineteenth century, bills of exchange 
represented small sack loads of wheat produced by individual farming househ olds.  
Cornering a nineteenth-century market would require tens of thousands of exchange bills 
scattered across the nation.  Although Filley never feared market collapses seen much 
later in Chicago, he was still gambling on wheat “futures.”  The scale was smaller, but 
the risks were present.  Eventually, a new economy of scale changed every aspect of 
labor, organization, and transportation (see figure 6, 7, 8, 9).
19
  
In addition to Filley’s foreign market concerns, most local banks were un reliable or 
valueless when dealing with eastern merchants.  The most stable means of making 
purchases and paying balances to and from eastern merchants, excepting actual specie, 
were notes drawn on banks in the East.  The financial crisis of eastern banks in 1837, 
however, made this form of currency even more attractive, since it lowered bank note 
values so that “New York money is worth from 4 to 5 percent as is almost all Eastern 
money.”
20
  Filley likely hoped to offer the holder of a New York bank note this small 
percentage of its value, and then draw on that bank for a larger percentage than he paid.    
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Fig. 6. George W. Ackerman, Unloading dry farm wheat, Wash., 1925. 
(National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the Extension 
Service, 33-SC-5094c.)   
 
 
Fig. 7. Rudolph Goebel, The Steamboat General Meade Taking on a Cargo of 
Wheat at Marais Croche, 1870s.  (John J. Buse Jr. Collection, folder 110, 
Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia.) 










Fig. 9.  James Vachon, Loading a Grain Boat at a Great Northern Railroad 





Diego) [database on-line];  available from artstor.org.  
Even if Filley received the same amount for a note, he still profited simply by having 
the opportunity to make transactions in the East.  Even though Filley knew his business 
“could get along tolerably well if we could get Eastern funds,” this currency as well as 
specie circulated in short supply, and was not a reliable commodity.
21
  Filley, like other 
western merchants, needed a means to convert his western profits into a commodity of 
exchange compatible in the East.   
Knowing the value of local products was equally critical for colonial city traders.  
Cathy Matson noted that this occurred in New York during the 1670s when the fur trade 
declined.  In this city, merchants not finding sufficient fur stocks purchased additional 
“small quantities of agricultural surpluses, including horses, cheese, staves, beeswax, 
butter, candles, tanned hides, flaxseed, straw wares, and earthen wares, from rural 
producers on Long Island and in New England.”
22
  Finding the right saleable items, 
however, was only half the task.  Rural producers often viewed transactions as more than 
impersonal business negotiations.  These transactions may have occurred among 
members of different social classes but nevertheless, took plac e between members of the 
same physical community.  As a result, small producers dealing more frequently with 
regional merchants set prices on “a calculation based on economic justice” between the 
seller and purchaser.  The hardest deals (and highest prices) farmers reserved for less-














Even in urban settings, a sort of economic justice was common.  For instance, 
prominent New Yorker Kiliaen Van Rensselaer’s profit margin required a 50  percent 
markup from wholesale to retail on his imported goods.  Matson quoted Rensselaer’s 
instructions to his city store clerk that he “must sell all such goods as can bear it, 
somewhat higher than 50 percent.  But I do not wish my own people to be charged more 
than 60 percent since they must gain it by hard labor.  But from other people, for whom I 
need not care, you may take as much as is the market rate you can get.”
24
  Rensselaer’s 
“own people” were his tenants and nearby associates who he charged lower prices than to 
unknown shoppers.  A merchant’s knowledge of farm product values, by necessity, was 
as broad as the activities within each household.  In addition to the types of products 
available, a merchant also kept a large mental list of favored customers.  For newcomers 
like the Filleys, the learning curve must have been painfully steep.   
Between June and November 1837, Filley increased his cash holdings from $15.00 to 
$300.00.
25
  He then promptly sent those funds to New York for a shipment of tin -plate 
bought earlier that season on credit.  Considering his earlier letters and the difficulties he 
expressed about collecting cash on debts owed him, amassing $300.00 seemed to solve  
his liquidity dilemma.  In actuality the shipment, paid for by the $300.00, was meant only 
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to sustain his tin ware production un til a much larger supply of materials could be  
purchased.
26
  Most likely, Filley never hoped that hard currency could meet his 
purchasing needs, as is evident in a cargo of 60,000 pounds of lead sent along with the 
$300.00 to New York.  This shipment of lead represented an exchange commodity that 
Filley could readily procure in St. Louis and that his suppliers in New York would 
accept.   
Filley expected the lead shipment to bring from “$1,000 to $2,000 for another lot of 
Tin Plate.”
27
  He likely purchased the lead through debts owed him in St. Louis, but no 
matter the means, his shipment clearly shows that in the four months between June and 
November Filley more easily amassed $2,000 worth of lead, than $300 worth of “eastern 
funds.”  The export/provisions trade, although a viable solution to currency shortages, 
was not the business for which Filley had gone west.  In spring 1837, exporting goods 
east was never mentioned as a possible option, but by late fall, it became a last resort, and 
the only means to maintain trade with the East.  Filley’s wide ranging estimate of how 
much tin-plate he could receive for a shipment of lead points to his novelty in the export 
business.  His brother Giles, similarly, shows an unfamiliarity with exporting by adding 
“we have had a notion to ship a quantity of Buffalo Robes for your market [in 
Connecticut] but do not know how they would pay for the trouble...  I must learn the 
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  That the Filleys looked to an export commodity as a solution to their 
purchasing problems in the East after other options had failed shows that keeping pace 
with the energetic consumer market in St. Louis demanded that a merchant look for 
alternate commodities of exchange in the form of local exports.  For the Filley brothers, 
incorporating local exports into their tin ware business was more a product of necessity 
than entrepreneurship.  Even merchants with lofty entrepreneurial goals, however, did not 
always anticipate becoming exporters of western products.   
Unlike the Filleys who confined their business to the city limits of St. Louis, J. R. 
Stanford sought to sell eastern goods in both St. Louis and Alton, Illinois .  In December 
1832, Stanford heeded the advice of his Boston suppliers by entering “an agreement with 
a man at Alton to supply him with a small stock of goods.”
29
  Though Stanford’s man 
promised that “he can sell a great many goods at the place,” Stanford had no intention of 
exchanging his goods for exportable products.
30
  Although Alton never matched the 
commercial activity in St. Louis, by the late 1830s it was also becoming a legitimate hub 
of river trade for both the Mississippi and Illinois rivers (figure 10).  Even in the larger 
St. Louis market, Stanford struggled to collect payments for credited purchases.  Had he 
not admitted to having collection difficulties, he could reasonably expect the smaller 
market in Alton to have cash in circulation.  He was equally aware that disreputable 














practices in the Missouri banking system forced “every man [to] have his bank in his own 
iron chest and be careful how he disposed” of it.
31
  With all this in mind, Stanford still 
insisted on a cash only business in both St. Louis and Alton, saying that “as I do not do a 





Fig. 10.  Henry Lewis, Alton, Illinois. Das Illustrirte Mississippthal (The Valley 
of the Mississippi Illustrated (Dusseldorf, Germany, 1854, reprint, trans., A. 
Hermina Poatgieter, ed. Bertha L. Heilbron, St. Paul, Minn., 1967, plate 60.)   
 
At the close of 1832, Stanford preferred a specialized dimensional business strategy 
of buying goods from the East and selling for cash in the West.  Like 1780s Philadelphian 
Thomas Fitzsimmons, Stanford hoped to be a specialized merchant.  Although 










Fitzsimmons specialized in provisions exports, he and Stanford wished to direct their 
energies into a single, stable market.  The critical distinction was that Fitzsimmons’s 
wealth afforded more options.  Stanford’s, on the other hand,  left him with almost no 
other choice but to venture into unfamiliar markets.  By the 1834 shipping season, his 
business strategy incorporated a second dimension of exporting Midwest provisions to 
the East.  Like the Filley brothers, Stanford’s cash-only business had to yield to a 
combination of imports and exports.  His arrangements in Alton gave him access to the 
lead reserves surrounding the Mississippi and Illinois rivers above St. Louis.  Although 
Stanford could not simply receive cash for his goods at Alton, he could at least procure 
lead there, either through barter or local bank notes, and then ship the lead from St. Louis 
to Boston, via New Orleans.
33
  This trade added layers to the original plan, as it used 
steamboats on the Mississippi River along with keelboats on the Illinois (figure 11).   
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Fig. 11.  Marine Insurance Policy of J. R. Stanford, 12 Aug. 1834.  (Homer 
Stanford Collection, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.)  Issued by 
Protection Insurance Company, Hartford, Connecticut.  The policy insures 
$3,800 on 1,379 pigs of lead at 2 1/4% ($85.50) for the safe passage of that 
freight on its entire journey from St. Louis to New Orleans (via steamboat 





For St. Louis merchants like Filley and Stanford, the easiest commodity to export was 
lead.  Their earlier counterparts, the Brown brothers, shipped iron and other provisions 
across the British Empire.  For merchants on the lower Missouri River wheat, flour, 
hemp, and tobacco served a similar purpose.  
The ability to ship local exports out of St. Louis aboard steamboats provided city 
merchants with a ready means to convert western profits into a commodity demanded in 
the East.  For merchants along the lower Missouri, however, shipping Missouri Valley 
products aboard steamboats was more difficult.  Historians Lawrence Giffen and James 
Pope, in writing about the emergence of steamboating on the lower Missouri River , 




Placing St. Charles within the context of similar river communities, like Weston or 
Independence, is unfortunately impossible through the newspapers, because of a gap in 
St. Charles local newspaper records between the early 1820s and the mid-1840s.  
Nevertheless, there are indications of similar economic conditions in St. Charles.  Like 
merchants in St. Louis, those in St. Charles enjoyed an energetic market from the rapid 
influx of consumers passing through town.  By the mid-1830s settlers flooded St. Charles 
County in groups “sometime 8 and 10 wagons together.”
35
  The completion of a steam 
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gristm ill in 1835, and steam sawmill in 1837, indicated that St. Charles was poised to 
take advantage of the growing commercial wealth in eastern Missouri.
36
  Its proximity to 
St. Louis afforded the opportunity to buy goods directly from eastern suppliers, or 
through commission and forwarding agents in the city.   
Just as shortages of currency presented difficulties to St. Louis based businesses , 
merchants in St. Charles similarly found it difficult to collect debts and pay balances.  
The proprietors of the St. Charles based dry goods business, Harmon & Zebulon, spent 
inordinate amounts of time collecting debts to balance their accounts with St. Louis 
creditors.  In the late 1830s, they purchased assortments of dry goods bought directly 
from Charles H. Carroll in Baltimore, along with similar purchases from N. E. Janney & 
Co. of St. Louis.
37
  At times Harmon & Zebulon filed protests with the county  circuit 
court to receive payment for credited purchases.
38
  They were also forced to take personal 
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John Bolten to A. D. Harmon, 24 Oct. 1839, ADHZP.  In this le tter, John Bolten 
complained that he could not pay his debt to Harmon & Zebulon, and that their execution 
against his property filed in the county circuit court would not produce cash, since “c ash 





loans for payment of their own debts in St. Louis.
39
  As their counterparts in St. Louis 
did, Harmon & Zebulon exported local provisions to supplement their sales business.  
Shipping local exports via steamboat, however, did not factor significantly in their 
business strategy.  Barrels of bacon brought to town by county farmers were sent to St. 
Louis, not by steamboat, but by wagon.
40
  On the return trip, Harmon & Zebulon’s 
teamster brought back dry goods purchased in St. Louis.
41
  Although available records do 
not discuss steamboat shipments to St. Charles in the late 1830s, they certainly benefited 
indirectly from increased shipments of eastern goods on the Miss issippi River that were 
eventually sold in St. Charles.  
St. Charles merchants’ apparent underutilization of steamboats was not because of a 
lack of exportable goods.  With the rise of commercial markets in St. Louis, St. Charles 
was poised to take full advantage of the growing commercial wealth.  Bound by both the 
Mississippi and Missouri rivers, St. Charles County had ample water access to St. Louis 
markets (figure 12).  The county’s abundance of agriculture resources warranted 
constructing a steam gristmill in 1835 that could grind 60,000 bushels of wheat per 
year.
42
  Other natural factors like a series of rapids above Alton isolated upriver shipping 
points on the Mississippi and favored communities with easier access to St. Louis.  The 
difficulties associated with transporting cargo from upriver locations exerted negative 
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impacts on St. Louis commission merchants who decided against purchasing agriculture 
products from areas above the rapids on the Mississippi (figure 13).   
 
 
Fig. 12. Detail from Missouri River Survey Map of 1858.   






Fig. 13. Henry Miller, The Lower Rapids of the Mississippi River. Das 
Illustrirte Mississippthal (The Valley of the Mississippi Illustrated 
(Dusseldorf, Germany, 1854, reprint, trans., A. Hermina Poatgieter, ed. Bertha 
L. Heilbron, St. Paul, Minn., 1967, plate 41.)  The Lower Rapids or Des 
Moines Rapids were 204 miles above St. Louis and beyond the mouth of the 
Des Moines River.  At low water stage steamboats had to unload heavy cargo 
to pass the rapids.  The above illustration shows the rapids at the low water.   
 
The extra time and handling required to unload freight just above the rapids, only to 
reload it on another boat just below the rapids, incurred a loss for grain shipments 
typically sent in flimsy burlap bags.  The commission merchants, Pope & West, in St. 
Louis complained that shipments of oats from Burlington, Iowa Territory , were not worth 
their effort to send to New Orleans.  The oats lost weight during the desc ent downriver, 
so that “the freight and bags and trouble in putting up oats and the loss in prices obtained 
must make a losing business to anyone that ships them from above the rapids.”
43
  Those 
wishing to send the agricultural products of St. Charles County to St. Louis seemingly 
                                                       
43





had an advantage over anyone above the rapids of the Mississippi.  Even with the same 
economic concerns as those in St. Louis, St. Charles merchants did not use steamboats 
for local exports.  Pope & West, in consideration of freight rates, advised that wheat 
marked for shipment on the Mississippi should not be purchased for more than 50 ¢ a 
bushel, if it was to compete with wheat selling in St. Louis for less than 63¢.
44
  Freight 
rates on the Missouri as rule were much higher than the  Mississippi, and with bushels of 
wheat fetching upwards of $1.00, steamboats were not economically compatible with the 
shipment of agricultural products on the lower Missouri.
45
  Freights rates, however, were 
only one hindrance to early steamboat shipments out of the lower Missouri River.  Before 
steamboats could be a viable means of local export the nature of both the steamboat 
industry and the agricultural producers had to change.  
Even on a small scale, the agricultural products of St. Charles County gene rated cash 
revenues.  Three years before constructing his steam sawmill, James C. Lackland bought 
and stored small quantities of flour in his warehouse at St. Charles.  His account book 
from 1834 shows 382 sales of flour, typically less than 200 pounds per  purchase (i.e., less 
than one full barrel).
46
  He sold most of the flour in and around St. Charles County, but he 
also placed about one third of the flour in barrels holding 196 pounds each for the St. 
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  Unfortunately, missing portions of the account book prohibit accurate 
comparisons between flour purchases and sales.  The existing portions , however, showed 
that the small lots of flour purchased locally amounted to 62,908 pounds between 
September and December 1834.  During that same period, Lackland sent 246 barrels to 
St. Louis.  Except for one shipment of 49 barrels, exports to St. Louis averaged only 7 
barrels per shipment.  While Lackland’s account of flour sent to St. Louis d id not record 
the method of transport, the small amounts sent and his notations of “sent via Jack,” or 
“sent via Davy” suggested Lackland employed teamsters using horses and wagons over 
the 20-mile connecting road between St. Charles and St. Louis.
48
  Lackland recorded 
sending these shipments to commission and forwardin g agents in St. Louis like Von Phul 
and Magrill and received higher profits from those sold in town (figure 14).   
What Lackland received foremost for the added labor, however, was cash.  
Lackland’s net proceeds for 62,908 pounds of flour sales between Sep tember and 
December were $1140.32, including both cash and credit (average $1.82 cwt).  His cash 
receipts totaled $991.40, leaving only $148.92 in outstanding accounts.  Of the total cash 
received for flour, however, $915.36 came from barrel sales in St. L ouis.
49
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Fig. 14. Business Card of Von Phul & McGill, 1837.  (The Western 
Address Directory.)  
 
 In the local market, Lackland sold 14,692 pounds of flour for $224.97, of which only 
$76.04 were in cash; the rest was in credit (average $1.54 cwt).  Of the total sales amount 
in pounds of flour, Lackland sold 48,216 pounds in St. Louis (average $1.90 cwt).
50
  His 
account book clearly demonstrates the cash generating power of agricultur al surplus in 
Missouri.  Although the sheer number of local sales outweighs t hose in St. Louis, 
Lackland rarely sold more than 200 pounds of flour at St. Charles, and received cash for 
only half his sales.  The home market was simply too small to produce the amount of 
cash available in the export trade of St. Louis.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
section gave cash received for flour sales listed in the first section (53,932.5 pounds 
bringing $991.40).  The third section gave total barrels “sent to St. Louis and elsewhere” 
showing an export of 177 barrels (155 to St. Louis) but did not give prices received.  The 
figure of $915.36 received for barrels sent to St. Louis, was based on comparisons 
between the last two sections showing cash received for the 155 barrels exported to St. 
Louis, plus another 91 not listed in the third section, due to missing pages.  The average 
price per barrel for Lackland’s flour, therefore, was $3.72 per barrel, with highest price 
was $4.25 for one sold individually in St. Charles.  The remaining 22 barrels sold on 
average at $3.94 per barrel.  Likely reflecting price incentives for cash customers.   
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Lackland likely never sent flour shipments to St. Louis via steamboat since those 
boats on the lower Missouri River generally considered an acceptable shipment to be 
upwards of 1,000 barrels a trip.  He did, however, utilize two important factors in a 
frontier economy.  He used an abundant local export in the procurement of cash, and he 
used a warehouse to store small amounts of flour until they were packaged for sale in the 
larger St. Louis market.  To match the economy of scale necessary for regular steamboat  
service, however, Lackland’s output for four months needed to increase 400  percent for 
just one shipment.  Though he had the facilities and access to exports, Lackland’s flour 
sales were simply not on a magnitude compatible with the carrying demands of 
steamboats.  Lackland was likely operating as Robert Henderson and other colonial 
merchants had who engaged in provision trades only briefly to generate cash for startup 
costs for their real ventures.    
Even though by the 1820s steamboating proved possible on the Missouri River, many 
communities in the state’s interior did not yet possess the means to exploit the new mode 
of transportation.  Even by the 1830s, as St. Louis was fast becoming a major trade center 
on the Mississippi, counties in Missouri’s interior had difficulty fully using steamboat 
traffic on the Missouri.  Historian Louis C. Hunter noted that growing use of steamboats 
on western rivers only gradually replaced traditional watercraft like keelboats and 
flatboats.  Though keelboat freight rates generally remained lower than steamboat rates, 
the expedience of steamboats offset the extra charges on the Mississippi River.   
Residents of the lower Missouri River, however, still paid higher freight rates from 





River to the town of Franklin in Howard County, the keelboat Water Witch charged 1¢ 
per pound for delivering freight to Boonville in Cooper County, just 222 miles (357 km) 
from St. Louis (figure 15).
51
  Three years earlier in 1823, the steamboat Maysville 
charged 40¢ per hundred pounds on its 700-m ile (1,127-kilometer) trip from Trinity, 
Louisiana, to St. Louis (figure 16).
52
  Even the adoption of steamboats by the American 
Fur Company never was intended to eliminate keelboat use, since their forays into the 
extreme upper reaches of the Missouri were profitable only with the use of keelboats that 
stockpiled fur shipments at forts marking the terminus of steamboat navigation.   
The lower Missouri saw an equally prolonged period of traditional watercraft use.  On 
the lower Missouri, however, no organized system of stockpiling the area’s resources 
existed until later in the 1830s.  While manufactures in St. Louis found boats available to 
send their cargos upriver, there was no way to ensure that the boats would receive full 
cargos on the return trip.  Alphonso Wetmore described these economic conditions along 
the “mad waters” of the Missouri.
53
  The Missouri River counties’ agricultural surplus far 
exceeded the available capacity of steamboats then employed in the Missouri River trade.   
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Steamboat Maysville, “Bill of Lading, Trinity bound for St. Louis,” 24 Feb. 1823, 
Steamboats Collection.  
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Fig. 16.  Bill of Lading for steamboat Maysville.  Steamboats Collection, Missouri 






Wetmore contended that farmers preferred flatboats for carrying their products to market  
(figure 17).  Although several smaller class steamboats carr ied merchandise up from St. 
Louis well after the June rise, they were not taking agricultu ral products downriver.  The 
individual farmer tended, to his own detriment, to “calculate on the highest prices, and 
the most ready sale of the products of his soil and labor ,” essentially stalling shipment of 
produce until “the channel of communication is closed with ice, or too shoal for safe 
navigation, even with flat-boats.”
54
   
Wetmore indicated that single farming households had the capabilities to finance, 
construct, and operate a flatboat.  Steamboats, however, were well beyond the financial, 
technical, and organizational capacities of a single household.  Even the smallest 
steamboat represented a group of investors who had financed the venture.  In May 1831, 
St. Charles resident George Collier agreed to “build a Steam Boat for the Missouri 
River,” with four other investors.
55
  Though Collier was to oversee the construction, 
insurance, and all other accounts of the boat, the five investors equally shared the 
venture’s $10,000 cost.
56
   
Steamboats in the Mississippi River trade similarly required a conso rtium of investors 
to defray expenses and risk.  Henry Chouteau considered investing in a steamboat under 





George Collier and others, “Agreement to build a steamboat for the Missouri 
River,” 23 May 1831 (St. Louis), Hamilton Rowan Gamb le Papers, MHS.  Collier was a 
St. Charles resident, but he appeared to conduct his steamboating endeavors exclusively 
in St. Louis.  The agreement did not mention where the boat was built, or its dimensions.  








construction at Cincinnati and destined for the St. Louis to New Orleans trade.  As the 
boat neared completion, steamboat owner, Richard Ackerman, assured Chouteau that “a 
boat which is owned in the City of Saint Louis, cannot help making money unless she 
should have unusual bad luck, or very bad management.”
57
   
 
Fig. 17.  Henry Lewis, Flatboat without Sail Rigging Near Warsaw, 
Illinois. Das Illustrirte Mississippthal (The Valley of the Mississippi 
Illustrated (Dusseldorf, Germany, 1854, reprint, trans., A. Hermina 
Poatgieter, ed. Bertha L. Heilbron, St. Paul, Minn., 1967, plate 50.)  
 
Ackerman’s projected cost for the new steamboat was $13,000.00.
58
  For comparison, 
in 1831 Edward Chouteau paid $200.00 for a two-year-old 35 ton keelboat, a cost of 
$5.71 per ton.
59
  Ackerman figured $16.00 per ton for the steamboat’s hull, although the 
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actual cost calculated between $65.00 and $52.00 per ton, figured for ei ther 200 or 250 
ton carrying capacity.
60
  Boats used by farmers, likewise were smaller and less expensive 
than even keelboats, considering that a new keelboat of 35 tons cost $375 and required 
about ten men to operate.
61
  Included in the inventory of tools during the sale of the St. 
Charles Steam Flour Mill was one “wood boat” valued at $30.00 in 1848.
62
 Whatever the 
actual cost of the typical farmer’s flatboat, Wetmore leaves the impression that these 
were cheap enough to be built and operated by a single farming household.    
Ackerman personally owned a single 1/4 share of the steamboat.  He previously sold 
two 1/8 shares, and attempted to divide the remaining 1/2 share between Chouteau and 
Captain Phillip, a mutual acquaintance.
63
  Ackerman’s comment on “bad management” 
downplayed the unavoidable risks associated with river navigation, but also struck at a 
particularity of the tramp and transient business.   
Whether on the Missouri or Mississippi rivers, a tramp boat captain hauled return 
freight with no previous arrangements.  After these boats left St. Louis, whatever freight 
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business was available at the destination port was the responsibility of the boat’s crew to 
find.  Ackerman admitted that boat captains sometimes could not find return freight, but 
that “Nine cares [sic] out of ten, the cry of bad luck is all unreal, it is bad management, a 
want of perseverance.  They [boat crews] will say on arrival at New Orleans after lying 
there ten days, freights were scare, could not get them.  Whereas had they look ed about 
the city they could have found them.”
64
  Applying this same “want of perseverance” on 
the lower Missouri River explains Alphonso Wetm ore’s description of tramp boats 
refusing to take return cargos down to St. Louis.  The smattering of agricultural  
shipments required captains to stop at several small landings and deal with numerous 
individuals, something they clearly were averse to doing in New Orleans.
65
  In a letter to 
Chouteau, Ackerman reiterated that the new “cheap” boat would realize profits, an d 
explained how Chouteau’s investment would be spent with an itemized list showing that:  
Her length is 145 foot Keel.  24 foot Beam.  163 feet on Deck.  6 foot Hold, will carry 
[on the Mississippi River] 200 Tons up and 250 Tons down and will not draw whe n 
light 28 inches water.  The contract for her hull when completed and launched, is 
$3,250.00.  $2,000.00 Cash, the balance Forward 6 m onths.  For her Cabin work all 
complete $2,250.00 – $1,500.00 Cash the balance 4 & 6 months.  For new work to 
Engines, putting up and put her in complete running order, ready for Steam $1,250.00, 
one half Cash, balance 6 months.  For Painting and Glazing furnishing all the glass 
wanting about the boat, 3 Coats white and 3 coats Green, $500.00.  $250.00 Cash 
balance 4 months.  Capt. Philips puts in the Engine, Boilers, Chain Cable, Anchors, 
Mattresses, Chairs, Tables, Sheets, Pillow cases, and everything belonging to H 
LeKinny which can be used to advantage for $4,500.00.  That you will perceive will 
make it cost $11,750.00 to which I have added for Carpet and many little things about 
the boat $1,250.00 making the whole cost about $13,000.00 which you will perceive is 





Although Ackerman referred to circumstances in New Orleans, his statement was 
applicable here since the vast majority of steamboats on the Missouri River also 









An earlier letter from Ackerman to Chouteau dated February 26, 1840, included a 
slightly altered but sim ilar list of expenses.  The total cost remained the same in both 
letters, but the March letter above included a more complete breakdown of expenses .  
Nonetheless, a few details did not carry over to the March letter.  The details omitted in 
the March letter included chandeliers and glassware for the cabin, new fire fronts and 
fire-bed chimneys for the engines, and carpentry work on the cook house and “room s 
below.”
67
   
The important consideration here is that nearly every item on the list represents a 
segment of a national trade network – all specialized industries supporting the carrying 
trade.  Each industry came with a set of credits drawn and debts owed that necessitated 
owners to employ their boat in an economy of scale sufficient to balance her books.  The 
connections required to engage in any business activity were the key to success.  Even for 
businessmen who were not placing capital directly in transportation, their busines s 
pursuits certainly hinged on the availability of transportation.   
Like steamboatmen, western merchants also needed a variety of business connections, 
especially with eastern suppliers, as well as forwarding agents in New Orleans.  Once a 
shipment destined for St. Louis arrived in New Orleans, a commission house tended to 
the forwarding of goods via steamboat.  In this system, forwarding agents served an 
intermediary function, agreeing to ship freight based on specified rate charges.  When 
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miss-communication or disagreements occurred between St. Louis merchants and their 
forwarding agents, a merchant in St. Louis could not always make direct arrangements 
with boats at his wharf.  After failing to have his freight forwarded to St. Louis, J. R. 
Stanford was forced to ask his partners in Boston to deal with a dispute between himself 
and New Orleans forwarding agents Stetson & Avery.  Stanford complained that:  
6 Boats arrived here [St. Louis] since the first shipment of my goods [from Boston] 
arrived at New Orleans.  The Captains of Boats which have arrived say that Messrs. S  
& A state that they are limited not to pay for my freight more than fifty cents per 
hundred.  I have given no such orders.  I did write them that I did not wish them to 
ship goods to me on a boat that would charge 75¢ for my freight and others fifty, 
which they did do to my certain knowledge.  I believe know that they are a little  
miffed at this and think to vent their spleen by keeping my goods and holding out as 




Stanford’s appeal for intervention from his Boston partners shows the inability for 
making independent arrangements with steamboats loading at New Orleans.  
Stanford’s and Ackerman’s letters demonstrate the degree of organization and labor 
involved in steamboating.  This was an enterprise requiring the combined efforts and 
capital of numerous individuals, all seeking their own profit.  Given the amount of money 
and risk associated with the steamboating business, it is understandable that boat owners 
had to dissuade investors’ fears.  Ackerman promised Chouteau that “diligent men” 
would safeguard against loss in the New Orleans freight business.  Steamboating ventures 
on the lower Missouri River had added concerns for loss.  Unlike New Orleans’s 
abundance of docks, wharves, and holding houses, few Missouri River towns had any 
comparable infrastructure.  While boat owners on either river attracted investors with 
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promises of business acumen and competent crews, warehouses became a key factor in 
determining steamboat profitability on the Missouri River.  For the most part, capital for 
warehouse infrastructure originated from commission and forwarding agents (figure 18).  
Their absence from the lower Missouri River left warehouse construction to farming 
organizations and local merchants – two groups lacking the financial or organizational 
resources of the large cities. 
 
 
Fig. 18.  Advertisement for Tabor, Shaw & Tatum, commission and forwarding agents 





When farming organizations or merchants constructed a warehouse, they connected 
with the larger corporate entities behind steamboats.  By having a location to safely store 
products, farmers could transport small wagon loads of goods on their own terms and 
merchants could promise a steady supply of freight as leverage in shipping arrangements .  
In a sense, farming communities acted as their own forwarding agents.  They provided 
resources for warehouse construction and negotiated freight rates with steamboat captains 
oftentimes without the need for direct communication.   
In A Mechanic’s Diary , former Missouri Governor Henry C. Brokmeyer described 
how neatly a warehouse fit into the farming lifestyle.  In his entry for October 19, 1856, 
Brokmeyer and his hunting party came across a surprisingly well kept road leading to a 
small, boat landing on the Mississippi River.  Upon meeting the owner of the landing, 
Conrad Witte, Brokmeyer learned that local farmers had built a house near the landing 
“to have something to put their wheat in.”
69
  After examining the small structure, 
Brokmeyer made note that “half a steamboat load of wheat was already” inside, and that 
the sacks of wheat belonged to multiple owners.  Witte replied that the wheat was 
awaiting shipment to market by river, and that prior to the warehouse, local farmers “had 
to haul it so far with wagons that they had to earn it over again.”
70
  Brokmeyer further 
recounted that Witte, pointing to the stored wheat, explained “it was the wheat which 
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built the road – the marketing of that wheat.”
71
  Shortly after construction of the road and 
warehouse, local farmers built a schoolhouse, market house, and church.  The placement 
of these structures hinged their location to the warehouse and boat landing, as Witte 
described “our people can’t run around on week days and make special trips for 
things…when the wagons go to the landing they all pass here, and that would be 
convenient for them.  Then, if the church were here too.”
72
  By building a warehouse, 
farmers had created an infrastructure to match the pace of household production.  As long 
as the warehouse stored grain at a pace corresponding to the capacity of steamboat holds 
and the frequency of their routes, the system worked well.   
Brokmeyer was a prominent leader of the St. Louis Hegelians, a Missouri-based 
philosophical school grounded in the German idealism of G eorg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel.  One of the Hegelians’ beliefs was a rejection of written history too sterilized with 
fact.  Brokmeyer, like his fellow Hegelians, considered work based purely on inductive 
reasoning as meaningless for its absence of true knowledge.
73
  Brokmeyer’s editor freely 
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admits that the diary is based more on the author’s personal observation than actual 
experience.   
Although the chance meeting of a boat landing owner likely never occurred, 
Brokmeyer’s tale was cautiously useful as an anecdote for the state of farmers in 
Missouri.  His account, though factually suspect, presented two key truths about the 
relationship between farming and steamboating.  First, steamboat captains/owners 
afforded farmers profitable access to agricultural markets linked to rivers.  Brokmeyer’s 
surprise at finding a good road showed the universally poor condition of Missouri 
roadways that added time and labor for wagon transportation.  By organizing to facilita te 
mobility to a boat landing, local farmers greatly reduced the distance between themselves 
and the market.  Second, these types of cooperative ventures between farmers were rare .  
The few instances in which local farmers banded together and built a storage facility 
proved decidedly advantageous.  When he loaded a wagon for the market, storing his 
goods in warehouses freed a farmer from scheduling his activities around those of 
steamboats.  Although B rokmeyer’s diary created a utopian Missouri community as a 
tool to dispense business advice on the farming community, his observation was from far 
novel.  
In July 1847, the Wheat Growers Association of St. Charles County prepared a report 
outlining their solution to the lack of acceptable shipping arrangements for its  products.  
The report first addressed the need for a suitable warehouse in the town of St. Charles.
74
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The Wheat Growers Association found “the old warehouse in the town of St. Charles…to 
be entirely unfit, in its present condition, for the storage of grain of any kind, but may be 
rendered secure at a small expense….The house belongs to Mr. Lackland and can be 
purchased at $26.”  Although James Lackland used his warehouse in 1834 to store flour,  
no records indicate his use of the facility for that purpose after construct ing his sawmill in 
1837.
75
  A second proposed warehouse on the Mississippi River in St. Charles County 
promised area farmers dual access to shipping on both rivers.  The Wheat Grow ers 
Association, like Brokmeyer, realized that warehouses had to be paired with steamboat 
shipments of agricultural products.  
The Wheat Growers Association, however, was not content with simply gaining 
access to steamboat transportation.  It also sought independence from town merchants by 
constructing a macadamized turnpike road between St. Charles and St. Louis.  The 
central issue for the association was a choice in transportation and markets.  Like 
Brokmeyer’s utopian community, the Wheat Growers Associat ion called for the 
construction of a warehouse and a smooth road, so that:  
when a small amount of produce is to be forwarded and a sufficient inducement is not 
offered in St. Charles to stop it there, the farmer may pass through and avail himself of 
the travel over a good road, where there will be neither stalling, prizing out of mud 
holes, nor sand banks as the case at the present.  This will render the small farmer as 
independent with his wagon, as the larger one is with his boat load of produce.  We 
say that we want two modes of transportation – that the turnpike is essential to the 
promotion of our true interests – it will afford to us the choice of markets, and place us 
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The Wheat Growers Association calculated the annual surplus of St. Charles County 
at $220,425.  Its estimate stemmed from the value of 14,076 tons of produce, mainly 
wheat, hemp, tobacco, and livestock.  Transporting these products required the equivalent 
of 35,190 horses, each hauling 800 pounds per wagon.  The estimated cost of the 19-mile 
(31-kilometer) turnpike from St. Charles to St. Louis was $124,000.  The Wheat Growers 
Association also estimated a trebling in horse traffic after construct ing the turnpike, so 
that an annual traffic flow of 100,000 horses would produce revenues of $5,000 –$20,000, 
dependent on toll fees of 5¢–20¢.
77
  At that time in St. Louis, a modest sized steamboat 
(rated under 150 tons) cost just under $15,000.
78
  Based on the Wheat Growers 
Association’s estimates, one trip of a fully  loaded 150 ton steamboat could carry the 
equivalent of 375 horses.  A fully loaded steamboat of this size would require 94 trips (2 
days each) to carry the same tonnage as the 35,190 horses could in an entire year.  Even 
with the addition of wages, maintenance, fuel, and certain lack of optimal conditions, 
steamboats decisively out competed horse and wagons.  The Wheat Growers Association 
realized this fact, since it admitted that “transportation by the rivers and upon a good 
turnpike road must go hand in hand.”
79
  Although the association certainly recognized the 
value of permanent shipping arrangements, one wonders if it also recognized the low cost 
of steamboats compared to turnpikes.  Stripped of their context, the transportation and 
cost estimates raise questions as to why the association never attempted to purchase a 
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steamboat, or even to subsidize regular packet service.  One answer might be found in a 
contemporaneous criticism that “farmers, especially of the west, seem to suppose that 
their interests will take care of themselves.”
80
   Statements like these revealed tensions 
between direct producers like farmers and owners of mills who controlled the means of 
agricultural production and entered direct transportation negotiations.  The Wheat 
Growers petition to the farming community for collective action was an implicit call to 
capture more control of their labor.  Cheaper transportation to several markets increased 
demand for their products and thereby raised labor value.  Historian Cathy Matson 
discussed similar tensions present in colonial New York.   
By the 1740s, New York merchants aggressively directed wheat supplies from their 
city’s hinterlands as well as from New Jersey and Connecticut.  During this period, the 
entire New York merchant class overtook their Boston neighbors for the lead in export 
values.  Although the city’s commercial sector flourished, provision s merchants 
continually petitioned the city council for favorable regulations of wheat and flour sales.  
Because purchasing power came from connections with local farmers, merchants in this 
sector were more vulnerable to up-start competition and so sought any means to subvert 
burgeoning non-city traders.
81
  As the city provisions merchants attempted to block non-
resident traders from purchasing either in the city limits or directly from country farmers, 
tension over prices and free trade mounted.  For Matson, the critical relationships to 
understand in colonial econom ies were found in these intermediate regional markets.  
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These locations provided the setting where rural producers and urban merchants 
negotiated prices based on the quality of agricultural goods and the cost of foreign wares.  
In the space between country households and city waterfronts “the distinct interests of 
colonists as buyers and sellers intersected and were muted or sharpened by continual 
negotiation.”
82
  Those negotiations sometimes broke down as when mid-eighteenth Long 
Island farmers once threatened to withhold their produce until prices rose or “till the 
Vermin Eat and Spoiled it.”
83
  
From the perspective of negotiations, Midwestern grain elevators showed the power 
of storage and transportation infrastructures to alleviate tensions between farmer and 
producers.  Chicago traders divorced farmers from direct negotiations with local millers 
in exchange for expedient payment.  As they relinquished control over their labor, it 
became a commodity for sale by city exchange houses.
84
  Anthropologist Eric Wolf saw 
the source of these tensions in seventeenth-century Europe.  He related the emergence of 
mechanized textile production to decreased requirements for human energy in thread and 
fabric production.  As the demand for labor decreased, so did labor value.  The 
emergence of factories during the Industrial Revolution altered the nature of household 
production especially in outlying urban areas.  Households that formerly produced 
finished textile s at their own pace, could negotiate their labor value in much the same 
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way as farmers did.
85
  Because textile producers eventually began working in factories 
for wages determined by owners, they lost their negotiating powers in a much more 
obvious way.  Grain elevators, on the other hand, neither altered the nature of farming 
household production, nor made the loss of negotiating power as obvious.  As a result, 
tensions appeared alleviated in within farming communities, whereas they were 
exacerbated in industrial ones.  No doubt, these distinctions partially explained the rise of 
collective labor unions in manufacturing sectors.  Caution must be raised, however, 
before taking such a narrow view for the organizational abilities of St. Charles farmers.  
Regardless of how loosely organized the Wheat Growers Association appeared, the 
steamboat business was not easily entered from the levee at St. Charles.   
With high costs associated with labor, insurance, and operational expenses, boat 
captains preferred to carry either a full load or none at all when leaving the Missouri 
River.  It was often cheaper to make a speedy return back to St. Louis empty handed 
rather than search about river towns for piecemeal small orders.  Compounding boat 
captains’ dislike for taking small shipments, farmers continually balked at specifying 
exact times for hauling goods to a landing.  Although an area might collectively have 
ample supplies to satisfy boat captains, farm products remained scattered about the 
countryside with no indication of moving.  Because no one could predict the size of 
freight at most river locations, captains were reluctant to offer continued service.  As a 
result, they frequently charged rates that made flatboats more affordable for household-
sized shipments.  Farmers who hesitated too late for safe flatboat navigation, oftentimes 
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found themselves at the mercy of the few captains making late season runs.  The desire to 
get the highest price possible was driven more by greed.  As Turner noted  
the beginning of manufacture in her cities [Mississippi Valley], however, promised to 
bring about a movement for industrial independence in the West.  In spite of 
evidences of growing wealth, there was such a decline in agricultural prices that, for 
the farmer who did not live on the highways of commerce, it was almost unprofitable 




The allure of St. Louis’s autumn price spike in wheat could prove detrimental to 
farmers but a windfall for shippers.  The local dry goods merchants, however, were 
caught in the middle of this situation.  They depended on the farming community (as 
import consumers and export producers) and on steamboat captains as the hub between 
their customers and suppliers.  For some merchants, the middle ground was traversed 
with ease, but for others like George W. Garriott negotiating the tensions between 
farming and boating interests was exhausting.  
Up to 1848, St. Charles merchant George W. Garriott concentrated his efforts in dry 
goods and tobacco manufacturing, but with the increasing difficulty to procure regular 
steamboat service between St. Louis and St. Charles, Garriott had to expand his 
enterprise to make S t. Charles’s levee an attractive destination.  The best way to secure 
regular steamboat traffic was to guarantee full cargo loads for steamboat captains, but 
before 1848, Garriott’s control of the amount of freight at St. Charles’s levee was 
restricted to the productivity of his tobacco factory and whatever flour he could purchase 
from the steam mill owned by John Atkinson.  By the winter of 1847, Atkinson’s mill 
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had produced flour for at least twelve months, and he had clearly just begun to establish a 
relationship with St. Louis forwarding agents.  The products of the new mill, shipped by 
steamboat to St. Louis, entered the hands of forwarding agents who sold this new St. 
Charles brand of flour in lots of 100 barrels, so that “Every lot of your flour which  we 
sell in this way for retail and distribute it about, will tell well in the way of establishing its 
reputation thoroughly.”
87
  Atkinson’s flour found an active market in St. Louis, as his 
agents there requested him “to get out more [flour] as we can safe ly say, that we can give 
you good returns for all that you can send.”
88
  Without an effective way to control the 
output of flour in St. Charles’s mill, Garriott could not directly control the amount of 
freight captains found waiting for shipment at the levee.  
Every market contains particular price-setting conditions.  One condition setting 
inland shipping rates apart from their oceanic counterparts was the variability of riparian 
navigation channels.  As a result, the steamboating industry fluctuated prices according 
the depth and danger of a river channel.  For boat captains, water was a commodity that 
provided leverage for negotiation.  Deep channels supported large, efficient boats that 
lowered rates.  Because rates depended more on navigation conditions than distance, 
charges between two levees varied widely regardless of mileage.  For example, b oat 
captains charged freight rates for the 45-mile (72-kilometer) river trip to St. Charles that 
were substantially higher than the 1,146-mile (1,844-kilometer) trip from St. Louis to 
New Orleans.  During winter months and low water stages, few boat captains agreed to 
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run from St. Louis to St. Charles and did so only with guarantees for a full load or 
penalties for smaller ones.  Garriott’s forwarding agents in St.  Louis during the winter of 
1847, for example, secured a steamboat for one shipment with “considerable difficulty.”
89
   
After agreeing with the captain of the steamboat Revenue Cutter to pay 37 1/2¢ per barrel 
of flour “conditional, that if you can give him  [Capt. McMahon] there a full load he will 




   Clark & Edwards had good cause to conceded apologetically 
that this was “the very best we could do,” since freight rates for the much longer trip from 
St. Louis to New Orleans  generally cost 20¢ per barrel of flour, even during winter 
months.
91
  By combining his dry goods and tobacco interests with products of the steam 
flour mill, Garriott stood a better chance of controlling the amount of freight available for 
delivery to St. Louis.  Providing stronger guarantees for full cargoes increased his 
negotiating power with steamboat captains.  Price and Clemens showed that tobacco 
shipping charges across the Atlantic in the seventeenth century routinely produced the 
lowest ratio of freight charges to im port value.  Tobacco was less bulky than grain and 
higher in price per pound, so that even small shipments would bring sizable profits.
92
  
Any penalties Garriott paid for light flour shipments likely would be absorbed with a few 
added boxes of tobacco.  In either case, Garriott’s first attempt to enter the flour market 
showed ambition and commitment in the venture.  
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In an article of agreement created on December 31, 1847, Garriott formed a 
partnership with John Lischy to rent and lease for one year  the “large steam flouring 
mill” owned by John Atkinson in St. Charles.  The  partnership conditions stated that 
Lischy was to “Superintend and manage all the business in and about pertaining to said 
mill,” while Garriott was to “keep the books...and manage  the financial business of the 
concern.”
93
   Garriott was clearly on his way to becom ing a specialized provisions 
merchant described by Doerflinger.  Price explained the intensive energy demands of a 
provisions merchant required delegation of certain activi ties.  A merchant often entrusted 
record keeping to clerks, or supply to competent buyers, but “no merchant could delegate 
the giving of credit or neglect the balance sheet of his firm.”
94
 
Nothing in the agreement specifically stated the total capital investment of both 
partners, but it divided profits based on the fraction of investment each member 
contributed.  Lischy’s 1/3 investment entitled him to 1/3 share in profits .  If he paid 
Garriott $1,500 by March 14, 1848, Lischy would be entitled to 1/2 of all profits.  Since 
the agreement specifically set Garriott’s contribution at 2/3 total expenses, the equalizing 
sum of $1,500 im plies a total investment of $9,000, with Garriott’s actual investment as 
$6,000.
95
  As a continuation of the December agreement, Garriott and Atkinson drafted 
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the official lease on February 4, 1848 that transferred half the rights of the flour mill from 
Atkinson to Garriott.  Though Garriott and Lischy controlled the operation and divided 
the profits of the mill, Atkinson retained his rights to properties covered in the lease.  
Atkinson’s role resembled a modern bank, in which he held rights of foreclosure should 
Garriott and Lischy renege on their debts.   
In addition to the steam mill, Garriott’s lease included rights to the adjacent  lot, which 
included a cooper shop and a blacksmith shop, along with “the island lying immediately 
above and opposite St. Charles” that was part of a claim held against Atkinson by 
steamboat builder, George Collier (figures 19 and 20).
96
  The island property was likely a 
valuable source for lumber, as the daybook of James C. Lackland, owner of the St. 
Charles Sawmill, frequently mentioned obtaining wood there.  Garriott required fuel for 
his mill’s engine and barrels for flour exports.  Owning a nearby lumbe r source had 
obvious advantages and showed Garriott’s efforts to manage as many spin -off industries 
as possible.  This was a good strategy for a merchant whose profit margins were already 
narrowed by sizeable loans.  In six bank notes, for example, Garriott indebted himself to 
Atkinson for the next three years, but the method of payment was such that $5000 of his 
total debt had to be paid by March 1849.
97
   
                                                                                                                                                                 
equal $1500.  Because there were six shares in tota l, the full capital investment was 
$9000. 
96




Ibid., under the February agreement, Garriott’s six bank notes were appropriated 
between the mill property and the island property.  The first three notes, designated for 





By the commencement of the 1848 navigation season, Garriott ambitiously combined 
his tobacco and dry goods interests with that of the steam flouring mill, but he also 
wagered against several factors outside his control.  His ultimate success hinged as much 
on the mill’s productiveness, as the negotiating power of his agents in St. Louis to secure 
steady and regular steamboat service to St. Charles.   
 
 
Fig. 19.  St. Charles plan view redrawn from an 1858 survey map.  Note lot 5 as the 
location of Lackland’s sawmill, and lot 9 as the location of Garriott’s large flour mill.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
notes were due between July 1848 and Mar. 1849.  The next three notes for $1000, 
$1000, and $500 were due Mar. 1849 and Mar. 1851.  The six notes, totaling $8500, did 
not include the cost of the tools in the mill and two shops whose unstated value likely 
makes the $500 difference between the notes and $9000 expense implied by the 






Fig. 20. Missouri River Commission Map, 1891. (St. Charles County 
Historical Society.) Below St. Charles were a number of small islands any 





After finalizing his investment in the flour mill, Garriott was likely optimistic about 
the upcoming year.  Unfortunately, his St. Louis agents were not quick to reciprocate 
those feelings.  Reports of the sluggish market on the St. Louis levee echoed in letters to 
Garriott from two of his forwarding agents in the city.  One firm , Houseman & Lowry, on 
January 24 noted at seeing only one purchase of “a small lot of fine [flour] at $4 [per 
barrel].”
98
  Compared to the $5.25 per barrel price obtained by Atkinson’s agents just six 
weeks earlier, this was certainly unfavorable news.
99
  Garriott’s shipments of tobacco 
fared equally poorly in the St. Louis markets that winter.  Houseman & Lowry urged 
patience from Garriott by requesting that he keep his tobacco in St. Charles until the 
opening of navigation.
100
  On a less bleak note, however, Garriott’s second forwarding 
agents, Clark & Edwards, sold one lot of St. Charles flour for $4.50 per barrel.  At this 
price they felt some obligation to reassure Garriott of their commitment for selling at the 
highest price possible, and that Garriott had to “rely a little on [their] judgments when the 
market has a downward tendency.”
101
  While facing a sluggish flour market in St. Louis, 
Garriott also encountered an equally poor reception from the city’s boatmen.  
  Steamboat navigation to most destinations on the Missouri River was generally 
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impossible between November and March during any given season.  Occasional trips to 
St. Charles outside the regular navigation season, however, did occur.  Although 
forwarding agents cajoled a handful of boats to run to St. Charles in the winter, these 
were not counted on to maintain service during the spring and summer.  As river 
conditions above St. Charles improved in early spring, the rising water channel opened 
navigation to upriver levees, thereby increasing the competition for service on the 
Missouri.  The fact that winter navigation to St. Charles was sometimes possible did not 
create strong enough ties between St. Charles and the boating community to lessen the 
importance of obtaining a commitment from a boat captain.  Garriott’s agents in St. Louis 
during the winter waited for news of the proposed spring packet lines, as eagerly as they 
did for the latest market conditions in New Orleans and Europe.  As they prepared for the 
upcoming season, positive news for dependable service between St. Louis and St. Charles 
gave promise for packet service.
102
  By the beginning of February, Houseman & Lowry 
were confident that Captain Dozier (of the steamboat Lake of the Woods) would enter the 
St. Charles trade.  They became even more confident after entering negotiations with a 
second boat captain.  Writing to Garriott in St. Charles, Houseman & Lowry described 
the negotiations by saying: 
We have seen the Capt of the “Linn” [Lewis F. Linn] and had a talk with him in regard 
to the packet trade to your place, he thinks favorably of it, and has promised to let us 
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know in a few days [of] his decision.  As yet we have not been able to see Capt 
Dozier.  If we can bring two or three Steam Boatmen into competition in this matter, 
[we] shall be able, we hope, to get one on favorable terms, to engage in the trade.  We 
shall have this matter in view, and do all we can to fulfill your  wishes in the matter.
103
     
 
By mid-February, however, news of the planned packet service on the Missouri 
appeared less favorable from advertisements in St. Louis.  Clark & Edwards sent word to 
Garriott on the fifteenth that both the Tamerlane and the Hay Dee arranged to run packet 
service on the Missouri River.  Unfortunately, these boats were expected to “be loaded 
above” St. Charles.
104
  Clark & Edwards’s letter reflected the changing complexion of 
steamboating on the Missouri, where in the minds of steamboatmen, St. Charles was fast 
becoming the last levee on the downriver trip, instead of the first levee upriver.  Within a 
matter of a few weeks, Garriott’s agents conveyed a dwindling sense of optimism for the 
availability of boats for St. Charles.  Negotiations swayed towards the boatmen’s favor, 
as hope for “favorable terms” and “competition” gave way to one -sided arrangements 
where “Capt Dozier says he can come up [to St. Charles]..., but he demands not anything 
less than the bulk of 1000 bbls [barrels] down.”
105
  Just a month away from the opening 
of Missouri River’s navigation season all of Garriott’s business prospects rested on the 
mercy of boatmen who clearly had little interest in negotiation.  Though Garriott likely 
had no difficulty in keeping the shelves of his store stocked with dry goods, the 
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downriver trip from St. Charles was being phased out (figures 21 and 22).  
By the 1848 navigation season, Garriott’s superintendent abandoned the mill and 
compounded his difficulties for dependable service to St. Louis.  Selling his interest in 
the steam flouring mill to Garriott on April 24, 1848, John Lischy left Ga rriott without a 
miller for most of May.
106
  Whatever impact the mill’s production suffered by Lischy’s 
absence could only have worsened the frustration of limited downriver cargo space and 
the increasingly sluggish market in the city.  Throughout May and Ju ne, Houseman & 
Lowry’s highest offer for flour was only $4.00 1/4¢.
107
 At this price, they could not 
follow Garriott’s instructions to accept no offers below $4.62 1/2¢.
108
  The disappointing 
market in St. Louis, however, was a secondary concern.  Missouri ste amers were 
allowing only a trickle of Garriott’s products to enter the market.  Through a combination 
of sources, the St. Charles mill’s estimated output was about 22,000 barrels per year 
(Dozier’s 1,000 barrel demand would take about seventeen days).  Throughout May 29 
and June 7, however, no single shipment from St. Charles exceeded 100 barrels (far short 
of Dozier 1,000 barrel request).
109
  During this period, Garriott shipped a total of 228 
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Houseman & Lowry received at least three shipments of flour from St. Charles:  on 
29 May 1848 the Lake of the Woods delivered 90 barrels, on 31 May 1848 the Mandan 
delivered 50 barrels, and on 7 June 1848 the Lake of the Woods delivered 88 barrels.  
These shipments are described in letters written on the day of the shipments’ arrivals 
from Houseman & Lowry to George W. Garriott.  The first two letters dated in May are 





barrels that required about 3.8 days to mill.  Even subtracting t wo weekend days (June 3–
4) from May 29 to June 7, the Missouri steamboats carried only about 48 percent of the 
St. Charles Mill production capacity.  This figure is highly speculative, however, because 
no daybooks survive for the mill.  Similarly, it is more than reasonable to assume that the 
mill underwent periods of slow production.  One indication of “slower” periods was a 
shipment of 88 barrels of flour sent aboard the steamboat Lake of the Woods.  On this 
shipment, Garriott combined barrels from the St. Charles mill with barrels purchased 
from the Grove Mills.
110
  Receiving only $4.00 3/8¢ for the 39 barrels of St. Charles flour  
   
Fig. 21.  Newspaper advertisement for George W. Garriott’s dry goods business.  
(Missouri Patriot (St. Charles), 13 Aug. 1846.) 
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Fig. 22.  Newspaper advertisement for George Garriott’s dry goods business.   
(St. Charles Advertiser, 1 Jan. 1846.) 
 
and $3.00 for the 49 barrels of Grove Mills flour, highlighted the need to  have sufficient 
cargo awaiting a boat captain.
111
 Garriott’s frustrations were certainly centered on the 
lack of transportation to St. Louis, but the trip of Lake of the Woods hints at further 
frustrations with grain supply.  To alleviate his supply problems, Garriott searched for 







new forwarding agents in the city.
112
   
As he planned to end his business relations with Houseman & Lowry, Garriott sought 
not only more adept salesmen, but also new supply sources.  In each report sent to 
Garriott, Houseman & Lowry consistently noted the rising prices of wheat and other 
unprocessed grains on St. Louis’s levee.  With lowering prices for manufactured products 
like flour and corn meal and rising prices for unprocessed wheat and grains, smaller 
wagon shipments were more competitive than large steamboat cargoes.  Houseman & 
Lowry described the situation: 
We find that our retailers are supplied with corn meal, from country wagons, ...and 
that the demand here will hardly justify you in grinding & shipping meal till Fall.  
Dealers are afraid of having meal mush on their hands, and prefer buying from wagons 




Sending products to St. Louis by wagon was an option for Garriott that he employed 
at least once in 1848.  Garriott likely sent small shipments like these to city grocers who 
provided him an alternate source for flour sales in St. Louis.  This source, however, 
operated on smaller economy of scale than Garriott positioned himself to exploit.  
Although grocers emerged from the specialized economy of the city, their activities were 
insulated from the large-scale trade of the provisions market.  Grocers generally dealt 
with only a handful of country millers who, like James Lackland a decade earlier,  
searched for short-term expedient cash profit.  These small-volume country millers often 
received payment by keeping portions of their mills products for their own use .  They 
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generally did not actively purchase wheat.  Instead, they exchanged services with local 
farmers and would generally spend winter months sharpening tools or repairing farmers’ 
equipment for foodstuffs.
114
  Both the country miller and city grocer were content in 
trading on a scale synchronized to farming household production.  Garriott’s production 
was more intensive and dependant on a much larger consumer base inaccessible through 
city grocers.  One advantage for small markets, however, was that they may have 
provided at least some revenues during absences of steamboat service.   
Almost as a rule, provisions trading was intensely competitive but the shared social 
position of these merchants made them all the more sensitive to business threats.  
Provisions merchants generally climbed out of humbler backgrounds without the benefits 
of inherited capital or advantageous marriages.  Many New York colonial provisio ns 
merchants hailed from the countryside or low-level positions within the city’s business 
world.  As a result, they rarely purchased real estate like the houses and gardens seen as 
characteristic of true prom inence.  Instead of material possessions, they placed capital 
gains into shipping, bills of exchange markets, and the endless demands of their business 
maintenance.  The lives of these provisions merchants were “not wealth and privilege but 
struggle against losses, gluts, and debts.  …  Their rates of return often were lower than 
those of eminent merchants, given their smaller vessels, widely shared ownership of 
cargo, and lower level of investment.”
115
  Although Garriott was certainly positioning 
himself for success, he was ascending heights tested by co untless others before him – 
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many of whom “fell for good.”
116
  
One receipt from Houseman & Lowry showed the highest price they obtained for 
flour at $4.75 per barrel.
117
  This shipment arrived in St. Louis by wagon, not steamboat.  
Though the sale grossed 13 1/2¢ per barrel below Garriott’s lowest asking price , the 
wagon load consisted of only 14 barrels and netted $64.84 after subtracting Houseman & 
Lowry’s 2 percent commission.
118
  The labor and expense involved in land transportation 
likely gouged profits further, but Garriott had few other options.  He found himself 
trading in a double-edged market where high grain prices raised milling costs, while 
plunging flour prices further magnified profit loss in a hostile shipping environment.  St. 
Louis merchants’ preference for purchasing small quantities until market prices returned 
to favorable conditions, allowed for higher prices but only for smaller shipments that 
were more likely to be sent by wagon at inflated transportation costs.   
Garriott’s shipping plight of May 1848 underscored the tense relationship between 
himself and the local farmers.  Historians John McCusker and Russell Menard 
epitomized the growing economy of scale during the colonial period as the “cheaper -by-
the-dozen effect.”
119
  Price clearly argued that British tobacco merchants knew full-well 
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that higher volume absorbed lower per unit costs.
120
  The difference between them and 
Garriott, however, was that they provided capital incentives for individual planters to 
increase production.  Exchange houses only accepted lower per unit retail sales because 
high volume ensured larger cumulative profits.  On the supply end, they rewarded large 
planters willing to provide high-volume wholesale pricing.  No matter how much Garriott 
increased his supply volume, however, the cheaper-by-the-dozen effect would never 
occur.  Every extra bushel of wheat Garriott bought represented another local supplier.  
As long his local suppliers grew exponentially with supply volume, he would never find a 
farmer capable of giving, or benefiting from, high-volume pricing.   
Houseman and Lowry’s only solution for curtailing the escalating local wheat prices 
was for Garriott to “induce [his] farmers to lower their figures for wheat.”
121
  Though St. 
Charles lay on the edge of highly productive wheat fields in St. Charles County, the 
carrying capacity of farm wagons could not meet the supply demands of the steam mill.  
The small amounts of grain farmers hauled to the city limits yielded prices unsatisfactory 
for the labor involved in transportation.
122
  The growing friction between the county’s 
wheat growers and St. Charles merchants, coupled with rising wheat prices in St. Louis, 
forced Garriott to find alternative supply sources.  Opening new avenues of exchange 
began first with forming new business relations in St. Louis, and second with finding 
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suppliers farther up the Missouri River.  In other words, the downriver core promised 
access to the upriver periphery.  
In early June 1848, Garriott formalized new arrangements with St. Louis agents, Scott 
Naylor & Co., while he scouted upriver locations for new suppliers.  After hearing his 
intentions, Warburton Rossiter & Co. sent word to Garriott about their “pleasure” to 
introduce him to some “friends” on the Missouri River who could purchase wheat for the 
St. Charles steam mill.
123
  Like earlier merchants, expanding to new territories required 
personal connections and reputable endorsers.  Warburton Rossiter & Co.’s offer to 
provide “friends” likely responded to a request from Garriott for a credit advance.  
Although they were unwilling or unable to extend more credit in Garriott’s favor, they at 
least pointed him to the right people.  Their friends would help Garriott balance his 
account.  Scott Naylor & Co. met Garriott’s more pressing credit  needs by providing 
capital for upriver purchases.
124
  Garriott’s strategy prom ised two positive outcomes.  He 
could take advantage of any downward trends in the St. Louis wheat market, by working 
with agents who would extend credit for shipping large lots to St. C harles.  He could also 
use upriver locations to his advantage by having agents write bills of lading oblig ing boat 
crews to land at St. Charles on downriver trips and discharge freight.  This move stopped 
                                                       
123
Warburton Rossiter & Co., forwarding agents in St. Louis, dealt with Garriott on 
some of his tobacco shipments.  Unfortunately, there were too few records to ma ke any 
statement regarding the amount or frequency of tobacco traded for Garriott by this firm.  




 Ibid., Near the end of Garriott’s relationship with Houseman & Lowry several 






a boat at his levee and cleared space for shipments to St. Louis.  By reorganizing 
downriver and upriver contacts, Garriott promised to lower his overhead costs and ensure 
access to larger economies of scale.   
Rumors of Garriott’s new business relations reached Houseman & Lowry, who 
inquired to “learn the  truth of it.”
125
  By June 23, facts replaced hearsay, as Garriott’s 
former agents brought his account up to date by presenting him a balance due of 
$60.99.
126
  Severing ties with forwarding agents who, instead of generating profit, 
presented bills for payment made good business sense at any time.  In late June along the 
Missouri, however, the few remaining weeks of predictable navigation magnified the 
necessity of seeing real profit soon.  In the face of $8500 worth of maturing bank notes, 
the first $3000 due on 1 July 1848, Garriott’s decision was even more justifiable.
127
   
He replicated the same business strategy seen a decade earlier in St. Louis.  Like the 
Filleys and J. R. Stanford, Garriott moved into the provisions trade.  Although his move 
appeared more a choice than a necessity, it bound him to participate in an economy of 
scale synchronized to the carrying capacities of steamboats.  Filley and Stanford 
benefited from spin-off industries in St. Louis.  Captains had good reason to lay idle for 
days or weeks in a city with dry docks and other repair services.  Additionally, they 
would not incur fuel expenses tied up at St. Louis waiting for customers.  Merchants in 
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St. Louis rarely, if ever, complained about availability in St. Louis steamboats.  
Unfortunately for Garriott, transportation proved an obstacle between himself and the St. 
Louis market.  Buying local exports was simply not enough to end his mounting debts.  
Garriott also had to control the storage, production, and shipment of western exports.  
Upriver sources for wheat promised to solve the more difficult of the latter two problems.  
In short, Garriott’s business strategy would have been completely familiar to a merchant 
in the colonial East a century earlier.  On the Missouri River, at mid-nineteenth century, 
however, Garriott was learning the rules of a  colonial game.  He, like the Filley’s and 
Stanford, were reinventing an economy long since antiquated in the big urban markets, 
but now finding use in the growing insular frontier of the Missouri Valley.   
 
IV. CREDIT, TRANSPORTATION, AND THE RHYTHM OF BUSINESS :   
BUILDUP TO A ST. CHARLES PACKET 
 
The good paymaster is lord of another man’s purse .  




Diversification was the key to a successful western business.  Even for St. Louis 
merchants and tradesmen, sitting in the heart of the western economy, specialized 
business strategies were impossible to maintain.  Merchants like O liver Filley and J. R. 
Stanford ventured west intending to be simply tin ware or dry goods dealers, but they 
quickly incorporated an unplanned export/provisions business into their original designs.  
Their reluctant transition into something akin to the antiquated merchant capitalist of 
New England was, however, completed with relative ease compared to smaller 
marketplaces like St. Charles.  Similar to Filley and Stanford, George W. Garriott went 
west with a preconceived business strategy.  He originally began as a dry goods dealer, 
purchasing eastern goods either directly on the east coast or indirectly from St. Louis 
forwarding agents.  In either case, he also needed to generate an exchange commodity 
demanded by eastern firms.   
Garriott in a sense was playing two sides of the fence.  On the one hand, he acted like 
the large British exchange houses of the eighteenth century – if he wanted to sell more he 
had to buy more.  Garriott, however, did not have the luxury of working with ambitious 
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planters, but he knew that at ports farther upriver wheat was centralizing in quantities 
large enough to keep his mill running full time.  As he stretched his ambition, however, 
he would find what lay hidden on the other side of the fence.  What distinguished him 
from the large tobacco firms in Britain was capital.  Large reserves of curren cy and credit 
justified all the risks exchange firms assumed.  At the base of every move they made was 
credit.  The funds extended to them, they passed onto to shippers and planters.  Credit let 
the large exchange firms orchestrate the rhythm of shipping and supply to their needs.  
This rhythm was the source of their fortune.  The following chapter demonstrates that 
Garriott’s lack of capital and his large debts became major obstacles.  Garriott’s first 
major move after buying the mill promised to succeed.  He could potentially tap the 
economy of scale necessary to profit from flour production.  As he purchased wheat 
upriver, he cleverly positioned himself to make steamboats finally work in his favor.  
Everything hinged, then on his wheat purchasing ability with farmers outside his normal 
territory.  The following chapter demonstrates that even tapping a new economy of scale 
required capital and transportation to work in unison.  Without either, the entire chain 
collapsed. 
The overwhelm ing shortage of physica l currency or “eastern funds” complained 
about by St. Louis merchants also prevailed in St. Charles.  This lack of currency 
explained Garriott’s alternate tobacco export business, which provided an essential 
exchange commodity for balancing accounts with eastern firms.  This trade, however, 
never provided cash returns of real significance.  Nearly half of all letters written to 







St. Louis merchants like N. E Janney & Co. asking for only $102.
2
  Several others were 
much higher, however, like his debts to Warburton & Rossiter Co., to whom Garriott 
owed at least two notes for just over $4,500.
3
  These debts partially explained his 
purchase of the flour mill.  Warburton & Rossiter  acted as Garriott’s tobacco agents in 
the city.  Based on these notes, Garriott continually lost money in tobacco sales.  After an 
audit in December 1848, Garriott’s account showed only six payments in an eighteen-
month period beginning in April 1847.  After a year and half in the tobacco business, 
Garriott still owed $1,400 on his original notes.  In the same letter, Warburton & Rossiter 
credited Garriott’s account for only $75.00 on recent tobacco sales.
4
    
Another account audit from St. Louis merchants J.C. Reynolds & Co. showed that 
from September 1847 through March 1848, Garriott purchased $1,502.71 worth of 
sundries on credit.  During the same period, he made six cash payments on his bill  that 
only amounted to $852.76, leaving a balance of $649.95.  J.C. Reynolds & Co.’s letter to 
Garriott in March 1848 stated that they wished all remaining balances cleared 
immediately, so maintaining large credit balances was part and parcel of standard 
business.
5
  Extension of large credit was not unique to western business.   
City commission firms gladly extended country producers credit for practical reasons.  
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Increasing arrivals of steamboats at the St. Louis levee necessitated that city merchants 
remain close to the waterfront.  They could not devote time to trac king the countryside 
for shipments knowing that their home-stationed competitors would gobble up cargo 
space immediately as it arrived.  The prosperous firms delegated collection to producers 
located closer to supply sources.  This arrangement had clear advantages in the colonial 
era as well.  Commission merchants managed the “dozens of details related to the 
management of vessels.”  Tending to these affairs allowed country producers to maintain 
close contact with farmers and establish a supply network.  In  colonial Philadelphia, city 
merchants were among the first to grasp this system’s benefits when they offered capital 
and shipping services in return for country millers’ stock and their “detailed knowledge 
of the various types of flour, which by the 1780s were going by specific brand names, 
such as Red Clay, Morton, and Fisher.”
6
 
Credit had downsides for Garriott too.  On his Reynolds account alone, he was 
expected to produce as much cash in one payment as it took his tobacco interests four 
months to achieve.  For Garriott, therefore, the tobacco business apparently produced 
more debt than profit.  At some point, Garriott thought it wise to enter the flour 
provisions trade.  To do this, however, he had to incur further debt.  Why then was flour 
so important, and why did Garriott divert his energies to a new export?  For St. Charles 
businessmen, like Garriott, flour was the most reliable exchange commodity.  Flour 
produced more cash than any other local product in St. Louis, New Orleans, the east 
coast, or even farther up the Missouri River for the growing Santa Fe and Oregon trails  
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trade.   
Unlike his counterparts in St. Louis, Garriott did not have the good fortune to own a 
shop sitting just a few city blocks from dozens of steamboats.  His predecessor in th e St. 
Charles tobacco trade, A.D. Harmon, seemed to rely more on his local market than 
attempting regular business with St. Louis.  He sent one shipment of nine tobacco boxes 
to St. Louis in May 1840, via the steamboat Fort Leavenworth.  Bypassing the St. Louis 
auction house, Harmon marked this cargo for shipment to New Orleans and then to 
Boston.  The fact that Smith Brothers & Co. were unfamiliar with either of Harmon’s 
New Orleans or Boston receivers showed how rarely he shipped freight directly to St. 
Louis.  Writing from St. Louis, Smith Brothers & Co. elected to send Harmon’s tobacco 
to a different house because “we ship to Joel Small at New Orleans as we did not know 
whether the house to which you had marked them was now in business in New Orleans.”
7
  
Apparently, Harmon did little business in St. Louis prior to this shipment, as his 
forwarding agents further commented “we would be happy to attend to your business 
from hereafter.  If you should not be personally acquainted with Messrs. Stevens & 
Wellington of Boston we would recommend to you to consign hereafter to Messrs. J.L. 
Maeggor & Co, good Boston merchants.”
8
   
 Harmon had good reason to avoid steamboat transportation.  For the Missouri River 
leg, the steamboat Fort Leavenworth carried Harmon’s nine boxes weighing 1,404 
pounds for 37.5¢ per box, which figures to 24¢ per hundred pounds.  Compared to the 
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longer Mississippi River leg, on which the steamboat Chester charged 30¢ per hundred 
pounds, the difference appears somewhat reasonable.  It becomes less reasonable, 
however, when considering the distance between St. Charles and St. Louis was only 45 
river miles (72 km), or about 4 percent of the total river voyage after including the 1,146 
river miles (1,844 km) between St. Louis and New Orleans (see  appendix D).  After 
additional shipping fees from two-day storage, drayage, and Smith Brother’s 
commission, Harmon paid $6.12 to send his tobacco to St. Louis, but only $4.22 from St. 
Louis to New Orleans.  On this one cargo, therefore, the first 4 percent of the total trip 
consumed 59 percent of all river expenses.  Harmon likely shipped his tobacco to Boston 
for the same reasons Filley and Stanford shipped lead; both products served well as 
exchange commodities in the East.  Just as with lead, the western market could not 
convert large quantities of tobacco directly into hard currency.  Since Smith Brothers & 
Co. had not dealt previously with Harmon, one would expect them to bait a potential 
client with boasts of large cash sales.  On the contrary, they apathetically offered to take 
Harmon’s future tobacco shipments, saying “if you cannot sell to your market, we would 
recover them and sell if possible on any other articles that you may deal in, beeswax, …  
tallow, … deer skins, … and coon [skins].”
9
   
 Quite possibly, Harmon’s previous shipments to the city were only small, wagon -
sized loads, similar to James C. Lackland’s early flour shipments.  Had he sent products 
by land, he never would require the service of commission and forwarding agents, but 
instead could sell directly to a retail grocer in the city.  Shortly after Garriott purchased 
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the St. Charles Flour Mill, he received an offer showing the distinction between goods 
sold to grocers over forwarding agents.  From St. Louis, L. H. Cavanaugh offered to 
directly purchase Garriott’s flour, writing: 
Being extensively engaged in the flour business.  I am asked repeatedly for your flour, 
and always am compelled to buy from others instead of being in receipt of that, as I 
am of other flour.  I therefore concluded to write to you, to ask you, at what rate you 
will furnish me one hundred barrels per week, delivered at my store on Commercial 
Street, if such by land carriage.  Or if such by water, upon the landing, the cash to be 





City grocers were willing to purchase small quantities of tobacco or flour, but doubtfully 
could pay cash for steamboat-sized loads.  Transactions of this kind also probably left a 
smaller paper record than larger ones completed through commission and forwarding 
houses.  Thus, it is difficult to know how much business Garriott sent city grocers via 
land or water routes.  Whatever expenses Harmon incurred over the 20-mile (32-km) 
country road to St. Louis would not have been too severe, as long as his shipments 
remained relatively small and light (see appendix D).
11
  Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
estimate the exact shipping charges by land from St. Charles to St. Louis.  The St. 
Charles Wheat Growers Association organized for the express purpose of reducing the 
high costs of land transportation.  Its argument fell short of providing exact freight 
expenses, but inadvertently proved the overall efficiency of steamboat transportation.  
One letter written to Garriott in July 1848 gives some indication of freight expenses 
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within St. Charles County.  Local farmer James Glenday estimated the total cost for his 
recent harvest of 128 bushels of wheat at $37.00.  This figure included all expenses of 
harvesting including hired hands and the use of two horses and one wagon for hauling to 
the mill.  Out of this estimate, Glenday counted $11.50 for transportation expenses.  On 
this one harvest, therefore, the cost of transportation was approximately 9¢ per bushel, or 
15¢ per hundred pounds, surprisingly less than waterborne commerce.
12
   Cavanaugh’s 
offer showed that the market was ready for St. Charles flour, but the real question was 
how to get it there.  Garriott could have shipped directly to wholesalers like Cavanaugh, 
just as James C. Lackland had done a decade earlier.  Garriott’s situation, however, was 
quite different.  Generating large amounts of cash required selling large quantities of 
flour.  Selling large quantities of flour required dependable shipping.  Acquiring 
dependable shipping, in turn, required the assurance of large quantities of flour, which 
required owning a flour mill.  This predicament revealed the distinctions between two 
economies of scale.   
Although only a decade separated Garriott’s and Lackland’s flour sales, the modern 
world had penetrated the lower Missouri Valley during the interim.  The changes 
occurred quickly and dramatically.  Lackland and Harmon rarely dealt with commission 
merchants in the city because they faced less competition from upriver steamboats, and 
so could see profits from small shipments no matter the transportation costs.  Garriott, 
however, was severely indebted to several individuals, and experienc ed greater boat 
traffic on the river, which flooded the St. Louis market with more agricultural products 
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each year.  In addition, some of his creditors were also forwarding agents, such as 
Warburton and Rossiter, who likely linked him to steamboating simply because this was 
their preferred manner of business.  At one point Warburton & Rossiter forced Garriott to 
sign over his life insurance policy to them.  The St. Louis agent for Mutual Life Insurance 
wrote Garriott notifying him that:  
I notice in looking over the pocket book that you have never yet assigned the Life 
Insurance Policy as intended.  As the original design of the same will probably be 
accomplished by a liquidation of the claim of Warburton & Rossiter at no very distant 
day and as your new business and new plans look to other persons with whom the y do 
business, I have presumed that you would have no objection to the form that I have 




Garriott clearly needed to make real cash quickly, something not possible with small 
wagon loads of tobacco or flour.  Raising cash with wagon loads of flour worked well for 
James C. Lackland, at a time when few boats brought large flour shipments from higher 
up on the Missouri River.  Similarly, Harmon left for the East just as the upriver ports of 
Weston, Lexington, and St. Joseph were fast becoming integrated with St. Louis 
shipping.  As long as intermediary locations in the Missouri Valley were confined to the 
old pioneering economy, one in which flatboats and wagons moved freight at a trickling 
pace, St. Charles would remain close to St. Louis only in a literal sense .  By the mid-
1840s, however, the whole lower Missouri River Valley above St. Charles was in fast 
transition from a pioneering style economy to a modern scale of high volume trade and 
specialization.  This transition depended exclusively on steamboat service  for 
transportation.  Initially because of military supply contracts and the burgeoning Santa Fe 
/ Oregon Trail trades, the upper counties leapt over lower ones on the river.  While the 
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nationwide transportation revolution steadily brought Missouri’s frontier closer to St. 
Louis, it effectively widened the gap between St. Charles and the modern world.  As the 
number of packets increased on the river to service the growing populations of the 
Boonslick and Platte regions, the total number of boat trips decreased.  As the western 
portion of Missouri became a focal point for steamboat operations, Garriott arrange d his 
business in such a way to either out compete upriver locations or to enter into their 
market.  Both options were equally troublesome. 
By mid-summer 1848, Garriott had diversified his business to conform to demands of 
the western economy.  No longer could he title himself simply a dry goods merchant.  
Now trapped in a frontier bubble, Garriott took additional measures to entice boat 
captains to stop at his levee.  Controlling operations at the flour mill was the first step in 
negotiations with the boat captains.  The second step involved informal agreements to act 
as steamboat agent for St. Charles.   
Up to this point, it was easy to imagine a partner in an eighteenth-century tobacco 
exchange house fully agreeing with Garriott’s strategy.  Jacob Price’s anyslsis of 
Glasgow exchange houses’ dominance of the eighteenth-century tobacco trade compared 
closely with much of Garriott’s plans.  Glasgow firms out competed rivals in other ports 
like London and Bristol by seeking areas of colonial production with large supplies.
14
  
Because freight charges for colonial products were higher than the wholesale valu e of the 
products, shipping finished goods was frequently viewed as a complimentary service for 
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access to more lucrative agricultural freight.
15
  If an exchange house could guarantee a 
shipper that a full cargo awaited across the Atlantic, their negotiating leverage rose 
dramatically.  Often an exchange house received discounted, or even free, freight charges 
on colonial bound freight in exchange for a full ship load of cargo on the home voyage.
16
  
As their trade grew, large houses began purchasing and charte ring their own vessels, this 
ensured shipping schedules were synchronized with both tobacco production and their 
account balances.  They arranged credit on purchases of European goods for extended 
periods of months or years.  Then they sold the finished goods to favored planters on 
short term credit.  The credit relationship ensured that the indebted planter would ready 
tobacco shipments on schedule.  The credit system had a multiplying effect on the wealth 
of all parties.  As exchange houses grew, so did their credit ratings.  As they received 
more credit, their planter became wealthier, and shipping arrangements became iron 
clad.
17
  Shipping and credit were the keys that would have seemed familiar to Garriott’s 
plan.  The imaginary eighteenth-century tobacco partner, however, would cringe at the 
way Garriott had to mange his shipping needs. 
 On the western rivers, steamboat operators frequently made informal trade 
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agreements with merchants at smaller ports.  As a steamboat agent, the merchant acted as 
a middleman between a boat and the local community.  Typically, an agent gathered the 
freight business of various individuals around town, storing their cargo with his own in a 
warehouse until the boat’s arrival.  He then accepted freight unloaded off the boat, and 
held deliveries until shipping charges were satisfied.  For his services, an agent usually 
attached a small commission from 1 to 2 percent of the cargo’s value.  Although he also 
shipped his own goods, he mirrored forwarding houses found in larger port s that shipped 
solely on other people’s behalf.  If local demand occupied more time than his original 
business, however, he might eventually put all his energy into the forwarding business 
and become a full time commission merchant.  Similarly, as his rela tionships with boat 




 Merchants and steamboat owners made cooperative agreements based on individual 
need and the particular characteristics of local trade.  Informality seemed the only 
common  trait with these agreements.  Because a handshake left little in the way of legal 
documentation, it was difficult to ascertain exactly how many steamboats Garriott served 
as agent.  When a person in the St. Charles area sent freight by steamboat through 
Garriott, the transaction produced three bills of lading.  Also called way bills, these 
documents served as receipts for the involved parties – sender, shipper, and receiver.  
Garriott’s function as an intermediary required him to hold the sender’s bill only as long 
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as the shipping account charges remained open.  Once the sender paid the shipping 
charges, the account closed, and Garriott handed over the way bill.  Although he likely 
kept several day logs for each of his business affairs, only one account book for his dry 
goods store exists – it expectedly contains no information about shipping.
19
  One 
situation, however, did occur that provided some indication of Garriott’s role as a 
steamboat agent. 
  If by chance Garriott left his warehouse unoccupied, and could not be found in town, 
a person sending freight left goods with a small note attached indicating the desired 
shipping directions (figure 23).  Ironically then, Garriott’s periodic truancy created the 
best surviving records for his role as a St. Charles steamboat agent.  From a few hundred 
slips of paper, it was clear that Garriott made agreements with at least five steamboats: 
Bertrand, Kit Carson, Revenue Cutter, Rowena, and Uncle Toby.
20
  Informal 
relationships with steamboat captains/owners characterized these agreements but also 
required interconnected arrangements with local farmers, Boonslick wheat purchasers, 
and St. Louis commission merchants.  As a result, the business of steamboating was a 
large network of personal cooperative agreements, any one of which could be redefined 
without prior notice and without affecting all parts of the network.  
The most crucial relationships for Garriott were agreements between himself and boat 
captains.  Unfortunately for Garriott, these proved difficult to negotiate.  Part of the 
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reason he abandoned Houseman & Lowry stemmed from their inability to form the same 
relationships Garriott had created.  Garriott’s position on the Missouri River gave him a 
peculiar set of advantages and handicaps.  First, the section of the river running through  
 
Fig. 23.  Note with shipping instructions from George C. Sibley to George W. Garriott.  
(GWGP) 
 
St. Charles County froze for only a fraction of the time compared to areas farther 
upriver.
21
  This potentially extended Garriott’s shipping  season, and allowed him to 
bargain with steamboat captains when they otherwise could not make trips else where on 
the Missouri.  Although he seemingly had an advantage on upriver locations for winter 
shipments, at this time of year most smaller boats went south for the lower Mississippi 
trade.  Steamboat captains, particularly of the smaller class vessels suited for the Missouri 
River, commonly owned part of their own boats and worked where and when the freight 
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business proved most lucrative.  During the winter, when the Mississippi River  dropped 
and no longer accommodated larger boats, many smaller steamboats running the Missouri 
River trade in the summer had no contractual obligations to remain in St. Louis,  waiting 
for the spring thaw.  Captains could be expected to leave a section of the river for any 
amount of time they chose, returning only when it was worth their effort.   
Even though St. Charles offered a more attractive location on the Missouri River in 
terms of navigability, the real driving force behind a particular steamboat trade was 
availability of cargo.  By the end of 1848, Garriott faced an incredible dependency on 
steamboats.  He could only expect to see boats ready for his trade once the major  
shipping centers at Lexington, Weston, and St Joseph opened for navigation as well.  As 
a result, Garriott’s nearness to St. Louis became his largest disadvantage when 
negotiating directly with boat captains.  One captain, Norman Cutter, bluntly made this 
point.  Writing from St. Louis, Cutter taunted Garriott saying:  
You have heard probably that my boat which we talked about some months ago is 
finished and running.  Perhaps you saw her as she passed up the Missouri.  She is 
lighter and faster than I expected.  She was quite fast and all her bedding, furniture, 
tackle, and etc. is good and new.  In short she is just the packet for the St. Charles 
trade.  Now I do not write to you to ask you to buy her, but perhaps your “say so” 
would act as a kind of stimulant or influence on others to do so.  For your business is 
the butt end of the trade at present and of course those running a boat [to St. Charles] 
would like to have such a one as would please you, and you of course would like to be 
pleased yourself as well as to have the balance of the public pleased.  I would sell her 
at a great bargain but not so low as I offered her to you for.  Would you act as her 
agent and give me your business if I will run her to St. Charles as a regular packet.  





Why did Cutter switch tone from his opening taunts with such a gracious offer at the end 
                                                       
22







of his letter?  Just two weeks later, he sent receipt of a $500 marine insura nce policy, 
purchased with one of Garriott’s bank notes.  He closed the letter somewhat pointedly 
with “don’t fail, my Dear Sir, to pay me the $1,400 this week as I find I shall need it 
much.”
23
  His offer then, rather left-handedly, played on Garriott’s desperation.  Intended 
less as cooperative business agreement, and more as blackmail, Cutter knew he could 
extort Garriott into a loose “partnership.”  By making Garriott his partner/agent in St. 
Charles, Cutter saved himself the trouble of dealing with multiple receipts and deliveries 
in town, and received some investment dollars for his boat, while not completely 
obligating himself to stay in the trade when navigation or freight conditions swayed.  
 Arrangements like Garriott and Cutter’s occurred regularly in steamboating.  
Generally, two forms of business associations took place when dividing steamboat 
interests among several individuals.  Co-ownerships were more formal contracts.  These 
arrangements bonded each of the interested parties to both liabilities  and profits of the 
steamboat venture.  They also gave each member a proportionate share in the business 
management.
24
  Steamboat co-ownerships, such as George Collier’s, often fell into 
disarray when one or more owners opted out of the arrangement.  The absence or death of 
a member required drafting new contracts, new insurance forms, and possibly the 
liquidation of company assets.   
 Partnerships were a second kind of arrangement that were a more fluid method of 
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organization.  These agreements took a similar, though less structured, appearance to a 
joint stock company.  In a partnership any portion of the boat’s management, profits, or 
losses could be divided among shareholders who held no claim over the actual boat.  
Partners could buy or sell their interest without disrupting the flow of business.
25
  
Similarly, they could be completely insulated from any damages occurring to freight on 
aboard an invested steamboat.  This served a particular advantage for James C. 
Lackland’s son, Eli, who was a business partner of Captain J. Goslee.   
 In December 1855, the George Collier docked in Memphis on a trip to New Orleans.  
While in port, fire erupted under the forward stairs, and quickly forced the crew to 
abandon the boat.
26
  The damage destroyed both the boat and her cargo, and prompted a 
lawsuit between the owners and forwarding merchants.  At the time of the fire, Captain 
Burnett Paris commanded the boat, though Captain J. Goslee owned her.  Eli was 
Goslee’s partner in St. Louis, and had signed a bill of lading fo r freight received in St. 
Louis.  Signing bills of lading traditionally fell to a boat’s clerk.  On this occasion Eli’s 
error caused a legal dispute between Goslee and Meacham & Galbraith , whose cargo 
burned with the Collier.   
 Most bills of lading limited boat owners’ liabilities to damages other than 
“unavoidable dangers of the river and fire.”  The bill Eli signed did not include fire as a 
non-liable event, so the boat owners were held responsible.  Had the boat’s clerk prepared 
the bill of lading, he simply would have penciled in the word “fire,” saving the owners 












from this risk.  As Goslee’s partner, not his co-owner, Eli faced no legal responsibility for 
damages to the Collier’s cargo.  In July, Goslee’s lawyers drafted a deposition for Eli to 
deliver in court, which Goslee sent to Eli with his own description of the matter’s 
severity.  Goslee’s letter stated:  
Enclosed I sent you Henry G. Smith’s letter to me about our suit with Messrs. 
Meacham and Galbraith.  You will perceive how important it is: that in your 
deposition you state emphatically that you supposed the bill of lading contained the 
fire clause as is usual – and that you were not authorized to sign bills, which would 
make the boat become the insurer as well as the carrier; and that you never would 
have signed the bill, with the knowledge that the fire clause was left out....  Be careful 
not to let the damned lawyers entrap you into saying that you did not think the fire 
clause important, and that you supposed the dangers of the river meant fire also....  
Now Eli I want you if possible to go at once to Memphis and let your deposition be 
taken, for it all depends on that.  If you should conclude to hand in your checks, I will 
have to pay M & G the amount of their claim to a certainty.  If you ca nnot possibly go, 
I want you to go to Pritchett’s office and have your life insured in my benefit for the 




 Eli’s partnership afforded him safety from legal suits brought directly against boats in 
which he had no official ownership.  Garriott’s partnership with Cutter appeared to have 
similar limitations, apparent when Cutter handed over a receipt for marine insurance.  
Although the policy did not require Garriott’s signature, his partnership agreement 
required sharing insurance expenses.  Garriott assumed no liabilities for the steamboat, 
which lowered his risk, but provided him on ly limited rights in the boat’s management.  
Saving only the loss of his $1,400 investment, Garriott stood to lose little in the 
partnership, which could be dissolved at any time with or without his consent.  His exact 
rights in the management of the steamboat’s affairs were uncertain.  He certainly 
provided storage facilities for local freight business, but he appeared not to have directed 
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boating affairs beyond the St. Charles levee.  Even if Garriott’s new arrangements came 
with less than sanguine intentions, he could at least assume some stability over steamboat 
activity on the river.   
 From the pages of the St. Charles Missouri Patriot Garriott brought no attention to his 
role as a steamboating agent.  He frequently bought numerous ads for his dry goods store, 
and repeatedly printed offers to purchase wheat, wool, and tobacco for cash, but did not 
advertise himself as a steamboat agent in St. Charles.  One inquiry for his services, 
however, came by way of the St. Louis Missouri Republican.  In October 1848, James 
McConathy of Columbia, Missouri, contacted Garriott writing, “I see from the Missouri 
Republican you are the agent of the steamboat Revenue Cutter at St. Charles.  I have a 
distillery near Nashville about twenty-five miles above Jefferson City [both Missouri] 
and can give you two loads of whiskey say 250 barrels at each time and I am willing to 
pay you seventy five cents per barrel for freight.”
28
   
 At the bottom of McConathy’s letter, Garriott penciled in a simple calculation.  He 
multiplied 250 barrels by 3.00 (for dollars).  He then divided that figure by 2, and then 
multiplied the new number by 5.  He apparently only considered the offer, since none his 
records contained further correspondences with McConathy or showed any shipments of 
whiskey.  Perhaps Garriott was a man of temperance, or perhaps he never realized his 
mathematical error that five whiskey cargoes would yield, not $185 as he calculated, but 
actually $1,875 (figure 24).  Significantly though, this le tter showed that Garriott 
anticipated sharing his earnings equally with someone else, and that this was the one part 
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of his business not advertised in the St. Charles newspaper.  
 
 
Fig. 24.  James McConathy to George W. Garriott, 12 Oct. 1848, showing a 
curious mathematical error.  George W. Garriott Papers.  
 
Oddly, the only steamboat advertisement appearing in the St. Charles newspapers in 
the late 1840s was for the Uncle Toby, which ran between St. Louis, Galena, Dubuque, 
and Potosi on the Mississippi River.  The advertisement state d that regular service was 
offered to Henry Bangs’s warehouse, presumably on the Mississippi River (figure 25).  
Census records show Bangs as a St. Charles resident during the 1840s but not the 1850s.  







levee.  Most likely Garriott contracted to purchase wheat from county farmers on 
speculation.  Those farmers closer to the Mississippi River, found it easier to haul to 
Bangs’s warehouse where the shipments were predominately taken to St. Louis, with 
only occasional stops at St. Charles.   
 
 
Fig. 25.  Advertisement for steamboat Uncle Toby. (Missouri 







This scenario gave Garriott two favorable outcomes.  First, if he wagered a low 
enough price for county wheat, he stood to reduce his purchasing costs even if some had 
to be transferred at St. Louis to another boat for the Missouri River.  This scenario was 
unlikely since wheat prices in St. Charles usually remained equal, or only a few cents 
lower, than St. Louis prices.  The second, and more likely scenario, was that Garriott 
planned to sell wheat shipm ents from the Uncle Toby at St. Louis, making this boat 
independent of his flour mill and steamboat interests on the Missouri.  The Uncle Toby, 
therefore, was either an alternate source of his wheat supply, or another way to increase 
sales at St. Louis.  That he had planned on selling wheat was apparent in blank receipts 
for wheat sales preprinted in Garriott’s name.  Although Garriott printed these receipts to 
facilitate his wheat sales, they also served as receipts for his wheat purchases simply by 
crossing out his name (as the seller) and inserting the other person’s name (figure 2 6).  
All surviving records from St. Charles had Garriott’s name crossed out.  It appeared, 
then, that in St. Charles Garriott only bought wheat but planned to sell it elsewhere.  His 
wheat sales presumably came from his service with the Uncle Toby running on the 
Mississippi River.  Whatever his connection with Mississippi packet boats, it was 
relatively brief, ending in January 1849 after he complied with an order to “deliver to Mr. 
Bangs all moneys and papers relating to the Uncle Toby.”
29
 
 Garriott benefited most from his role as a steamboat agent when he engaged in the 
wheat trade above St. Charles.  The population of central and northwest Missouri was 
growing at a faster pace than St. Charles.  This growth increased market competition and 
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promised larger and cheaper wheat supplies.  Upriver from St. Charles, Garriott sought 
the cheaper-by-dozen effect, but would he find it there? 
 
 
Fig. 26.  Preprinted Wheat Receipts for George  W. Garriott. (GWGP) 
 
He first entered the upriver wheat trade by establishing a relationship with agents of 
his own in Boonville.  From this location Garriott’s agent, James Watson, negotiated 
prices with local farmers and sent shipments downriver on the Kit Carson and Rowena.  
The first two months of this arrangement appeared relatively productive.  Watson made 







These purchases supplied the St. Charles mill with 1,842.16  bushels wheat, 
approximately 110,529.6 pounds.
30
  (See table 1 for standard weights of grain.)   
Millers expected a 2–5 percent loss, called shrinkage, from the difference in weight of 
wheat ground to the flour produced.  Thus, one-hundred pounds of cleaned wheat ground 
in a mill produced between 98 and 95 pounds of flour.
31
  From Watson’s purchases, 
therefore, Garriott likely produced a minimum of 105,003.12 pounds flour, equaling 525 
barrels flour, or about 52.5 tons freight for St. Louis.  Tables 2 and 3 show comparative 
flour prices in St. Louis and New Orleans giving the average prices for five years.  Based 
on these market reports, Garriott presumably grossed between $2,142.00 and $2,278.50 
on flour sales in St. Louis.  His net profits, however, were more difficult to ascertain.  At 
least four overhead expenses reduced Garriott’s net profits.  Two of these expenses, cash 
paid to farmers and Watson’s commission for buying, were clearly stated.  Watson paid 
$930.18 to Boonville farmers for wheat.  His comm ission services added 5¢ per bushel of 
$92.10, making a total of $1,022.28, and raising the price per bushel to 55¢.  The next 
two expenses from sacking and shipping wheat, however, can only be estimated from 
Watson’s records.  He purchased several sacks a t an average price of 19¢ per sack.  He 
also shipped one lot of 52 sacks, weighing 6,205 pounds, making about 120 pounds per 
sack, or two bushels of wheat in each.  This indicates that Watson’s purchase of 1,842.16  
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bushels of wheat required at least 921 sacks, costing $175.
32
  In a letter dated in late 
August, Watson stated that steamboats quoted freight charges from Boonville to St. 
Charles from 12.5¢ to 15¢ per bushel.  Unfortunately, he did not indicate the 
acceptability of these charges.  If the lowest quote was charged on Watson’s shipments, 
then steamboat freight from Boonville to St. Charles added at least another $230.33 to the 
cost of wheat.
33
  Using Watson’s information and the inferences made from his sales 
account, the total cost for wheat purchased in Boonville, therefore, was about $1,427.61 
at an average price of just over 77¢ per bushel.   
 
 
Table 1. Weights of Grain  
 





Indian Corn 58 
Peas 63 
Beans 62 
Red Clover 64 
 
Source: The Western Farmer: Devoted to Agriculture, 
Horticulture, and Rural Economy  1, (Feb. 1840), American 
Periodical Series, Reel 698, 183.  
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January 3.75 - 4.00 3.63 - 3.70 4.38 - 4.50 3.62 - 3.75 4.69 - 4.94 
February 3.75 - 4.60 3.60 - 3.63 4.00 - 4.13 4.62 - 4.75 4.09 - 4.35 
March 3.95- 4.13 3.60 - 3.63 3.88 - 4.00 4.37 - 4.50 4.38 - 4.67 
April 3.70 - 3.75 3.45 - 3.50 3.50 - 3.63 4.62 - 4.75 4.24 - 4.44 
May 3.70 - 3.75 3.65 - 3.70 2.95 - 3.00 4.87 - 5.00 4.20 - 4.33 
June 3.50 - 3.55 3.65 - 3.70 3.05 - 3.10 6.25 - 6.50 3.70 - 3.90 
July 3.70 - 3.75 3.70 - 3.75 2.00 - 2.25 4.50 - 4.62 3.87 - 4.19 
August 3.75 - 4.00 3.45 - 3.50 2.50 - 2.55 4.62 - 4.75 3.47 - 3.83 
September 3.80 - 3.90 3.00 - 3.07 2.88 - 3.00 3.87 - 4.00 3.87 - 4.41 
October 3.88 - 4.00 3.13 - 3.25 3.75 - 3.80 4.30 - 4.37 4.10 - 4.25 
November 3.56 - 4.00 3.70 - 3.75 3.80 - 3.88 4.50 - 4.62 4.13 - 4.36 
December 3.75 - 4.00 5.75 - 6.00 3.75 - 3.80 5.00 - 5.25 4.12 - 4.35 
      
Average: 3.74 - 3.96 3.70 - 3.77 3.38 - 3.47 4.60 - 4.74 4.08 - 4.34 
 
Source: Western Journal 2 (Feb. 1849), 134.  
Note: Numbers on the left represent wheat prices on the first of each month.    
Numbers on the right represent average wheat prices for each month.  
 
 
Table 4 lists the comparative prices of wheat at St. Louis for five years, and shows 
that wheat purchases from Boonville provided no economic benefits from city prices that  
ranged from 48¢ to 74¢ during June and July.  Additionally, St. Charles farmers asked 
nearly 65¢ per bushel and reported transportation costs at only 9¢ per bushel.
34
  By 
looking only at the prices Watson paid his local farmers, Garriott did receive compet itive 
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prices against the St. Louis and St. Charles markets.  When considering the added 
expenses of conducting business upriver from his home port, however, Garriott’s 
business strategy appeared to be a losing concern.   
 
 
Table 3. Comparative Prices of Flour per Barrel at New Orleans 1843–1848 
 
 
1843 - 1844 
$ 
1844 - 1845 
$ 
1845 - 1846 
$ 
1846 - 1847 
$ 
1847 - 1848 
$ 
      
January 4.60 - 4.50 4.60 - 5.25 5.75 - 7.00 4.88 - 5.25 5.50 - 6.00 
February 4.50  -   na 3.75 - 4.50 5.00 - 6.25 6.00 - 6.34 4.75 - 5.50 
March 4.50 - 4.84 4.00 - 4.75 4.88 - 5.25 5.50 - 6.25 5.00 - 5.75 
April 4.25 - 4.50 3.50 - 4.25 4.50 - 5.00 6.00 - 6.25 5.50 - 5.88 
May 4.13 - 4.25 3.88 - 4.50 4.00 - 4.75 5.75 - 6.50 4.50 - 5.50 
June 3.50 - 3.75 3.34 - 4.67 3.88 - 4.50 6.75 - 7.50 4.50 - 4.75 
July 3.50 - 4.25 3.50 - 4.63 4.00 - 4.00 6.00 - 7.00 4.50 - 5.00 
August 4.00 - 5.50 4.00 - 4.74 3.50 - 4.00 4.00 - 5.50 4.00 - 4.84 
September 4.50 - 4.50 na  - 6.00 3.50 - 4.50 3.50 - 4.00 4.75 - 6.00 
October 4.00 - 4.60 3.50 - 3.60 3.88 - 4.50 4.00 - 4.88 4.00 - 5.00 
November 4.00 - 4.25 4.00 - 4.50 4.50 - 5.50 5.00 - 5.50 5.25 - 5.75 
December 4.25 - 4.50 4.00 - 4.38 7.50 - 8.50 4.50 - 5.34 5.34 - 6.00 
      
Average 4.15 - 4.50 3.83 - 4.65 4.58 - 5.32 5.16 - 5.86 4.80 - 5.50 
 
Source: Western Journal 1 (Nov. 1848), 632.  
Note: Numbers on the left represent wheat prices on the first of each month.    























      
January .65 - .70 .68 - .70 .70 - .75 .50 - .62 .69 - .88 
February .65 - .70 .60 - .65 .65 - .68 .80 - .85 .59 - .83 
March .75 - .80 .68 - .70 .63 - .66 .65 - .75 .69 - .93 
April .70 - .75 .65 - .67 .63 - .65 .80 - .85 .69 - .89 
May .70 - .72 .68 - .70 .63 - .65 .90 - .95 .55 - .83 
June .60 - .63 .68 - .70 .50 - .52 1.10 - .25 .53 - .74 
July .50 - .56 .70 - .73 .38 - .40 .80 - .90 .48 - .70 
August .60 - .65 .50 - .53 .48 - .50 .75 - .85 .49 - .66 
September .65 - .68 .54 - .56 .50 - .53 .70 - .80 .52 - .80 
October .60 - .63 .63 - .65 .60 - .63 .80 - .87 .49 - .84 
November .70 - .73 .75 - .80 .57 - .59 .75 - .85 .52 - .84 
December .67 - .70 .85 - .90 .58 - .60 .77 - .00 .60 - .83 
      
Average .65 - .69 .67 - .70 .58 - .60 .78 - .88 .57 - .82 
 
Source: Western Journal 2 (Feb. 1849), 132.  
Note: Numbers on the left represent wheat prices on the first of each month.    
Numbers on the right represent average wheat prices for each month.  
 
Surprisingly though, Garriott bought wheat from Watson throughout the remainder of 
the summer, and culled more relationships with at least two other wheat buyers in Union 
and Washington, Missouri.
35
  Although his initia l purchases came at higher prices than 
his local market, Garriott fully realized the apparent folly of his upriver contacts.  The 
cheaper-by-the-dozen effect seemed to elude Garriott again.  
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By mid-August, Watson appealed Garriott to loosen his restrictions on purchasing, 
saying “I am offering from 40¢ to 42¢ [per bushel of wheat], but so far have been unable 
to buy a single bushel since I saw you.  If you think it advisable to advance to 45 ¢, please 
advise me immediately, as I think some wheat can be bought at that price – but under 
that, I think but little if any can be bought before the close of navigation.”  Watson 
reiterated his appeal with “I shall of course be governed by instructions, although have 
offered as high as 42¢ today, without purchasing.”
36
   
Cutting the average price of wheat by just 10¢ from those of June and July, brought 
Garriott’s expenses closer St. Charles’s.  At 40¢ a bushel, the additional commission and 
steamboat freight raised the price to about 67¢ per bushel, or only a few cents above St. 
Charles farmers.  If Garriott allowed W atson to raise quotes, he would revert to the 
exorbitant prices paid in June and July.  He apparently had no choice but to grant quotes 
above 45¢.  Even with this slightly higher offer, however, Watson still encountered 
difficultly purchasing wheat.  Shortly after receiving his new instructions, Watson 
complained that “your favor of the 15th of this month per Rowena was duly received but 
I have not as yet been able to buy any wheat except one small lot of 25 bushels at 45 
cents.”
37
  Garriott’s options, however, were limited.  As Wetmore described, farmers held 
their crops waiting for higher autumn prices.  Watson’s suppliers knew full well  the 
close of navigation signaled higher prices for their products.  As captains prepared their 
last trips, farmers demanded higher prices from increasingly anxious buyers.   Watson 
reported that “principle [sic] lots now in the county are held firm at 50 cents and even to 
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this is added the time they want given them to get it out, from one to two weeks.  This is 
one great difficulty in getting wheat readily here – our farmers are decidedly too 
independent for their own good.”
38
   
Watson’s sentiments echoed those of earlier colonial provisions merchants.  Tensions 
between New York City merchants and county farmers arose frequently from the 1680s 
through the 1770s.  Cathy Matson noted a typical complaint among city traders that 
farmers “pay No Regard to [traditional pricing] but are Governd [sic] by their Own 
Judgement [sic].  [They] are not Ignorant of the Quality and Prices [for  exchanged 
commodities], but they choose to set their own levels.”
39
  
This disparity between Garriott’s supply needs and farmers’ unwillingness to lower 
prices revealed how the large consumer base produced by dry goods trading did not 
scale-up to the large supply base required for provisions trading.  The cheaper-by-the-
dozen effect occurred only when staples purchasers targeted a few high -volume 
producers/traders – as British tobacco firms did.  Even though increased numbers of 
farming households multiplied regional production, it did not create incentives for 
individual low-level producers to reduce offers.  To a farmer needing a teaspoon sitting 
on Garriott’s shelf, it made little difference how quickly his foreign accounts were 
balanced.  To a high-volume St. Louis wheat trader, however, subtracting a few cents off 
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each bushel gave him a competitive edge over other traders.  On a personal level, it 
aligned Garriott’s solvency to the trader’s interests since reduced overhead made 
payment inevitable.  In this way, modern econom ies of scale tethered the interests of big 
business while they severed country traders from their former suppliers.  Garriott was 
painfully learning this fact. 
Watson’s complaints forced Garriott to revert his quotes to the June and July price of 
50¢ per bushel.  Garriott’s other agents expressed similar purchasing difficulties as those 
in Boonville.  Writing from Washington, F.G. McDonald reported that “wheat in this 
neighborhood can be bought at fifty cents per bushel, though the large st lots they are 
asking fifty-five for.”
40
  Again, Garriott raised his offer in accordance with his agents’ 
recommendations.  He now offered 15¢ above his lowest competitive price, but still 
received appeals for yet higher offers.  By mid September, McDonald refused to continue 
purchasing wheat for Garriott, explaining that “when I wrote to you on the 3rd of this 
month, I could have got wheat at 50¢.  Since that time wheat has advanced in St. Louis, 
and it can’t be bought for less than 55¢ per bushel.  I shall not attempt to buy at your 
price.  The merchants are paying more, and it would be nonsense to offer less than they 
were offering.”
41
  As the year ended, Garriott sought more purchasing agents upriver 
from St. Charles.  He held tight to his final offer of  50¢ per bushel, but failed to make 
purchases at this price.  Two final attempts in late December show how far Garriott 
underestimated the upriver market prices.  Writing from Providence in Boone County, 
                                                       
40
F.G. McDonald to George W. Garriott, 3 Sept. 1848, GWGP.  
 
41







John Parker boasted that:  
I have bought considerable wheat since the 15th of September, say 5,000 bushels, 
which I shipped to St. Louis with the exception of a few hundred bushels I have on 
hand.  There is still some fine lots of wheat in this county ... I think that most of the 
wheat is sold that can be bought at 50 cents.  At present all the farmers that have lots 
of any size are holding to ship and it will take an advance to buy it at present.  I do not 
think I could make any contract with you to any certain amount.  I am willing to 
purchase wheat for you at the commission you suggest – 5 cents per bushel including 
storage, shipping, and etc, provided you will give the highest market price.  Our 




Table 4 shows that the market price for wheat in St. Louis during December 1848 peaked 
at 83¢.  Although Parker offered no exact figure for wheat purchases, Garriott received a 
similar rejection from another buyer in Glasgow who suggested nothing less than 65 ¢ per 
bushel.
43
   
 Garriott’s desire to buy wheat from upriver locales at higher prices than his local 
market is not simply explained by poor business management.  This situation revealed 
Garriott’s shipping predicament and the peculiar nature of the transportation network 
between St. Charles and St. Louis.  McCusker’s truism was validated by viewing upriver 
purchases beyond face value.  Although wheat was not necessarily cheaper by the dozen, 
the guarantee for available shipping space was invaluable.  
Going back to Cavanaugh’s offer raises two curious questions about the organization 
of Garriott’s business.  First, could Garriott realize profits from large shipments of flour 
sent by wagon to St. Louis?  The demand for St. Charles brand flour in St. Louis 
appeared based upon quality, not price.  Severa l letters from Garriott’s former agents in 
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the city, Houseman & Lowry, discussed selling Garriott’s barrels at higher rates than 
other brands.  Likewise, Cavanaugh’s offer indicated that when St. Charles’s flour was 
unavailable, he could find other brands to fill his orders.  At times of ready supply, the St. 
Charles brand sold quickly.  For Garriott, the key to selling flour was not simply to offer 
the lowest price, but more difficultly, to get the flour on steamboats headed to market.  
Garriott’s shipping needs hinged on the productivity of his mill.  If he anticipated 
flour exports to bring only a secondary income, he would not have leased the mill from 
John Atkinson.  Garriott showed much more ambitious intent, so it can be safely assumed 
that he planned to divert serious energy into the flour business.  The only way to realize 
profits, therefore, was to keep the mill in continuous production and to ensure the 
availability of cargo space on boats.  The need for constant production set Garriott apart 
from other country millers who spent inactive days sharpening tools on their mill stones.  
Had he remained content with small export shipments, such as sent by Harmon and 
Lackland, his business would depend less on steamboating, and probably could have 
sputtered along the country roads to St. Louis.  But ambition linked him irrevocabl y to 
steamboats, flour production, and a modern economy of scale.  The second question is 
how dependent was Garriott on steamboating, or more simply , how much flour did his 
mill produce?   
 Garriott’s mill ran three sets of stones that acted like an assembly line.  Each stone, 
placed progressively closer to the grinding surface , produced consecutively finer grades 
of flour from course, to fine, to super fine.
44
  Disappointingly, records concerning output 
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for the St. Charles Flour Mill do not exist.  Table 5 shows productivity estimates for 
fifteen St. Louis flour mills in 1847.  These estimates ranged from 6,000 to 70,000 barrels 
for one year, with a total average of just over 24,000 barrels and a cumulative output of 
365,000 barrels.  Table 5 shows only two of the four main indicators for productivity, 
speed, coarseness setting, and number and size of stones running in each mill.   
Although neither the speed nor coarseness setting for any of these mills were 
reported, some comparison with the St. Charles Mill is possible.  For three of the four St. 
Louis mills running three stones, all but one used five-foot diameter stones.  The 
remaining mill used 4.5 diameter stones.  These five mills reported a production of 
11,000–30,000 barrels, with an average of 22,750 barrels and a cumulative output of 
91,000 barrels.
45
   
 If the St. Charles Mill fell anywhere within the productivity range of the St. Louis 
three-stone mills, Garriott’s expected sh ipping needs would range between 1,100 and 
3,000 tons per year (200 pounds standard barrel weight).  With even a smaller class 
steamboat measuring only about 150 tons, Garriott potentially required only about seven 
to twenty shipments a year, aboard an empty steamboat.  Table 6 shows that this trade 
was less than 2 percent of the tonnage moved on the Missouri River in 1848.  By the late 
1840s, boat captains stationed in St. Louis reported making at least twenty individual 
trips per year from the levee.  Sim ilarly, boat construction of the mid-nineteenth century 
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produced lightweight hulls that allowed steamboats to carry one and a half  to twice the 
cargo weight of their reported tonnage.
46
  Even with one of these smaller class 
steamboats, then, Garriott’s true shipping needs easily fell within the carrying capacity of 
just one smaller class steamboat, and certainly could have been accommodated by the 
thirty to forty boats expected to service the Missouri River.   
Table 5.  Flour Production in St. Louis City Mills 1847 
 
Name of Mill 
Number of Stones 
(sets of two) 
Average Size of 
Stones (ft.)  
Number of Flour 
Barrels 
Page’s Mill 8 4′ 6″ 70,000 
Missouri Mill 3 4′ 6″ 30,000 
Star Mill 3 5′ 26,000 
Union Mill 3 5′ 24,000 
Eagle Mill 2 4′ 9″ 24,000 
Park Mill 2 4′ 6″ 24,000 
Brick Mill 2 4′ 6″ 20,000 
Washington Mill 2 4′ 24,000 
Franklin Mill 4 3′ 16,000 
Phoenix Mill 4 4′ 30,000 
Nonantum Mill 2 4′ 6″ 30,000 
Centre Mill na na 16,000 
Chouteau’s Mill 3 5′ 11,000 
Paragon Mill na na 6,000 
Mound Mill na na 14,000 
    
Total Number of Flour Barrels   365,000 
 
Source: Western Journal and Civilian  1 (Jan. 1848), 54.  
 
                                                       
46



























        
Illinois 
River 
658 104,000 na 
 
710 140,000 101,391 
Upper 
Mississippi 
717 151,000 na 
 
619 211,000 198,510 
Missouri 
River 
314 55,000 na 
 
363 57,640 57,640 
Alton 201 35,500 na 
 





 1,800 na 
 
105 12,000 23,120 
Cairo 146 14,000 na 
 
136 29,000 28,403 
New 
Orleans 
502 100,000 na 
 
443 120,000 173,223 
Ohio River 430 75,000 na 
 
506 83,000 103,546 
        
Totals 2,968 563,300 na  3,497 690,840 770,287 
 
Source: Western Journal 2 (Feb 1848), 135.  
*The original table included the header “Estimated Tonnage Keelboats, Flatboats, etc.”  
The Western Journal did not specify the kind of watercraft included in “etc.”  
†
The Western Journal did not specify the meaning of “coast.”  
‡








Garriott’s flour shipments appeared rather light compared to the actual number of 
steamboat trips required for transportation.  Why then did Houseman & Lowry seem so 
anxious to secure agreements for packet service to St. Charles, when only a relatively 
small amount of cargo needed shipment?  The answer was the crystallization of 
settlement hierarchy discussed earlier.  As St. Louis’s economy spread throughout the 
whole valley, shippers found it more profitable to shuttle between St. Louis and the next 
most active centers at Weston, Boonville, etc.  Steamboats represe nted a physical 
manifestation for the underlying business connections competing against Garriott.  Like 
Chicago leather manufacturers discussed earlier by W illiam Cronon, personal 
relationships between the two markets were structuring transportation routes to suit their 
needs.  Cronon detailed how the Chicago leather industry successfully diverted capital to 
railroad construction from their city to the cattle herds of northern Missouri.  As they 
secured direct train connections, the former center for leathe r processing at Alton, 
Illinois, was bypassed.
47
   
Initia lly, Alton lay between Chicago and the Missouri cattle producers.  Its industries 
collected, processed, and then distributed hides and beef across the Midwest.  Prior to the 
railroads, the Alton cattle industry functioned relatively independent of Chicago and was 
its main source for semi-processed hides and beef.  The Chicago businessmen, however, 
successfully used railroads to subordinate Alton industry.  Alton’s leather producers 
stood helpless as they watched fully loaded cattle cars move east past their town.  Even 
more disheartening, west bound trains from Chicago carried stores of beef and leather 
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boots formerly produced at Alton.  Again, Cronon showed the ultimate extension of a 
process occurring throughout the nineteenth century.  The transportation infrastructure 
underscored business relations that placed peripheral areas in dependency to core areas of 
investment.  The secondary effects created large urban centers with supporting county 
industries in the same pattern noticed by Von Thünen.  Cronon, however, revealed the 
possibility for Alton businessmen to have been a source for a quite different history.  Had 
they directed capital to build an infrastructure suiting their needs, Alton might be qu ite a 
different city today.   
As in Alton, transportation threatened to subordinate Garriott’s industry to a larger 
market.  Garriott attempted to use shipments to his advantage, but he failed to attract 
considerable business to the levee.  He had only one way to guarantee steamboat service.  
He had to buy and operate his own boat.  Once he did this he would be in prime position 
to coordinate his mill production with shipping and be able to send flour to St. Louis with 
a degree of efficiency that was otherw ise impossible to achieve.  Houseman & Lowry’s 
worries over securing steady transportation for the St. Charles Mill were directly related 
to the credit they extended Garriott.  He and his upriver agents mostly purchased wheat 
on credit.  In fact, John Atkinson (former operator of the St. Charles Mill) acknowledged 
the great advantage of Missouri Valley farmers’ willingness to sell on credit.  In a letter 
to Garriott, Atkinson wrote of his fledging operations in Pekin, Illinois.
48
  He was 
disheartened that “I must raise every dollar I can and only borrow some before I can get 
into business operations – it is not here as with you all kinds of grain command the cash 
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and the buyers [i.e., Atkinson’s competitors] have plenty of money to operate on.”
49
  
Although Garriott’s advertisements in St. Charles newspapers routinely offered cash for 
wheat, wool, tobacco, and other products, his local business could operate effic iently 
without hard currency.   
Whereas Atkinson complained that “here among strangers…every bushel of grain is 
sold for cash down,” Garriott could use his mill as a sort of personal bank.
50
  His records 
contained hundreds of paper slips promising the holder a specified amount of flour.  
These “coupons” were as good as cash locally but not outside the St. Charles area (figure 
27).
51
  The system operating for Garriott was similar to Kenneth Lewis’s identification of 
a cash barter system in mid-nineteenth-century frontier Michigan.  Local producers sold 
items like wheat, wool, or tobacco to Garriott not for actual cash but for their cash value 
in flour.  Similarly, those who sold products to Garriott could charge the cash equivalent 
of their sale to other local merchants who also had accounts with Garriott.
52
  In this way,  
credit became the actual currency for which cash was just a unit of measure.  In this 
system, all transactions maintained a balance of indebtedness.  That is until some part of 
the system demanded actual cash for the debt.   
 
 



















Fig. 27. Two “Coupons” Redeemable for Flour at the St. Charles M ill.  (GWGP)  The 
top coupon reads “Good for one Bbl [barrel] flour.”  The bottom coupon reads “Good 
for five dollars and seventy five cents in flour” These slips represent the cash barter 
system in action.  They also illustrate the personal and informal w orkings of the 
frontier economy.  
 
Atkinson’s letters to Garriott in the fall of 1848 were not just reports on the progress 
of his business endeavors in Illinois.  Atkinson and Garriott shared business connections 
with Warburton and Rossiter, commission and forwarding agents in St. Louis.  Atkinson 
sought cash from a note drawn by Garriott in the amount of $511 owed to  Atkinson for 
the mill’s lease.
53
  Warburton and Rossiter then sought to collect cash for the note from 
Garriott.  Atkinson’s letters appealed to Garriott to pay the sum, so that Atkinson could 
purchase wheat in his market.  Normally, Warburton and Rossiter would simply extend 
credit to Atkinson and then deduct the balance from Garriott’s sales.  The cash demands 
in the Pekin market, however, placed new stress on the cash/credit system.  It is unclear 
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how Garriott satisfied this debt, but this example illustrated that St. Louis commission 
merchants were the means for generating cash.  By accepting Garriott’s drafts, Warburton 
and Rossiter made guarantees of receiving Atkinson’s business.  They also further 
solidified their interests with Garriott’s  success (namely in tobacco sales).  Through their 
network of clients, then, commission merchants became a node of business 
connections/interests, and they also were the point at which credit was converted to cash.   
Scott Naylor & Co.’s situation with Garriott was hardly different.  The credit they had 
extended to Garriott allied his interests with theirs.  Garriott’s sales in the local market 
probably only rarely involved actual cash, but Naylor & Co. undoubtedly had clients 
whose markets demanded it.  Unlike Houseman &Lowry, however, Naylor & Co. never 
expressed anxiety over the availability of shipping from St. Charles.  Their strategy was 
to remove Garriott’s products from a credit generating system to one generating cash.  
The solution was to remove themselves from unfruitful negotiations with boat captains, 
and provide Garriott with the means to procure his own steamboat.  Naylor & Co. also 
turned over some of Garriott’s drafts to Warburton and Rossiter.
54
  Warburton and 
Rossiter became eager to close Garriott’s account saying “we are anxious to close this 
matter up and do not think we have been impatient but as we either have to raise money 
by borrowing ourselves or from our debts must prefer the latter mode.”
55
  The credit line 
connected Naylor & Co., Warburton and Rossiter, and Garriott.  This connection explains 
Naylor & Co.’s willingness to invest further funds in Garriott’s business – his debts were 
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now theirs.  A steamboat would simultaneously promise to solve many of Garriott’s 
transportation and cash problems, but it required even more debt.  
Garriott’s overall strategy was well founded.  Like the prominent British exchange 
houses of the eighteenth century, access to larger markets became the first step towards 
engaging the new econom y of scale sweeping through the Missouri Valley.  Garriott’s 
purchase of wheat at higher prices than found in his home market was a consequence of 
his shipping predicament.  The added expense of wheat could not compare to the benefit 
of transportation.  Although Garriott could not manipulate the shipping industry to suit 
his purchasing needs, his commission merchants in the city were willing to offer their 
help.  They supplemented Garriott’s capital deficit by extending credit to purchase 
reliable transportation.  Like the exchange firms in Glasgow, Garriott now had two ends 
of the economy secured.  He could tap large supplies, receive them at his port, and ship 
finished products at will.  This was all possible because of his connections to St. Louis 
capital.  What Garriott found, however, was that the more capital his partners placed in 
his business, the more their risks increased.  Garriott was no longer the ambitious, self-
made man he appeared, and was now an investment.  He was a favored miller playing to 
his creditors’ tune. 
 
V. THE ORGANIZATION OF A ST. CHARLES PACKET  
 
The West admired the self-made man and was ready to follow its hero with the 
enthusiasm of a section more responsive to personality than to the programs of 
trained statesmen.  





Up to fall 1848, every aspect of the St. Charles Mill relied on the stability of river 
transportation.  The availability of upriver wheat sellers, the production capacities of 
Garriott’s mill, and the activity of the St. Louis flour market were inconsequential 
without steamboat connections.  Garriott’s St. Louis agents tried unsuccessfully to 
contract boat captains for the St. Charles trade.  Agreements with boatmen such as 
Captain Dozier were never reliable and created more competitors than allies.  In one 
instance, one of Garriott’s agents informed him that Dozier and his partner had purchased 
the majority of wheat remaining above Washington, Missouri.
2
 Although Garriott had 
invested funds in Dozier’s boat, he had no control over its operations or the interests of 
other partners. 
Garriott’s trouble in securing downriver freight was explained further by similarities 
to colonial shipping patterns.  Prior to the Revolution, British shippers profited mostly 
from transporting colonial exports back home.  Competition for shipping less bulky 
manufactured items to the colonies kept westbound freight charges low.  A ship owner’s 
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main profit came from high charges attached to bulky agricultural products exported out 
of the colonies.  As a result, outbound British shippers often charged about 2.5  percent of 
invoice value for freight departing home ports.  Frequently, they even waved c harges for 
a favorite exchange house that referred colonial customers to the ship owner.
3
   
Garriott likely had no trouble receiving a few boxes of plates, hardware, etc. from St. 
Louis.  What he found, however, was that steamboat captains also delivered i dentical 
goods farther upriver.  Those locations, in turn, were afforded the first opportunity to ship 
goods preferred by captains.  A captain’s universal desire to ship the most profitable 
freight over the longest distance explained how St. Charles became seen as the last stop 
in the St. Louis wheat trade.  Referring back to central place theory, this situation 
appeared to contradict Von Thünen’s original model.  Instead of cheaper transportation 
and higher land prices orchestrating the nature of settlement hierarchy, it was the profit 
motivation of shippers that ensured agriculturalists who lived farthest from urban centers 
gained access to city markets.  Unreliable transportation to St. Louis put Garriott directly 
at odds with boat captains and indirectly with local producers.  The following chapter 
argues that the mechanism to alleviate those former tensions came from St. Louis based 
capital and the reliable transportation it purchased.  As Garriott freed himself from 
transportation tensions, he briefly continued purchasing wheat from his former suppliers.  
Transportation alone could not solve the endemic problem of upriver supplies – they 
were not found at prices cheap enough to maintain the scale of operations at the mill.  His 
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creditors in St. Louis, now viewed Garriott as their investment.  They, in turn, focused his 
operation exclusively on the St. Louis market for wheat supplies and flour exports.  
Garriott in one sense was free from former trouble, but he was no longer his own man.  
Through the extension of credit, Garriott’s success became interlocked with the interests 
of St. Louis commission merchants.  After exhausting themselves with unruly captains 




With this acquisition, all components of the milling operations were coordinated.  For 
a brief period, the Fayaway provided a stable source of transportation for upriver wheat 
purchases.  Throughout the fall of 1848, Garriott employed Isaac Fulkers on as his boat 
captain and purchasing clerk.  Fulkerson traversed the rivers between St. Louis, St. 
Charles, and the wheat fields of western Missouri.
5
  By June 1849, however, Fulkerson 
left command of the Fayaway, and Garriott replaced him with John Orrick.
6
  Orrick had 
spent his earlier years as a clerk and partner for mercantile firms in Pennsylvania and 
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  With the addition of Orrick, the operations strategy changed.  While the 
Fayaway eliminated the need to contract with boat captains for deliveries of upriver 
wheat, she also guaranteed a steady source of cargo space for downriver shipments from 
St. Charles.  Prior to purchasing the Fayaway, a significant factor for purchasing wheat 
above St. Charles was to ensure that a boat would stop at the levee, unload freight, and 
free up space for flour shipments to St. Louis.  After buying the Fayaway, upriver 
purchases no longer became vital.  Once Orrick joined the operations , the Fayaway 
became a true packet boat.  She received wheat shipments from St. Louis and brought 
them to St. Charles.  Although the St. Louis wheat prices were higher than markets on the 
Missouri River, the alleviation of transportation costs and the aggravation of dealing with 
boat captains appeared to be worth the extra expense.  In addition, the Fayaway provided 
revenue by carrying local freight between the two levees.   
Running a packet boat created some additional complications, such as attending 
shippers’ requests.  For instance, Thomas Bates asked Garriott to “do me the favor to see 
that the bungs are tost [sic] in and the small holes by the sides are stopped.”
8
  Garriott 
was shipping barrels of cider to St. Louis for Bates.  In another instance, Garriott had to 
hold some hogs for D. K. Pittman who requested “do not send the h ogs tomorrow, I fear 
they will die of heat, and it will perhaps be cooler in a day or two.”
9
  Owning a steamboat 
was not a glamorous business, but it came with big rewards.  
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The Fayaway’s shipping records indicated extremely brisk sales in wheat and flour.  
The turnover rates appeared to be the primary factor for generating profit.  On each trip to 
St. Louis, Orrick purchased between $500 and $1500 worth of wheat.  He then delivered 
flour to Scott Naylor & Co., who sold the flour in St. Louis, New Orleans, or Boston in 
lots worth between $600 and $1300.  Estimating the profits of this venture were nearly 
impossible.  The transactions for wheat purchases survive d in two forms.  First, Orrick 
purchased wheat from a variety of commission merchants.  Only the sta tements of one 
merchant house (Morgan and Reid) have survived.   
Second, the record of wheat sales accompanied a city weigher certification.  These 
records were more numerous than other accounting documents and show ed purchases of 
up to 45,000 pounds of wheat (figure 28).  Unfortunately, the weigher certifications did 
not always list prices paid for the wheat or the associated commission attached by the 
purchaser.  As a result, there is no way of tallying exact expenses of wheat purchases 
made under Orrick’s command.  One certainty, however, is that the decision to purchase 
wheat from the St. Louis market took the mill out of the cash barter system  and gave it 
access to a sufficient economy of scale needed from the beginning .  Credit still played a 
role in transactions, however, but loans were of a much shorter duration and were not 
paid in mill products.
10
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Fig. 28.  City Weigher Certificate from St. Louis with hand written calculation for the 
price paid for wheat (GWGP).  This receipt shows the purchase of 45,070 pounds wheat. 
The actual price should have been $488.26. Most weigher certificates did not contain 
similar hand written calculations.   
 
 Although credit still comprised much of the mill operations, the Fayaway provided a 
more efficient way of managing it.  Writing from St. Louis, Orrick reminded Garriott that 
by coordinating wheat purchases with flour sales they could obtain and manage the credit 
needed to stay in business.  In his letter, Orrick related having made several large 
purchases of wheat but stated that a number of payments were soon due.  He had no 
doubt that St. Charles flour would command a high price certain to meet these debts, but 
“every effort must be made to bring [the flour] out on Saturday.”
11
  By ensuring 
commission merchants that their loans would be paid quickly, Orrick believed that “we 
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shall get credit here that will be equal to cash capital.”
12
  The turnover rate required  
securing a reputation of both quality and solvency.  For example, one commission 
merchant in St. Louis told Garriott that “I shall have no difficulty in buying what wheat 
you want at three days credit, but cannot on a week, you are aware, that all sales of wheat 
flour are made for cash.”
13
   
 Orrick’s faith in focusing attention on the St. Louis market was quickly proven to be a 
wise decision.  Throughout the summer of 1849, Garriott’s commission merchants for 
flour sales reported cash profits in his favor.  In their letters, Scott Naylor & Co. 
continually reported rising wheat prices and dropping flour price s in St. Louis.  Although 
these conditions should have exerted a negative impact on Garriott’s business, owning a 
steamboat provided the necessary flexibility to cope with down trends in the market.  At 
times when flour sales were slow, Naylor & Co. arranged to have Orrick tie up alongside 
other boats at the St. Louis levee.  The Fayaway’s flour cargo was then transferred 
directly to the other boat.  Occasionally, the Fayaway made several trips over the course 
of two or three days transferring her cargo to a single boat.  While onboard the receiving 
boat, Naylor & Co. accepted bids for St. Charles flour.  Whatever amount of cargo 
remained on the boat was sent to New Orleans, Boston, or back up the Missouri River.  
By coordinating flour sales in this way, Nay lor & Co. avoided additional charges for 
storage and drayage, and guaranteed that the mill’s stock was in constant circulation 
throughout several markets.   












Orrick and Garriott safeguarded against a glut of St. Charles flour by synchronizing 
wheat flowing into the mill with flour demand in St. Louis.  As soon as prices dipped for 
even a single day the boat was on hand to carry back “all the wheat [in St. Louis] that the 
Fayaway can swim under.”
14
  The profits generated through these efforts were evident in 
the periodic audits of Garriott’s account.  Naylor & Co. showed several cash returns 
netting about $5,000 each even during times when they claimed the flour market was 
slow.
15
  In addition, Naylor & Co. paid off drafts held in Garriott’s name.  It appeared, 
then, that the interests of both Garriott and Naylor & Co. were on an upswing. 
 The relationship between Garriott and his commission merchants reflected the 
growing attraction of the St. Louis market.  Prior to the Fayaway, Naylor & Co. offered 
little advice to Garriott.  The Fayaway, however, dramatically altered this relationship.  
Naylor & Co. not only recognized the financial interests of Garriott as their client, but 
they eventually came to see Garriott as an investment.   
Throughout the summer of 1849, wheat farmers above St. Charles asked Garriott 
whether he planned to send the Fayaway to collect their wheat.  Even with high wheat 
prices in St. Louis both Naylor & Co. and Orrick urged Garriott to focus on St. Louis.  
Orrick recommended that Garriott loosen his quality standards and accept lower grades of 
wheat.  Naylor & Co. also found it necessary to keep Garriott’s attention focused in St. 
Louis.  In one instance, Garriott complained that Naylor & Co.’s reports of inactivity in 
the St. Louis flour market were inaccurate.  Business reports coming back from St. Louis 
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had apparently convinced Garriott that he was not receiving the highest possible price for 
his shipments.  Naylor & Co. assured Garriott the “we do not wonder that you notice the 
discrepancy between our letters, and the market reports.  For the last eight days the 
reporters have not known much more about the flour market here than if they were in 
Greenland.  It has been the policy of nearly all the dealers to keep them in the dark, and 
keep the rates up here.”
16
  Naylor & Co. continued to say that the business reports were 
frequently wrong during periods of inactivity because  
no one [was] under any obligation to state the facts to the reporters, and some men 
would as soon tell them lies as truth.  When everything is moving on quiet, and 
smooth, and even, and nobody interested to mislead, the market reports approximate 
the truth, but in such times as we have had for the past three weeks the newspapers 
are the wrong place to go for the real facts.”
17
   
 
Naylor & Co.’s letter sought to appease Garriott and maintain his trust in their judgment.  
Their strategy thus far had been netting cash profits for themselves and Garriott.  Even 
with cash rewards from the new business plan, Garriott seemed dissa tisfied.   
At one point, he apparently complained that Naylor & Co. were too conservative with 
their cash advances for wheat purchases.  Their response to this claim demonstrated the 
ties between their interests and Garriott’s.  Naylor & Co. assured Garrio tt that their 
advances on his flour shipments were as liberal as they could afford.  They further 
commented that “you seem to think that we advance sparingly on you r flour.  We hope 
and believe, that it will net something more than we advanced, but it is not certain to, 
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and, everything considered, you cannot but feel that we ought not to go beyond absolute 
certainty” [emphasis in original].
18
   
Naylor & Co. sought to maximize returns from the St. Charles Mill.  While Garriott 
controlled the speed of production, Naylor & Co. increasingly controlled the cash flow.  
By keeping Garriott in the cash market of St. Louis, Naylor & Co.’s position became 
increasingly influential in the milling operation.  
 By removing him self largely from the cash barter system of the Missouri Valley, 
Garriott’s dependency on cash became more severe.  He no longer operate d in a manner 
similar to his predecessors, such as James Lackland, whose purchases of wheat rarely 
required the exchange of hard currency.  For these individuals, the c ash obtained from 
sales in St. Louis was likely seen as a windfall.  For Garriott , it became necessary to 
tether all his operations to both St. Louis and Naylor & Co.  The wheat purchases were 
no longer based on the availability of Missouri River transportation, but on the degree to 
which Naylor & Co. gambled on flour futures.  Garriott was now an investment 
dependent upon the activity of markets in St. Louis, New Orleans, and Boston.  Unlike 
local farmers, he could not pay St. Louis merchants for wheat purchases directly with 
flour.  The mill’s products could not simply circulate debt, but had to produce hard 
currency for every dollar spent on wheat.   
 As the process of Garriott’s transformation from client to investment unfolded, 
Naylor & Co. became involved in new aspects of the mill.  At one point, they advised 
Garriott to purchase new barrels for shipping flour saying “we notice with regret that 









some of the barrels of ‘St. Charles’ flour are badly stained – weather beaten – old.  These 
barrels we think you had much better sell to the apple men, but if you use them at all, put 
the ‘Mo River Mills’ flour in them ” [emphasis in original].
19
  A few weeks later Garriott 
heeded their advice by selling some barrels to a local orchard and by putting the lower -
grade middling flour into some barrels.
20
  Naylor & Co. offered other unsolicited advice 
about John Orrick’s purchasing habits.  Responding to Orrick’s earlier advice about 
loosening quality standards at the mill, Naylor & Co. informed Garriott that  
 
Captain Orrick is probably doing as well for you as anyone could… you ought to be 
specially and particularly careful not to get any second rate wheat into the “St. 
Charles.” 
    You had better pay a man $10.00 per day, to assort your mixed wheat – (i.e.) where 
each sack is of one kind than to get it indiscriminately….  





 Naylor & Co.’s fears over the damage to St. Charles Mill quality resulted from a need 
to protect their investment.  The ease of operations made possible by the Fayaway came 
at a price besides the debt incurred from its purchase.  Garriott released himself from the 
whims of ornery boat captains and the instability of Missouri River shipping, but he now 
gave up control to the captains of capital in St. Louis.  
These were common concerns for firms whose investment weighed heavily on the 
specialized knowledge of country millers.  For instance, the Philadelphia miller William 
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Crammond, received similar advice early in his career when his British partner wrote, “I 
doubt not you will engage a person to purchase your grain who is a perfect judge of the 
article, as some Houses object to give their orders to general [word unclear] because they 
do not perfectly understand the quality” [emphasis in original].
22
 
A miller’s reputation was not taken lightly.  Cathy Matson noted fears of disreputable 
practices among millers in New York during the late seventeenth century.  Wheat prices 
in New York’s countryside fluctuated widely.  Part of this fluctuation was because 
country farmers often heard city wheat prices through regional informants.  City millers 
felt neighboring farmers dishonestly raised their prices and frequently searched for 
supplies in New Jersey or Connecticu t.  Tensions on both sides created heated 
competition and hostilities among millers.  The high wheat prices and competitive flour 
market often nudged millers to act unscrupulously.  Because a region’s reputation was 
paramount, city millers kept close watch over their rivals.  Matson related one incident in 
1715 when two merchants accused another of discrediting New Yorkers by shipping half -
barrels of flour to Barbados.  The flour was mixed with substantial amounts of foreign 
matter and represented a real threat to New York’s flour reputation.
23
  Other incidents 
like this continued to tarnish New York’s flour brands until the city’s merchants gathered 
in 1750 to call for an end to dishonest practices.  Matson quoted prominent exporter 
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William Alexander :  
the Great frauds Committed in the manufacturing [of flour] and the great necessity 
there is of some remedy being applied.  …about seventy of the merchants of this City 
petitioned the Assembly to the same purpose, and the next day attended the house 
with above thirty Evidences of the discredit our flower is in through all the Islands in 
the West Indies and . . . letters by which it clearly appeared that neither the English, 
French, Dutch, Spaniards or even the Negroes would buy a barrel of New York 




The protests led to a 1751 act to regulate quality, weight, brand naming, and to penalize 
fraudulent millers.
25
  Reputation of a miller’s flour, like a good credit rating, was a point 
of both pride and wealth.  
 Throughout the summer and fall of 1849 the Fayaway played an instrumental role in 
generating cash revenues.  The mill’s products arrived in St. Louis without interruption.  
Although the coordinated activities of milling and steamboating made for profitable 
business, the old hobgoblin of debt again haunted Garriott.  When he first purchased the 
Fayaway in the fall of 1848, Naylor & Co. provided an advance capital in actual cash of 
$5,600.
26
  This amount appeared unusually high compared to their other clients as they 
rem inded Garriott that they had “extended accommodations … far beyond what our 
arrangements contemplated.”
27
  In addition, they pointed out instances in which they sold 
flour shipments at lower prices than the advance received by Garriott.  Naylor & Co. 
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informed Garriott that “I find the account has if possible been growing rather than 
otherwise recently – viz. on the last shipment of 165 barrels worth $660 you have drawn 
$1,000.”
28
   
This audit occurred before Orrick joined the operations and was a point at which 
Garriott was still running the Fayaway to upriver locations – buying wheat in the cash 
barter system.  Shortly after the November audit, the Fayaway ran exclusively between 
St. Louis and St. Charles.  This was also a turning point in Garriott and Naylor & Co.’s 
correspondence.  As cash proceeds were shown in future audits, Naylor & Co. increased 
control over the pace of mill production (i.e., through conservative or liberal cash 
advances).  Although Garriott’s total debt amounted to over $16,000 to Naylor & Co. by 
June 1849, their correspondence suggested shrinking debt.  They were paying off drafts 
and sending cash back to St. Charles.  Garriott, however, was still indebted to several 
other individuals who applied pressure just as the mill began turning profits.  One of the 
more virulent protests came from E. D. Smith who wrote Garriott in June 1849 
demanding payment on a draft note.  Smith bluntly told Garriott that “your honor is at 
stake, and I hope you value yourself at more than $850.”
29
  Garriott had several other 
creditors who were all as equally irate as Smith.
30
 
 None of Garriott’s creditors exerted a greater impact on the mill’s operations than 
John Atkinson.  In November 1849, Atkinson sued Garriott, John McDonald, and Charles 





 E. D. Smith to George W. Garriott, 12 June 1849, GWGP.  
 
30







Cole to protest a leasing agreement the three had entered.  Garriott had subleased a 
portion of the mill and its property to McDonald and Cole.  In the St. Charles 
Chronotype, McDonald and Cole advertised: 
We, the undersigned, take this mode of informing the public, that we have leased the 
St. Charles steam Flouring Mill of George W. Garriott, and have bought the steamer 
Fayaway, and intend running the same.  We also state that we will pay the highest 




Garriott, however, never obtained permission from John Atkinson to sublease the mill.   
 By early 1851, the St. Charles Circuit Court ruled in Atkinson’s favor.  The resulting 
actions transferred ownership of the mill back to him, while McDonald and Cole took 
control of the Fayaway.
32
 Garriott’s fate, unfortunately, remained unclear.  His name 
never appeared on the 1840 or 1850 census records for St. Charles County.  His tenure 
there appeared confined to the interval between official census records.  The anonym ous 
writers of the St. Charles County history mentioned Garriott only once, saying simply 
that he was one of the many residents who left for the lure of western gold.
33
  
 In the winter of 1850, Atkinson placed advertisements seeking to purchase wheat 
from county farmers.
34
 McDonald and Cole also advertised for the Fayaway.
35
  
Dissolving joint ownership of the mill and the Fayaway, however, altered the nature of 
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St. Charles steamboat service.  McDonald and Cole’s papers showed a brief period in 
which they operated the Fayaway in the St. Louis wheat/flour trade.  By November 1850, 
however, they dissolved their partnership and sold the Fayaway to R. M. Barclay who ran 
her exclusively between St. Charles and Jefferson City (125 miles (201 kilometers) up the 
Missouri River, see appendix D).
36
  Orrick’s steamboating career also ended at this time.  
He, however, remained in the wheat/flour business by entering a partnership with St. 
Charles resident Louis Yosti.  Orrick and Yosti eventually served on the board of 
commissioners for the North Missouri Railroad and were instrumental in securing St. 
Charles as a stop on the railroad (figure 29).
37
   
 
Fig. 29. A. Ruger, St. Charles, Pen Picture of St. Charles and the Little Village of 
Brotherton, 1869.  (John J. Buse Jr. Collection, folder 174, Western Historical 
Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia.)  The North Missouri 
Railroad Bridge spans the river on the right.  
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 The brief period of coordination between milling and steamboating in St. Charles 
underscored three essential elements in the frontier economy.  First, the agricultural 
wheat market functioned in a cash-only environment in St. Louis but in a cash-barter 
environment along the Missouri River.  Initially, the Fayaway linked upriver wheat with 
the St. Louis flour market, but it soon became more advantageous to operate in the St. 
Louis trade for both purchases and sales.  The duality between St. Louis and upriver 
markets, therefore, forced a geographical specialization of the mill’s major activities.   
 The specialization, however, was impossible without access to transportation 
infrastructure.  To function in the cash-only market, shipments of wheat and flour had to 
occur at a predictable rate.  The transportation network of the Missouri Valley, as a  
whole, focused increasingly on the movement of goods between St. Louis and the 
western edge of the state.  This made intermediate stops less significant and directed 
transportation to the cash markets.  The shift in strategy from making upriver wheat 
purchases to buying wheat in St. Lou is was Orrick’s way of following suit with the rest 
of the Missouri.  It also allowed synchronization between mill input and the econom y of 
scale necessary to profit from provision output.  All the events leading up to the purchase 
of the Fayaway indicated an increasing shortage of cargo space for St. Charles products.  
With its own source of transportation, however, the St. Charles Mill took advantage of its 
proximity to St. Louis.  As Orrick knew, closeness to St. Louis meant a speedy transition 
from purchased wheat to saleable flour.  The Fayaway made all this possible, but 
required capital that could not be obtained from local farmers.  The only individuals with 







was not in hopes of receiving goods for their farm and family, but for cash.  At this point, 
then, the two markets created the need for transportation, and then transportation created 
the need for cash.  
 Although credit always played an important role in the western economy, its meaning 
was transformed.  In the cash-barter system credit served as an equalizer for transactions 
in that wheat was sold for the cash equivalent in other goods.  Once credit could no 
longer be paid in alternate products, all goods were expected to bring actual cash.  This 
split the flour business into separate operations (purchasing and selling) that were 
independent but demanded coordination.  The linkage between these two separate 
businesses was transportation.  In an intermediary location like St. Charles, however, the 
link could only be established through indebtedness to individuals in St. Louis.  This 
revealed the major transformation in the credit system .  Whereas Garriott’s extension of 
credit had previously originated from farmers who had a need for the staples of life over 
specie, the source of credit now flowed from middlemen (i.e. wheat dealers) in St. Louis.  
They could not be satisfied in the same way as farmers.  The mill was now exclusively at 
the mercy of market conditions and could not operate outside them.  The Fayaway’s 
restriction to the route between St. Charles and St. Louis was a glaring indication of the 
movements of goods and, more importantly, cash.   
Garriott’s quest for reliable transportation reflected a larger process of the 
transforming western economy.  Cash was no longer a windfall received from surplus 
staple goods, but was itself a staple.  Trading alliances between Native Americans and 







nineteenth century as an alliance between agriculture and cash.  It was in the transition 
from cash value to actual cash that the West was reshaped, and adjusted to the spreading 
modern world.  Garriott’s ambition linked him to exports, transportation linked him to St. 
Louis, but credit broke it all apart.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since Frederick Jackson Turner’s seminal paper on the frontier, historical studies 
have approached American expansion as both a geographic and cultural phenomenon.
1
  
Defining the frontier simply in geographic terms was difficult with Turner’s logic.  On 
the one hand he provided a starting point in seventeenth-century colonial America for a 
process that was set in motion across the expansive American West.  On the other, his 
definition never provided a way to satisfactorily understand the mechanics of the process.    
Chapter one discussed the work of other scholars who clarified Turner’s process.  
Turner’s frontier hypothesis was part of a greater whole – the spreading of the modern 
world and the formation of a new economy of scale.  Theorists like Karl Marx, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, and Eric Wolf revealed how altering relations of trade and production were 
significant indicators of tensions experienced by people engag ing the modern world.  
Analytical historians Jacob Price, Paul Clemens, John McCusker, Russell Menard, 
Thomas Doerflinger, and Cathy Matson revealed how colonial people manipulated and 
adapted economies of scale on the cusp of the emerging modern world.  Their work 
showed that the process critical to seventeenth-century North American developments 
had discernable traces in nineteenth-century western America.  Geographers Jerome 
Steffen and Joseph Cassagrande defined terminology describing how the modern world 
reshaped settlement.  William Cronon and Kenneth Lewis showed that these terms were 
viable led to clearer understandings for the predicament George Garriott faced in 
shipping.  
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 Chapter two demonstrated how transportation spread across the United States from 
the east coast to the interior west.  In every location where new technology was the 
source of transportation improvement, large capital investments were always required.  
These investments inseparably linked transportation to business.  Although the types of 
transportation improvements shifted through time – from the canal mania of the 1820s to 
the steamboat craze of the 1840s – the reduction in shipping costs and the drawing 
together of markets was a constantly repeated process throughout the decades.  These 
large-scale processes provided the context for replication on the smaller regional level.  
The concept of replication also gave the frontier a temporal aspect that allowed us to 
understand the developments in one particular region as part of a larger, continu ous 
process.  There was no single part of nineteenth-century America that can be studied in 
isolation.  The difficult aspect of seeing the frontier as a process, however, was that this 
view easily leads towards deterministic explanations of the past.  When  one looks at the 
United States on a broad scale, the patterns of colonization appear quite regular and 
determined.  On this broad scale, it seem ed predestined that eastern cities like Boston or 
Philadelphia should develop before western cites like New Orleans or St. Louis.  When 
we looked at the United States on a finer scale, the picture and explanation bec ame more 
complicated.   
The large scale developments occurring across the country created countless 
opportunities for economic development in several regions.  For instance, the activities of 
early St. Louis businessmen demonstrated how they learned to operate in an economy 







magnet for river commerce.   
Chapter three examined the expansion of US transportation and economy on the 
regional level of St. Louis and the Missouri Valley.  During the 1830s, St. Louis became 
the “commercial emporium of the West.”  Businessmen like the Filley brothers and J. R. 
Stanford bridged the gap between the older frontier economy of St. Louis and 
transforming modern one.  They could not easily conduct a cash-only business, but found 
a way to ship western products with cash values in the East.  While transportation 
allowed men like the Filleys and Stanford to coordinate their businesses between the East 
and the West, it had a different impact on smaller markets like St. Charles.  
In St. Charles, the larger process of frontier expansion created restraints on certain 
activities but favored others.  As transportation brought St. Louis closer to the eastern 
markets in the 1830s, the opportunities for St. Charles businessmen were extremely 
broad.  The town’s residents engaged in the growing markets at their le isure with 
relatively little modification to their business.  Men like James Lackland required no 
extra investment to cart a few wagonloads of flour to St. Louis for some extra cash.  
Other men like A. D. Harmon conducted business by land or water and still realized 
profit.  While the growth of transportation to St. Louis initially allowed resident 
merchants to directly engage in the eastern markets, it also restricted that same access to 
the external markets like St. Charles.  The restricted access to cash markets, however, 
was not problematic until cash became the primary method of business transactions.  
Chapter four highlighted the growing primacy of credit and cash in St. Charles 







however, later St. Charles businessmen had a narrower range of opportunities.  The 
increase in steamboats on the river limited George Garriott’s options for transportation, 
ultimately giving him few choices other than to become both a flour miller and a 
steamboat owner.  St. Charles’s location created an unexpected irony.  Although it was 
the closest Missouri River town to St. Louis, it increasingly became last in line for 
steamboat service.  This position inverted the process of frontier expansion, but was the 
result of how the frontier process reshaped regional markets.  Ultimately, a businessman 
like George Garriott could not operate in the market of St. Louis without reliable river 
transportation.  Similarly, he could not operate without the extension of credit.  The 
major change brought about in the growing economic environment was the acceptable 
sources of credit.  To procure transportation, Garriott had to disconnect himself from his 
primary source of credit – his customers.  As transportation became more unpredictable, 
Garriott had to send increasing amounts of shipments to St. Louis.  This eventually led 
him to discontinue the practice of buying wheat from the farmers who bought flour from 
his mill and dry goods from his store.  He now bought from city dealers who only 
accepted cash.   
Chapter five demonstrated that no predetermined reason existed for Garriott’s 
business failures.  The explanations were found in his business choices that opened him 
to the mercy of his creditors.  The fact that he was forced into a cash-only market on the 
purchasing end of his business certainly has strong links to the national economic 
expansion.  The choices he made from that point forward, however, were entirely a 







partnerships forged, there is no telling how his business would have impacted the local 
St. Charles economy, or what lasting effects might still be seen today.   
 The value of examining the frontier process in the light of decreasing scales ha d a 
number of positive effects.  First, it provided an understanding for the links between 
transportation and capital investment.  On the large scale, the US economy appeared to 
spread from east to west at a raid and predictable rate.  It also provide d a context to 
understand how early western businessmen mitigate d the different environments of the 
east coast and the western interior.  
 Second, by looking at the frontier process on the regional level, the context of large-
scale expansion became less-deterministic.  The national changes allowed individuals on 
the fringe of expansion to capitalize on opportunities afforded by a growing economy.  
While people like James Lackland remained on the fringe, cash was less essential and 
could be used as a supplement to other forms of labor exchange.  
 Third, by looking at the finest scale, that of individual businessmen, the frontier 
process lost any degree of determinism.  Although the econom ic environment selected 
certain types of activities (like water transportation), the ultimate decisions were still 
individualistic in nature.  People, like John Orrick, who appeared to grasp the favored 
options for the new environment flourished, while others did not.   
The developments affecting St. Charles residents were similar to those of earlier 
times and places.  In many ways, theirs was the story of ordinary people living ordinary 
lives.  As it stands today, we have yet to record, or even quantify, the tens of thousands of 







our modern world, however, is not its degree of ordinariness but its rarity of telling.  

















        
 1846-47 1846-47 1846-47 1846-47 1846-47 1846-47 1847 
        
Jan. 15  22   8   8   3   9     5  4    7   0  15   5 11  
Feb. 33  15 24  16 42   8  31  8    1   1  21   6 10 
Mar.  25  48 26  28 40  85 36  41 10  14  21  13 3 
April 27  77 35  41 44  91 55  74 20  32  14  12 1 
May 59  93 65  61 80  106 115  128 43  63  10  20 19 
June 36  49 52  37 51  60 98  91 47  48  11  13 8 
July 23  67 30  41 32  58 60  81 32  45  16  19 19 
Aug. 32  24 44   37 32  41 56  51 29  32  18  24 10 
Sept. 30  28 37  30 15  45 46  57 27  23  16  28 18 
Oct. 32  22 48  67 41  57 61  80 18  31  37  34 18 
Nov. 34  32 24  42 30  60 56  69 14  16  27  18 13 
Dec. 49  25 27  22 36  38 44  33   8   9  26  12 16 
        
Total 395  502 420  430 446  658 663  717 256  314 232  201     146 
1845 250 406 298 547 249 167 na 
 
Source: Western Journal 2 (Feb. 1848) 135. 
*Cairo was listed separately for the 1847 Illinois monthly totals.  It was not clear whether 









Table A2. Arrivals and Tonnage of Watercraft Each Month at St. Louis 1846–1847 
 
 1846  1847 
 steamboats tonnage* 




keel & flat 
boats  
        
Jan. 50 8,917 6  64   12,312 27 
Feb. 152 26,111 35  67   19,550 24 
Mar. 158 31,850 22  231   48,804 81 
April 158 49,334 44  119   181,536 192 
May 162 78,124 68  na na na 
June 195 64,043 38  245   56,537 30 
July 193 46,554 68  351   75,085 26 
Aug. 211 37,553 75  238   42,408 74 
Sept. 171 28,331 72  242   41,229 20 
Oct. 237 37,558 162  341   56,038 35 
Nov. 185 31,346 171  297   46,731 60 
Dec. 190 32,393 120  na na na 





2,412 577,824 881 
 





2,062 472,114 881 
 
2,195 580,230 569 
 
Source: Western Journal, 1 (Jan. 1848), 55.  
*Tonnage represents steamboats. 
†
The Western Journal did not explain the meaning of reported totals.  
‡













Table A3. Arrival of Steamboats to St. Louis from the Missouri River 
 
 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 
             
Jan. na 1 2 0 0 1 2 4 2 0 0 0 
Feb. na 0 6 0 3 1 6 1 0 1 4 5 
Mar. na 10 14 12 19 0 25 10 11 18 13 44 
April na 12 18 22 25 20 36 26 25 46 36 71 
May na 20 25 28 36 27 36 43 37 45 48 55 
June na 21 24 24 25 26 30 40 39 53 31 43 
July na 17 16 15 16 29 23 30 32 36 36 21 
Aug. na 7 7 10 17 27 25 23 23 34 38 41 
Sept. na 7 9 12 16 22 20 20 23 26 45 44 
Oct. na 9 13 12 12 13 28 18 18 25 40 47 
Nov. na 7 9 10 7 10 23 17 14 19 30 26 
Dec. na 2 1 3 0 7 2 1 6 5 8 10 
             
Total 93 113 144 148 176 183 256 233 230 308 329 407 
 
Source: James Sterling Pope, “A History of Steamboating on the Lower Missouri 1838 –
1849, Saint Louis to Counc il Bluffs, Iowa Territory,” (Ph. D. diss. Saint Louis 
University, 1984), appendix B, 187.  
Note: Pope compiled his figures from the St. Louis newspapers: Missouri Republican, 


































      
Adventure  1 49 50 49.5 49.5 
Antelope  3 132 210 171 513 
Ashley  2 na 140 140 280 
Astoria  13 na 150 150 1,950 
Belle of 
Missouri 2 na 160 160 320 
Dart 15 na 125 125 1,875 
Glasgow  1 na 249 249 249 
Howard  11 122 122 122 1,342 
Kansas  10 na 112 112 1,120 
Little Red  4 201 223 223 892 
London  3 na 160 160 480 
Naples  1 na 100 100 100 
Pirate  11 137 128 132.5 1,457.5 
Platte  8 na 160 160 1,280 
Relief 1 na 75 75 75 
Saint Peters  17 na 119 119 2,023 
Susquehanna  1 na 138 138 138 
Willmington  4 206 206 206 824 














Sources: *Lawrence E. Giffen, Walks in Water: The Impact of Steamboating on the 
Lower Missouri River (Jefferson City, Mo., 2001), table 5-3, 66; 
†
Pope, “A History of 
Steamboating on the Lower Missouri,” tables 1, 23 ; 
‡
Western Boatmen (St. Louis) 21 Jan. 
1839. 




























       
Aerial 1 na 100 na 100 100 
Albany  1 na 158 na 158 158 
Antelope  1 132 210 na 171 171 
Bedford  4 83 105 na 94 376 
Bowling 
Green  10 na 144 148 146 1,460 
Corsican  1 na 224 na 224 224 
Euphrasie  9 na 161 na 161 1,449 
Fayette  1 na 112 na 112 112 
Flora  2 na 119 na 119 238 
Fulton  1 na 122 122 122 122 
General 
Brady  2 na 178 na 178 356 
General 
Leavenworth  8 na 160 na 160 1,280 
Georgia  1 na 135 na 135 135 
Glaucus  2 na 191 na 191 382 
Gloster  2 na 128 na 128 256 
Harry 
Tompkins  1 na 81 na 81 81 
Hugh L. 
White  1 na 230 na 230 230 
Leander  2 na 138 na 138 276 
Little Red  6 201 223 na 212 1,272 
Mail 1 na 148 na 148 148 






























       
Naomi 3 164 184 165 171.34 514.02 
Osceola  4 na 94 na 94 376 
Pensacola  1 na 140 na 140 140 
Platte  7 na 160 na 160 1,120 
Pocahontas  2 na 250 na 250 500 
Preemption  4 na 180 na 180 720 
Rhine  16 na 118 na 118 1,888 
Rienzi 2 na 141 na 141 282 
Robert Emmet 1 na 104 na 104 104 
Salem  2 na 106 na 106 212 
Shawnee  16 na 177 na 177 2,832 
Thames  19 na 136 na 136 2,584 
Tiber  1 na 207 na 207 207 
Wilmington  1 na 206 na 206 206 
Worden Pope  3 na 180 na 180 540 
















Source: *Lawrence E. Giffen, Walks in Water, table 6-2, 83; 
†
Pope, “A History of 
Steamboating on the Lower Missouri,” tables 5, 48; 
‡
Western Boatmen (St. Louis) 13 Jan. 
1841; 
§
Frederick Way Jr., Way’s Packet Directory  (Athens, OH, 1994).  
Note: Pope compiled his figures from the St. Louis newspapers: Missouri Republican, 
New Era, and Evening Gazette. Because Way listed steamboats alphabetically, reference 



































        
Alexander 
Hamilton  3 na 261;  213 212 212 249.5 748.5 
Algoma  2 229;375 209; 285 209 200 251.17 502.34 
Alton  2 na 344; 344 344 344 344 688 
Amaranth  6 na 290; 234 165 330 254.75 1,528.5 
Amelia  22 na 152; 152 151 150 151.25 3,327.5 
Bertrand  12 148 146;  146 145 na 146.25 1,755 
Boreas No.3 3 na 249; 249 264 na 254 762 
Cora  13 na 159 144 144 149 1,937 
Dolphin  1 na 125;  90 99 na 105 105 
Duroc  1 na 220 220 na 220 220 
Eliza Stewart 7 na 170 169 na 169.5 1,186.5 
Fayaway  1 na 102 na 102 102 102 
Haydee 13 na 147; 145 144 na 145.34 1,889.42 
Highland 
Mary  6 na 159 158 159 158.6 951.6 
John J. 
Hardin  1 na na na na 0 0 
Julia  19 na 234 234 na 234 4,446 
Kansas  9 na 276 276 na 276 2,484 
Kit Carson  19 na 280 280 na 280 5,320 
Lake of the 
Woods  14 na 86 86 86 86 1,204 
Light Foot 3 na 145 145 na 145 435 
Little Mo. 1 na 198 198 na 198 198 
Mandan  13 na na 204 204 204 2,652 































        
Mary  1 na 280 276 276 277.34 277.34 
Mary Blane  8 na na 181 na 181 1,448 
Mustang  8 na 129 128 128 128.34 1,026.72 
Plough Boy  2 na na 248 248 248 496 
Revenue 
Cutter  na na 101 na na 101 na 
Rowena  20 225 220; 250 230 230 231 4,620 
Sacramento  1 na 230 221 na 225.5 225.5 
St. Joseph  14 na 218 217 220 218.34 3,056.76 
St. Croix  12 na 159; 180 158 150 161.75 1,941 
St. Louis Oak 4 na 109; 108 108 100 106.25 425 
Tamerlane  13 na na 132 125 128.5 1,670.5 
War Eagle  2 na na 155 na 155 310 
Whirlwind  11 na 225 226 na 225.5 2,480.5 
Wyandotte  9 na 315 na 314 314.5 2,830.5 
        
Total boats 
(36 boats) 
286 na na na na 6,904.4 55,050.2 
 
Source: *Lawrence E. Giffen, Walks in Water (Jefferson City, Mo., 2001), table 7-3, 108; 
†
Pope, “A History of Steamboating on the Lower Missouri,” tables 5, 48; 
‡
Western 
Boatmen (St. Louis) 13 Jan. 1841; 
§
Frederick Way Jr., Way’s Packet Directory  (Athens, 
OH, 1994); **Western Journal (Jan. 1849). 
Note: Cells with two tonnage figures represented conflicting measurements reports.  
Totals excluded Revenue Cutter because it was unknown how many trips she made in 
1848.  Pope compiled his figures from the St. Louis newspapers: Missouri Republican, 
New Era, and Evening Gazette.  Because Way listed steamboats alphabetically, reference 
to page numbers were not provided here.  
Appendix B.  Missouri population maps from 1810 through 1860. Showing the growth 
and delineation of county borders, along with population statistics of Mississippi and 
Missouri river counties.  
 
Map B1. Territory of Missouri in 1810 showing county lines, and selected river towns.  
United States Census data is unavailable. Abbreviations for the bottom three counties 







Map B2. Territory of Missouri in 1820, showing county lines, selected river towns, 






Map B3. State of Missouri in 1830, showing county lines, selected river towns, 






Map B4. State of Missouri in 1840, showing county lines, selected river towns,  







Map B5. State of Missouri in 1850, showing county lines, selected river towns, 







Map B6. State of Missouri in 1860, showing county lines,  selected river towns, 
population tables from the Seventh United States Census.  
Appendix C.  Condensed typescript of George C. Sibley’s travel log April–June 1844.  
 
George C. Sibley, Commonplace Book No. 3, George C. Sibley Papers, Missouri 




Table C6. Travel Expenses Transcribed from Sibley (1844:77)  
 
1844 Transcript of Sibley’s Entry  $ 
   
Apr. 13 Passage from St. Charles to St. Louis [stage coach] 
 
 1.50 
Apr. 15 Boots $2.50 - Socks $1.37 1/2¢ - Umbrella 75¢ - Handkerchief 




Apr. 16 Bill at The Planter’s House $2.75 - a Book 87 1/2¢ 
 
 3.62 1/2¢ 
Apr. 20 Boot Buckles: 12 1/2¢ - Shaving Glass 18 3/4¢ 
 
 0.31 1/4¢  
Apr. 24 Passage from St. Louis to W heeling (St. B. Manhattan)* 
 
10.00 
“ Passage from Wheeling to Baltimore (Stage & R.R. carr)* 
 
11.00 





Apr. 27 Clothing &c. Purchased in Baltimore Vest  
Hat $4.50 - Dress Coat $17 - Dress pant $7 - Dress Vests $8 - 
Handkerchiefs $5.50 
Drawers $1.50 - Summer Coats $8 - D. pants $2.50 
3 Shirts $6 - Collar $1.50 - Stockings $1.37 1/2¢ - Bracer $1.75 
Umbrella $4.50 - Knife $2.50 - Spectacles $2.50 - Books $1 









“ Passage to Washington City & porterage (carr) 
 
3.00 








Table C6. –– Continued.  
 
1844 Transcript of Sibley’s Entry  $ 
   
“ Passage to Norfolk (including Carpet Bag $4)  
 
6.00 
May 9 Bill & Expenses. at Norfolk (St. B. Osceola)* 
 
7.00 
May 10 Passage from Norfolk to Baltimore (St. B. Jewess)* 
 
6.00 
“ Passage Baltimore. to Phil & porterage - R.R. Carr 
 
4.50 
May 15 Bills & Expenses. in Philadelphia  
 
2.75 
“ Passage from Phil to New York City: porterage &c.* 
 
3.25 
May 18 Bill & Expenses - Astor House $4.25 - Omnibus &c. $1.00 
 
5.25 
“ Tweed Pants: $5 - Under Shirts $4 - in New York City  
 
9.00 
May 18 Passage from New York City to Albany (St. B. Knickerbocker) 




May 19 Passage Albany to Rochester (Carr) & other Expenses.  
 
9.75 
May 20 Expenses. at Canandaqua (including 87 1/2¢ for razor strap)  
 
2.37 1/2¢ 
“ Passage from Rochester to Buffalo (Carr) 
 
2.25 
“ Expenses at Rochester to Buffalo (Books 87 1/2¢)  
 
2.87 1/2¢ 
May 21 Passage Buffalo to Chicago (St. B. Great Western)* 
 
14.00 
May 27 Expenses at Chicago & on Road to Peru [Illinois]  
 
1.75 
“ Passage from Chicago to Peru (Stage)*  
 
6.00 
May 29 Expenses at Peru 
 
1.00 
May 30 Passage Peru to St. Louis (St. B. Chicago)* 
 
4.00 







Table C6. –– Continued.  
 
1844 Transcript of Sibley’s Entry  $ 
   
“ Lamp $12.50, Socks 50¢, Collars 37 1/2¢ & 25¢  
 
13.62 1/2¢ 
June 4 Passage St. Louis to St. Charles (mail Stage)*  
 
1.50 
   
 Whole Amount 252.06 1/2¢ 
 Add a Book & Map at Buffalo 56 1/2¢ 
 [total expenses]  [252.63] 
   
 Actual expenses of traveling  129.00 
 Necessary purchases (Clothing chiefly)  97.63 
 Expenditures Somewhat Superfluous  
(of this $15 was for a Lamp & a portrait of Henry Clay)  
26.00 
 
Source: George C. Sibley, Commonplace Book No. 3, George C. Sibley Papers, Missouri 




Condensed typescript of George C. Sibley’s travel log April–June 1844.  
 
 
Whig National Convention: 
 
April 12, St Charles: ...preparing to set out for Baltimore to attend the Whig National 
Convention on the 1st day of May [1844] as the Delegate from the First Electoral 
District of Missouri to which I was duly appointed in November last.  
 
Steamboat Manhattan : 
 
Apr. 16, St. Louis: ...the Manhattan set out for wheeling having on board about 40 
delegates from Missouri & Illinois, and many other passengers.  The boat is very 
much crowded.  Before we started there was some parade and speechifying on board, 






Apr. 19, Ohio River: ...the Ohio is not in very good order, and the Manhattan is not a fair 
runner.  She will only rank about third rate.  Capt. King, who is a very young man, is 
attentive and kind and certainly does his best.  There are several Mormons on board, 
men, women, and children, among them are preachers.  Our company is large and 
much mixed, Whigs, Socos [?], Mormons, &c., but we get along very harmoniously.  
Among the passengers, we have Dwarf 24 years old, 37 inches high of perfect form, 
called “General Tom Thumb.”  A man and woman claiming to be his father and 
mother are exhibiting him through the country for money.  At sunrise this morning 
we were about 100 miles below Louisville.  At about midnight we had got through 
the canal and lay at the wharf at Louisville ready to proceed.  Putting out and taking 
in some freight detained the boat about 3 hours, during which time “The Boys” [Whig 
delegates] were pretty noisy and merry. 
 
Apr. 20, above Louisville: ...at 3 o’clock this morning we continued our voyage up the 
Ohio....  Landed at Madison, Ind. at 7 o’clock and lay half an hour....  Madison is a 
very pretty place and appears to a thrifty business town.....  At 10 p.m. we arrived at 
Cincinnati, and laid up for the night, having much freight, principally wheat from 
Illinois to land.  “The Boys” went ashore, visited most of the hotels, singing W hig 
songs and making Whig speeches in all which they were joined most heartily by 
hundreds of the Whigs of Cincinnati – I did not go from the boat.  I was very fearful 
that in their frolic “The Boys” would trench upon the Sabbath [Christian], but I was 
glad to find that such was not the case.  
 
Apr. 21, Cincinnati: ...We left Cincinnati this morning at 10 o’clock.  The boat has but 
little freight on board now, but does not get along any the faster for that.  
 
Apr. 22, Marietta, Ohio: ...At noon arrived at Marietta where we were detained aground 
some two hours or more.  The Ohio is falling and is now shallow in many places.  
 
 
Wheeling to Baltimore by Stage and Railroad : 
 
Apr. 23, Wheeling, Virginia: ...We arrived here at 1 o’clock this morning, took a short 
nap and afterwards a hearty breakfast, and then at 5:30 [a.m.] set out for Cumberland 
(in 7 coaches) on the National Road, 131 miles, stopped an hour at 
Washington....dined just at sunset at Uniontown and then went on all night.  
 
Apr. 25, Cumberland: ...We reached th is place at 7 o’clock this morning, had time to 
wash and take breakfast and then at 8 o’clock, set out on the rail road for Baltimore 
which is 180 miles from Cumberland.  Dined at Harper’s Ferry (rather poor fare) and 
at 6 p.m. reached Baltimore, all safe and sound, though much fatigued, dusty, and 
drowsy...thus have we completed the journey from St. Louis to Baltimore in 8 days 






Steamboat Osceola : 
 
May 5, Washington City: ...visited the office of the American  Colonization Society, and 
paid over to Mr. Lain the Secretary $650 on account of the estate of Thomas Lindsay 
(for transportation of his Negroes to Liberia) for which I took his receipt. [In early 
March 1844, Sibley had accompanied Lindsey’s former slaves to New Orleans.] 
From Mr. Lain I learn that those Negroes arrived at Norfolk from New Orleans on 
last Friday the 3rd of May (they left New Orleans on the 7th of April) and that one of 
the children had died on the passage, which one he knew not.  I suggested to Mr. Lain 
that I would probably go down to Norfolk and see the conditions and dispositions of 
those people; which he said he thought very desirable.  The expense would not be 
much and possibly if there was anything like wavering discouragement or 
dissatisfaction among them, I might be able to remove it.  
 
May 8, Steamboat Osceola: ...at 9 o’clock a.m. the boat left the wharf at Washington 
[D.C.] and proceeded rapidly down the river on her way to Norfolk.  The distance is 
120 miles to the mouth of the Potomac and then 100 miles down the Bay to Norfolk.  
The time of arrival at Norfolk varies according to the wind, tide, and weather, neither 
of which being favorable today.  The captain says we shall hardly make the trip 
before midnight....  At 8 p.m. we entered the Chesapeake Bay....  The boat is quiet 
comfortable, pretty well found, and very well managed.  The passage to Norfolk is $6 
in the best cabin.  The Osceola is a middle sized boat and is reckoned a swift runner.  
At night it became cloudy and dark and the wind pretty high.  Some became “sea 
sick;” and we all soon betook ourselves to our berths as being the most eligible 
position under all the circumstances. 
 
May 9, Norfolk: It was 3 o’clock this morning when the Osceola landed here.... [7 a.m.] I 
then called on Soutter & Belle, agents of the Colonization Society, to enquire for the 
Lindsay Negroes; and afterwards went to see them.  I find them in comfortable 
quarters, all in good health and in fine spirit.  So far from being at all discouraged by 
their long and rough voyage from New Orleans, they are more resolute and 
determined than ever to proceed to Liberia.  They are all at work, that are all able to 
earn wages.  (I desired the agents to keep them employed while here so as at least to 
defray them expenses, and also enjoined on them all to be industrious and economical 
which they promised to do.)  Betsy, the daughter of Jenny about 9 years old, died of 
dysentery the day after they left New Orleans.  Her mother says she died very 
happily, expressing full faith and hope in the Savior...I gave them some advice and 
instructions and again bid them all goodbye....  After supper went on board the 
steamboat Jewess bound for Baltimore, to leave this place tomorrow morning at 4 









fine, but the wind is rising.  This is a larger and better boat than the Osceola.  Not 
many passengers, passage $6 to Baltimore.  Distance 160 mile s, expect to arrive in 
time for the Philadelphia carr [sic]....  The Bay is very rough today, and several of the 
ladies are very seasick.  Among the passengers is a maniac, youth of about 19 years 
of age.  His father, and a physician from Georgia, have him  in charge.  They are 
taking him to the Lunatic Hospital near Philadelphia..... Boxes of strawberries and 
barrels of peas in large quantities are here on passage for Baltimore.  Reached 
Baltimore just in time for the carr, and in 5 minutes, just at dark, was on the way to 
Philadelphia.  Carr crowded and inferior.  
 
Philadelphia to New York City: 
 
May 15, Philadelphia: ...I took leave of my sister and other friends, and crossed the 
[Schuylkill] River at the foot of Walnut Street to the rail road carr, and wa s quickly 
on the way rapidly to New York.  At South Amboy we were shifted from the carr to a 
steamboat (rather a shabby one, the regular packet in repairing they say).  
 
New York City to Albany:   
 
May 17, New York: ...I am tired of this great city, bustling City of “Gotham,” and am 
determined to pursue my journey homeward without any further delay, and have 
arranged to go up to Albany tonight in the steamboat Knickerbocker which leaves 
here this morning at 7 o’clock.  The Astor House, as now kept, is by no means “what 
it is cracked up to be.”  The buildings, plan, and position are all doubtless very well, 
and I dare say the establishment sits very well with those who regard bustle, show, 
and extravagance more than comfort....  I think the Plantation House at  St. Louis far 
better than the Astor House is now, and there are several smaller houses in St. Louis 
far preferable, in my opinion, to either of those - “everyone to his own notion” about 
such things. 
 
May 18, Albany: ...The Knickerbocker is a very fine boat, at least equal in all respects to 
her pretensions.  We landed at Albany this morning at 4 o’clock....  Employed a cab 
to convey me to the railroad depot, where I found a few shabby looking men and 
women, with their luggage, dosing near a dirty stove, w aiting for departure of the carr 
northwardly; which is to take place at 7 o’clock.  I deemed it prudent to keep a sharp 
look out for my baggage, having a good reason to think there are thieves and pick 
pockets about....  Precisely at 7, the train carr  was in motion.  The carrs are 
comfortable and we are not crowded....  Our route took us through, or in sight of, 
many pretty towns and villages: Schenectady, Amsterdam, Little Falls, Utica, Rome, 
Syracuse, Geneva, and Canandaqua, which last named place is 250 miles from 
Albany.  We ran at the rate of about 15 miles an hour nearly the whole way (frequent 
short stops deducted), so that a mere glimpse of the country was all that we could get.  






Steamboat Great Western: 
 
[After visiting relatives in Canandaqua, Sibley took a short railroad trip to Rochester.] 
 
May 20, Rochester: ...tomorrow the Great Western is to leave Buffalo for Chicago, and I 
am so desirous of taking passage in that fine vessel that I must go on in the carr 
today.... [In Buffalo] I secured a berth on board the Great Western, which is to sail for 
Chicago this evening at 4 o’clock.  
 
May 22, steamboat Great Western: ...left Buffalo at 4 o’clock yesterday evening, the boat 
much crowded.  The weather cold and unpleasant, the Lake [Erie] quiet 
rough...arrived at Detroit about midnight, 318 miles from Buffalo.  I enjoyed the Lake 
scenery for an hour or two this evening, from the upper deck - it is extremely grand 
and beautiful.  
 
May 23, Detroit: ...the boat lay here till 9 o’clock this morning.  I availed myself of the 
opportunity to take a morning walk about the city.  It is an interesting and pretty 
place, opposite on the Canada Side is the little town of Sandwich, which does not 
appear to be growing or improving.  The Detroit River here is about as wide as the 
river at St. Charles [ca. 100 yards]....  The scenery along the shores is pretty as seen 
from the boat.  We entered Lake St. Clair at a little after 10 o’clock, and about 1 p.m. 
entered the River St. Clair.  The breaking of a wheel detained us several hours today.  
A little after sundown we passed Fort Gratiot, 75 miles from Detroit, and entered 
Lake Huron.  Along the shore of the river St. Clair (which is about 3/4 mile wide and 
nearly 40 miles long) are several thriving villages on the western or American side.  
The few that are on the British side are strikingly inferior....  Our entrance into Lake 
Huron just after sunset was exceedingly fine.  The current of the river for 3 or 4 
miles, where it pours down from the Lake, is said to run 17 miles an hour, requiring 
great power to stem it.  This power being duly applied, our boat ascended 
majestically, though slowly passing the Fort and a light house, and we were fairly 
through the pass and on the bosom of the Lake before it was quite dark.  
 
May 24, Lake Huron: ...the Lake is rough yet from the wind of last night...[the Lake] is 
very deep, water very blue and clear, abounds with fine fish: salmon, trout, white fish, 
and sturgeon....  We reached Mackinaw Island at half past 6 this evening...at 8 
o’clock we entered Lake Michigan and continued our course all night.  
 
May 25, Lake Michigan: ...the morning boisterous and the Lake rough, and many of our 
female passengers are very seasick.  The fog and mist on the Lake last night impeded 
our progress somewhat.  At 7 o’clock this morning stopped for wood at one of the 
Manitou Islands (about 100 miles from Mackinaw).  The whole of this day was 
stormy, wet, and unpleasant.  The Lake was so rough and so shrouded in fog that we 
could see nothing if we looked out....  There are many emigrants on board from the 





families, wagons, furniture, and nearly all of them are stowed in the “steerage” and  
must have a hard time of it.  Altogether, there are now about 400 souls on board.  
There were 600 when the boat left Buffalo.  The Great Western is one of 19 boats 
now employed by one company, carrying freight and passengers from Buffalo to 
Chicago (both ways) and the intermediate places.  Besides these, there are many sail 
vessels and “propellers” employed in the same way.  The whole distance is from 
Buffalo to Chicago is about 1100 miles and the average trips of this boat are 5 days 
up, and 4 days down.  The Great Western is a large fine well found and well managed 
boat, though I am of opinion, much inferior so far as relates to comfort and speed to 
our largest V class Mississippi Boats, with one exception (the Wisconsin a new boat).  
She is preferable to any other boat now on these Lakes.  The Wisconsin is said to be 
better....  Great quantities of white fish and salmon trout are here taken and salted in 
barrels for transportation.  Whenever the Michigan and Illinois Canal is completed, or 
a paved or railroad established between Chicago and Galena (both of which are in 
contemplation and will doubtless be effected in a few years), then their fish trade will 
take a new direction, and become a very important item of subsistence and luxury 
throughout the great valley of the Mississippi.  The salmon trout weighing from 8 to 
80 pounds (I was offered one weighing 45 pounds for one dollar) inferior to no other 
fish...may be taken fresh packed in ice to St. Louis, New Orleans, etc., at cheap rates 
and this will all soon be realized.   I doubt not.  
 
May 26, Lake Michigan: ...The boat landed at Milwaukee about 1 o’clock this morning 
and put out a number of emigrants and their effects....  At half past 3 o’clock p.m. 
landed at Chicago.  
 
Stage Coach from Galena to Peru:  
 
May 27, Chicago: ...I had made up my mind “pretty much” to go from here to Galena, 
160 miles, and from thence down the Mississippi to St. Louis; howbeit I had also a 
desire to see the country along the Canal Route to Peru and also the Illinois River 
from Peru down.  From Chicago to Peru it is 98 miles, and the line of coaches are said 
to be very good.  Owning to the immense rains, all the roads are reported decidedly 
bad, that to Galena decidedly the worst.  I decided last night however, to take the Peru  
Route, and secured my passage in the mail coach for this morning.....  After breakfast, 
at a little after 8 o’clock, I left Chicago in the stage for Peru.  The stage is quite full 
and very much overloaded with baggage.  It was near sunset before we got to  Juliet 
(40 miles) a very pretty romantic town on the canal and Juliet River.  The country 
thus far is exceedingly beautiful and fertile and rapidly filling up and improving - 
roads very very bad.  Our stop here was only for half an hour, to change horses and 
the mail, and then we proceeded very slowly and roughly, all night.  Of course, saw 
no more of the country, the night being cloudy and dark, till morning; which found us 
moving at a snails pace about 30 miles from Juliet.  We got to Ottoway (a pretty 
thriving place at the mouth of the Fox River and near the canal) at about 10 o’clock, 





pleasant, we had a pleasant drive (in 2 coaches) to Peru (16 miles) where we arrived 
safely, though fatigued.  
 
May 28, Peru, Illinois River: ...We arrived here at 2 o’clock this evening.  The boat that 
we expected to find here was gone and none looked for till tomorrow.  So we must 
submit to stay in this poor place till then.  Our route from  Chicago was along the 
valley of the canal, or in view of it, and at many points presented views of surpassing 
beauty.  The terminus of the canal is at La Salle, a new town on the Illinois River.  
Occupying an elevated and very pretty position about 3 mile s above Peru, La Salle is, 
I think, destined to grow up to considerable importance after the completion of the 
canal.  The immense water power that will there be afforded, must itself, cause the 
town and its vicinity to flourish rapidly and permanently.  A nd for the same reason, 
Peru must decline, as in fact it has already begun to do very evidently.  This point (up 
as far as La Salle) may be considered as the head of navigation of the Illinois River.  





May 29, Peru (270 miles up the Illinois River): ...The steamboat Chicago, Captain Field, 
arrived here at 11 o’clock this morning, and at 12 was on the way back again to St. 
Louis.  Of course, our party all em barked in this boat.   
  It seems proper here, to say what I think is due in relation to the Line of Stage 
Coaches between here Chicago and Peru.  Our trip through was certainly tedious and 
uncomfortable enough, owing however to the bad weather and bad roa ds.  The 
coaches, houses, and drivers – I pronounce good, very good.  The only fault I could in 
conscience find was the enormous load of baggage that our coach governed under 
from Chicago to Ottoway.  At Ottoway, our breakfast was super excellent, and well 
deserves a special notice.  
  We proceeded rapidly [on the Chicago] down the Illinois, stopping only at some 
small towns to exchange mail, and at a little before sunset landed at the beautiful 
town of Peoria (80 miles from Peru, at the lower end of Peoria Lake).  Here we were 
detained till near dark, and then proceeded all night.  
 
May 30, steamboat Chicago: ...At a little after sunrise we landed for an hour at 
Bardstown, 80 miles below Peoria, and about 100 miles from the mouth.  The Illinois 
is now in a very high flood, overflowing its banks and a wide extent of the adjacent 
country.  Farms, and villages even, are completely submerged and all looks like 
destruction and desolation.  
 
May 31, St. Louis: ...We landed here this morning at a little after one o’c lock.  At 
Chicago, I had undertaken, by particular request, to take care of a young girl on the 
journey to St. Louis.  She is from Genesea, New York, and was a passenger from 





The gentleman (I did not learn his name) came no further than Chicago, where he 
requested me to take charge of her, which it was out of my power to refuse.  Her 
name is Emily Treat, sister of Mr. Treat of St. Louis: co-editor of the Reporter, 
attorney at law.  She is about 16 years old, I suppose, and I think a sensible, well 
educated, and deserving young lady.  My first business this morning, as soon as 
people were a stir, was to acquit myself of my duty towards Miss Emily, by finding 
her brother and conducting her to him; which I was able to accomplish in an hour or 
two.... 
  I must make a note here concerning the boat Chicago.  She is small, but very 
decidedly the neatest, best provided, best managed, best running, most comfortable 
boat of her class that I have ever been a passenger in.  Captain Field is a polite, 
gentlemanly, clever fellow; and deserves the support and patronage of the public.   
 
 
 Mail Stage from St. Louis to St. Charles:  
 
June 4, St. Charles: ...at length I have got home again, after an abundance of 52 days.  
Having traveled about 4000 miles, I came up from St. Louis in the mail stage, which 
owing to the badness of the road (especially through the Missouri Bottom, which is 
full of water and swimming in some places) was pretty bu sily employed from 8 
o’clock this morning till after 3 this evening getting up to St. Charles. I find all well at 
home and pretty well to do.... 
 
Appendix D.  Distance to locations in the Missouri Valley by land and water.  
 
Table D1. Road Distances from St. Louis to Independence, Jackson County, Mo. 
 
to Mileage between Mileage from St. Louis 
St. Charles  20 20 
Pittman’s  12 32 
Pond Fort 8 40 
Taylor’s  15 55 
Camp Branch 12 67 
Danville  18 85 
Loutre Lick, Van Bibbler’s  3 88 
McMurtry’s in  
Nine Mile Prairie  7 95 
Grant’s  7 102 
Fulton 12 114 
Columbia  25 139 
Booneton or Leintz’s  12 151 
New Franklin 18 169 
Arrow Rock 12 181 
Smith’s  10 191 
Carthay’s  20 211 
Grand Pass 12 223 
Demoss’  2 225 
Webb’s  6 231 
Lexington 25 256 
Rennick’s  12 268 
Independence 28 296 
 
Source: Alphonso Wetm ore, Gazetteer of the State of Missouri: with a Map of the 
State, from the Office of the Surveyor-General, Including the Latest Additions and 
Surveys, to which is Added and Appendix Containing Frontier Sketches, and 
Illustrations of Indian Character, with a Frontispiece, Engraved on Steel   (New York, 





Table D2. Distances by Water from St. Louis to Fort Leavenworth, Mo.  
 
to Mileage between Mileage from St. Louis.  
Mouth of the Missouri 
River 20 20 
Charbonniere 12 32 
St. Charles  8 40 
Tavern Rock 20 60 
Mount Pleasant 10 70 
Washington 5 75 
Marthasville  5 80 
Newport 5 85 
Pinckney, or Griswold City  10 95 
Loutre  10 105 
Gasconade 10 115 
Portland 10 125 
Smith’s Landing  10 135 
Cote sans Dessein  8 143 
Jefferson City 12 165 
Marion 12 177 
Nashville  12 189 
Rocheport 15 204 
Franklin and Boonville 10 214 
Arrow Rock 15 229 
Glasgow 15 244 
Jefferson 8 252 
Doylestown 12 264 
Mouth of Grand River 10 274 
Caton’s Landing  25 299 






Table D2. –– Continued. 
 
Fine’s Landing  10 314 
Lexington 15 329 
Camden 20 349 
Sibley 12 361 
Richfield 10 371 
Independence  8 379 
Chouteau’s  12 391 
Cantonment Leavenworth  40 431 
 
Source: Wetmore, Gazetteer of the State of Missouri, 270. 
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